

JPRS 79824

8 January 1982

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1644



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

8 January 1982

USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1644

CONTENTS

MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

| | |
|--|---|
| Commander Combat Training: Estimate of the Situation (V. Yarenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 Oct 81)..... | 1 |
| Book Review: Issues of Troop Control (V. Nazarenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Sep 81)..... | 4 |

ARMED FORCES

| | |
|---|----|
| Contents of 'KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL', No 19, 1981 (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 6 |
| Political Indoctrination: Principles of CPSU Nationalities Policy (N. Arisov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 8 |
| Material for Missile Troop, and Artillery Day (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 18 |
| Troop Indoctrination on Universal Military Service (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 24 |
| Troop Indoctrination on Discipline and Duty Performance (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 33 |
| Troop Indoctrination on Combat Traditions and History (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 40 |
| Warrant Officer Training on Party Cadre Policy (V. Korolenko; ZNAMENOSETS, Oct 81)..... | 47 |
| Followup on Complaint About Warrant Officer Training (ZNAMENOSETS, Oct 81)..... | 56 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Action Taken on Warrant Officer's Complaint (ZNAMENOSETS, Oct 81)..... | 58 |
| Party Political Work (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates)..... | 60 |
| Role of Party Collective Discussed, by S. Bystrov | |
| Quality of Political Worker Cadres, by A. Agafonov | |
| Principledness of Communist Discussion Reviewed, by M. Sobolev | |
| AIR FORCES | |
| Party-Political Work in Air Transport Aviation Units (V. Kolchanov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 72 |
| GROUND FORCES | |
| Tactical Missile Described (V. Knyaz'ko; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, Nov 81)..... | 78 |
| NAVAL FORCES | |
| Party-Political Work on a Submarine (V. Tkachev; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 81)..... | 33 |
| STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES | |
| Strategic Rocket Forces: Capabilities Discussed (V. Vishenkov; ZNAMENOSETS, Oct 81)..... | 92 |
| LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS | |
| Signal Troops: Telegrapher Training Described (V. Golyshchikov; ZNAMENOSETS, Oct 81)..... | 97 |
| CIVIL DEFENSE | |
| Combatting Peat Fires Discussed (P. Gorbunov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, Nov 81)..... | 100 |
| CD Course Outlined (VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, Nov. 81)..... | 104 |
| Civil Defense Local Organizational Structures Discussed (VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, Nov 81)..... | 106 |
| Training of Commanders of Non-Military Formations Discussed (V. Shustikov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, Nov 81)..... | 109 |

MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

COMMANDER COMBAT TRAINING: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Col V. Yaremko, candidate of military sciences, docent: "The Estimate of the Situation"]

[Text] It is well known that in the organization of battle much depends on how the commander estimated the situation. Unfortunately, proper attention is not always devoted to this factor on exercises. I should like to read materials on this subject, including those on a theoretical plane, on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Guards Captain V. Sokol
Chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion
Red Banner Belorussian Military District

The specific situation, the mission received, and the availability of time--to put it briefly, the commander's order of work in organizing combat operations depends on these factors each time. One of the decisive factors in attaining success in battle is the commander's ability to make an estimate of the situation quickly and competently.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, when the time for a change in a combat situation was reckoned in hours, and often even in days, the commander often had the opportunity to estimate it during a comparatively long time. He could study each of its elements individually: the enemy, friendly troops, adjacent units, the terrain, time of year and day, and weather.... At times, some of the elements were evaluated several times each. Thus, in accordance with the experience of offensive operations of 1944-1945, a regimental commander was allotted five to seven days to organize the breakthrough of an enemy prepared defense, of which he expended 1-1.5 days on the estimate of the situation alone.

In contemporary battle, the methods for estimating the situation have a qualitatively different nature. Nuclear weapons, the great fire- and striking power of units and subunits, and their high mobility permit changing the relative strengths in men and equipment very rapidly, breaking through the defense, and changing from one type of combat operations to another. The situation now changes much more rapidly. In addition, new means of combat have not only increased the dynamism and intensity of

battle, but also expanded the sphere for its conduct and led to a further increase in the interdependence of elements of the situation and the merging of some of them into a single whole. In this connection, somewhat different methods were required for its estimate.

In particular the commander, in making an estimate of the situation, strives for the combination of its similar elements into bigger components which are evaluated in their close interconnection. The experience of exercises shows that of all the elements of an estimate of the situation, the decisive role belongs to the study of the enemy and the study of friendly troops. They are studied in the dialectical, actually existing interconnection between them and also in the aggregate with space and time. By the way, the latter direction is becoming intensified more and more as the material basis of battle is improved, in connection with which its practical significance is increasing.

In aggregate with space.... Well, why not with terrain or, let us say, with weather conditions? The fact is that space, as an element of the situation, encompasses the entire totality of the environment which furthers or hinders the attainment of success in battle. Terrain, especially open or average broken terrain, is losing its former significance by itself, without interaction with other elements of the environment. Today, thanks to those revolutionary changes which have occurred and are occurring in military affairs, the environment as a whole rather than its elements taken separately is exerting ever greater influence on the nature of troop operations. In other words--space with all its natural and artificially created elements.

The expediency of estimating the situation with aggregated elements is also caused by the fact that contemporary battle is not waged on the ground alone.

The casualty-producing elements of weapons are a weighty argument which justifies the expediency of estimating the situation with aggregated elements, in particular the evaluation of the enemy and friendly troops in the aggregate with space and time. Let us take nuclear weapons. They influence the environment as a whole rather than elements of the environment taken separately. They create vast zones of destruction and contamination of a spatial rather than an area nature.

Consequently, the sphere of operations of troops can be studied completely if they are considered as a single whole. As we have noted, the situation in which a battle is prepared and conducted changes not only in space, but also in time. In any case, the commander is not indifferent to the time which he has available to organize the battle and how it is commensurate with the enemy's operations. In making his decision, he structures his plan and calculations on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of both the enemy's composition and combat capabilities and those of his own troops and with the mandatory consideration of the time and space situation. I will refer to the following example.

On one of the exercises, the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Major K. Bliznyuk conducted battle successfully in the depth of the "enemy's" defense. However, it encountered strong resistance on an intermediate line. The attack began to lose its initial harmony and coordination. The necessity to commit the second echelon became obvious. It was also dictated by the fact that the "enemy" had moved up his reserve from the rear.

Proceeding from the situation which had developed, the officer made the decision to commit the second-echelon company to the battle. Here, he compared the situation of his own reserve and that of the "enemy" in space and in time and established their mutual distance from one another and the time when they could approach, deploy, and move into action. Simultaneously, he planned a number of measures to ensure not only the organized commitment of the reserve, but also to forestall the "enemy." The combined estimate of the situation permitted the battalion commander to continue it successfully without reducing the rate of the attack.

Of course, there are no schemes in the sequence of making an estimate of the situation and there can be none. At the same time, in order to attach a specific and purposeful nature to this process, in each case the commander begins to make an estimate of the situation in the sequence in which the forthcoming battle may begin, be conducted, and end. For example, on the exercises of "Zapad" [West]-81, the regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V. Lepikhov was in the departure area and prepared for the attack. On receiving operational instructions the regimental commander clarified the mission which had been received and gave the necessary instructions to his subordinates, after which he began to make an estimate of the situation. He began with a calculation of the time through the prism of which he evaluated the regiment's capabilities to leave the occupied area in time and arrive at the line for launching the attack.

The regimental commander also examined the actions of his subordinates in the accomplishment of other missions in the same methodological key. He speculatively gamed the battle from its beginning to its end, constructed a model of the battle where he evaluated his own troops first and then, against their background, he evaluated the "enemy" troops. Why did he proceed in this manner? Because he had the time for a detailed estimate of the "enemy" and for comparing his own and enemy forces and capabilities.

And here is another example. The subunit commanded by Major P. Klimov had to assume the defensive under conditions of direct contact with the "enemy." The officer began his estimate of the situation with a calculation of the time and an analysis of the "enemy's" situation, capabilities, and the presumed nature of his operations. This was dictated by the fact that here the initiative and decisive role in the formation and change of the situation belonged to the "enemy."

In short, the experience of exercises shows that the sequence in the estimate of the situation is predetermined each time by the nature of the battle, its start, and development. As a rule, it begins with the calculation of the time and an analysis of the situation and the condition and actions of the side which has the initiative at the given time. As a result, such a sequence gives the process of estimating the situation a specific and creative nature and helps the commander to disclose and consider with great objectivity namely those factors which exert a direct influence on the content of his decision.

6367
CSO: 1801/010

MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

BOOK REVIEW: ISSUES OF TROOP CONTROL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 81 p 2

[Review by Col V. Nazarenko, candidate of military sciences, of book "Upravleniye voyskami v nastuplenii (Po opytu Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny)" [Troop Control in the Attack. (From the Experience of the Great Patriotic War)] by P. Tovstukha and R. Portugal'skiy, Voenizdat, 1981, 222 pages, price 85 kopecks]

[Text] A military-theoretical work by docent Lieutenant General P. Tovstukha and Doctor of Historical Sciences Colonel R. Portugal'skiy, "Troop Control in the Attack," was published by the Military Publishing House of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. It examines the most important problems in the control of troops, analyzes the work experience of commanding generals (commanders), staffs, and other control elements in the preparation of the attack and in the course of it, and discloses the trends and regular laws of the basic directions in the improvement of the control process.

At the contemporary stage of development of the forces and weapons of armed conflict the working out of the scientific principles and disclosure of the essence, content, and special features of the troop control process acquires especially important significance. It is for this very reason that in recent years the field of military studies of control problems has expanded noticeably. In a comparatively short period, the Military Publishing House has published several works devoted to this subject. Among them, we should note, "Osnovy upravleniye voyskami" [Principles of Troop Control] by D. Ivanov, V. Savel'yev, and P. Shemanskiy, "O nauchnykh osnovakh upravleniya voyskami" [On the Scientific Principles of Troop Control] by S. Ivanov, and "Voprosy psikhologii v upravlenii voyskami" [Problems of Psychology in Troop Control] by A. Shramchenko. I should like to express the conviction that the work being reviewed will occupy a worthy place in the series of military scientific literature of recent years, for it analyzes the most important problems of control which arose in the course of the battles, engagements, and operations conducted by Soviet troops in the period of the Great Patriotic War and instructive conclusions are drawn.

On the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, the authors examine in detail the essence, content, and conditions for troop control during the war years and provide an evaluation of the condition of control organs and means. The scientific processing of a tremendous volume of factual material, a significant portion of which is reduced to easily readable tables, permitted drawing the conclusion that the improvement of control organs, systems, and means under contemporary conditions as well as

in the future should proceed along the path of raising the efficiency and flexibility in making decisions and their realization and the skillful coordination of the efforts of diverse forces. Here, it is accurately stressed that the problems of troop control can be solved successfully with consideration not only of the typical features of contemporary operations, but also of those lessons and trends which follow from the inexhaustible experience of the last war.

The book is intended for generals and officers. It is written from materials from the Central Archive of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, a considerable portion of which is published for the first time. The work contains a large number of tables and diagrams. The authors drew on Soviet and foreign military and military-historical literature, captured documents, and recollections of participants in the war. The reader will find answers to many of the questions which interest him and will become acquainted with the evaluation of activity of such outstanding military leaders of the last war as Marshals of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov, K. Rokossovskiy, and I. Konev as well as with the military skill of such commanders as Heroes of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel G. Filippov and Captain V. Massal'skiy.

Of course, in an historical-theoretical work numerous aspects of the problem in the further improvement of troop control are studied with different depths. Debatable propositions are present in it and a number of questions are worked out only in general form. However, for the most part the goal is attained.

The book, "Troop Control in the Attack," is the fruit of the authors' many years of work, the study and generalization of archive materials, and contemporary views. And it can be said with confidence that this work has justified itself. A book has been published which can be used successfully in command, military-science, and military-historical work.

6367

CSO: 1801/010

ARMED FORCES

CONTENTS OF 'KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL', No 19, 1981

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 18 Sep 81) pp 1-2

[Full-text translated articles published in this issue of the JPRS report are indicated with an asterisk (*); excerpted translated article -- with a double asterisk (**)]

| [Text] Contents | Page |
|--|------|
| "The Brightest Democracy on Earth"--Editorial | 3 |
| "Critical Period in the Affairs of Party Organizations" | 9 |
| "On the Road of Peace and Building Communism (On publication of Volume 8 of L. I. Brezhnev's works "Following a Leninist Course")" | 15 |
| *"Triumph of Leninist Principles of Party Nationalities Policy (For Classes in the Officer Marxist-Leninist Training System)"--N. Arisov | 23 |
| OUR CALENDAR | |
| **"Flaming Shield of the Soviet Homeland (Materials for Reports and Discussions on Missile Troops and Artillery)" | 31 |
| FOR A LENINIST WORK STYLE | |
| "Not by Pattern but Innovatively"--Yu. Berdyshev | 37 |
| PROBLEMS OF TRAINING AND MILITARY INDOCTRINATION | |
| *"By Means of Party Influence"--V. Kolchanov | 43 |
| *"With Faith in Man"--V. Tkachev | 48 |
| PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATION -- CENTER OF DAILY IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION ACTIVITY | |
| "Position of the Communist? Always Active!"--V. Medvedev | 55 |

| | |
|--|----|
| "They Are Awaiting a Propagandist in the Company"—V. Babushkin | 61 |
|--|----|

KOMSOMOL AFFAIRS

| | |
|--|----|
| "Not for the Sake of the Mark 'Completed' (Comments on Organization of Leisure Time for Young Servicemen)"—V. Ginzburg | 65 |
|--|----|

POLITICAL INSTRUCTION CLASS GROUP INSTRUCTORS

| | |
|---|----|
| *"Procedure of Performance of Military Service, the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation | 71 |
| *"Discipline and Follow-Through -- Most Important Moral-Fighting Qualities of Soviet Servicemen" | 76 |
| *"Fighting History and Traditions of the Unit (Ship), Combined Unit, District (Fleet)" | 80 |

INTERNATIONAL TOPICS

| | |
|---|----|
| "South Africa: In the Struggle to Eradicate Colonialism and Racism"—A. Ivanov | 84 |
|---|----|

CONSULTATION

| | |
|--|----|
| "Party Report-Election Meeting. How to Prepare for It" | 89 |
|--|----|

IN THE DISTRICTS AND FLEETS

| | |
|--|----|
| "In the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany" -- "Discussing Progress in Pledge Fulfillment by Competition Initiators" -- "Concern for Indoctrination of Cadres" -- "Combat Proficiency of Missile Crewmen Is Increasing" -- "For Excellent Quality and Efficiency of Combat Training" -- "Constant Attention Toward Field Training Exercises" -- "Assembly of Young Political Workers" -- "Examining Problems of Indoctrination of Military Construction Workers" -- "Rally of Excellent Performers in Training" -- "Special Evening Activities" -- "Conference of Warrant Officers" | 92 |
| "Follow-Up to Journal Articles" | 96 |

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1981

3024

CSO: 1801/019

ARMED FORCES

POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: PRINCIPLES OF CPSU NATIONALITIES POLICY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 18 Sep 81) pp 23-30

[Article by Doctor of Legal Sciences Prof Col N. Arisov: "Triumph of Leninist Principles of Party Nationalities Policy"]

[Text] The 26th CPSU Congress noted among the outstanding achievements of the society of developed socialism the steadily strengthening fraternal friendship among all the peoples of our multinational homeland. "The unity of Soviet nations is stronger today than ever before. This of course does not mean," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the congress, "that all matters lying within the sphere of ethnic relations have been resolved. The dynamics of development of such a large multinational state as ours engenders many problems which require sensitive attention by the party" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 56). Strict observance of Leninist principles of the nationalities policy is a guarantee of successful resolution of these problems.

* * *

An unbroken chain of tribal, racial and national conflicts runs through the entire history of mankind, from remote antiquity to the present day. Such conflicts have time and again plunged countries and peoples into an abyss of calamities and sufferings and have steeped entire continents in blood. The finest minds have sought for millennia to find a solution to this situation but have come up against a solid wall of exploiter domination, which engenders and supports national oppression.

Marxism-Leninism showed a concrete way to eliminate this oppression. Its point of departure in resolving the nationalities question is that the liberation of oppressed and exploited nations, elimination of ethnic inequality and establishment of friendship and brotherhood among all peoples is a part of the overall program

It is recommended that this article, as well as the article "Army of Friendship and Brotherhood of Peoples," published in issue No 12 of this journal, be used in officer Marxist-Leninist training groups when studying the topic "Leninist principles of party nationalities policy. Friendship of peoples -- source of the strength and might of the USSR and most important foundation for strengthening the Armed Forces and multinational military collectives."

of socialist revolution. Innovatively developing the ideas of the founders of scientific communism, V. I. Lenin created an integral and balanced doctrine on the nationalities question and elaborated the scientific principles of party nationalities policy.

The clear-cut, high-principled position taken by the Communist Party on the nationalities question and its many years of struggle for the freedom and equality of peoples constituted one of the decisive conditions for the international unity of Russia's multinational toiler masses. The party succeeded in creating a united front of revolutionary struggle against Czarism, and subsequently for the victory of the socialist revolution. The Victory of the Great October Revolution and establishment of Soviet rule made it possible rapidly to include within historical creative and productive activity the broadest strata of working people of all nationalities and ethnic groups, headed by the worker class, and to ensure their close unification with the aim of ending the system of capitalist exploitation and, together with it, the system of ethnic oppression.

On 2 (15) November 1917 the Council of People's Commissars issued the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia." It proclaimed the basic points of the nationalities policy of the Soviet Government: equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; the right of these peoples to free self-determination, including separation and formation of an independent state; abolition of all ethnic and ethnic-religious privileges and restrictions; free development of national minorities and ethnic groups. This declaration held up to shame the great-power policy pursued by Czarism and Russia's bourgeois Provisional Government, and proclaimed fraternal friendship among peoples, grounded on equality before the law and mutual trust.

These and other actions by the Soviet Government expressed the essence of the Communist Party's Leninist nationalities policy and attested to the fact that a fundamentally new type of relations between nationalities was being established in our country, for the first time in the entire history of mankind.

The bourgeoisie and its accomplices -- the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries -- feverishly took up arms against the right of nations to self-determination. They slanderously claimed that the Bolsheviks allegedly were seeking to demolish the historically established centralized Russian state. In actual fact, however, a profound internationalist meaning is grounded in the right of nations to self-determination, if it is interpreted not in the bourgeois but rather in the proletarian manner. V. I. Lenin wrote in the pre-October period: "We demand freedom of self-determination... not because we have dreamed of economic splintering or of an ideal of small states, but on the contrary because we want large states and rapprochement, even merging of nations, but on a truly democratic, genuinely internationalist foundation, which is inconceivable without freedom of secession" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 27, page 68). He further stated: "We want as large a state as possible, as close a union as possible, as many nations as possible, living as neighbors with the Great Russians; we want this in the interests of democracy and socialism, in the interests of enlisting in the struggle of the proletariat the greatest possible number of working people of different nationalities. We want revolutionary-proletarian unity, unification, not separation" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 34, page 379).

The party's internationalist position on the nationalities question was specified in the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Program adopted in 1919. It stated that the party places emphasis on a policy of rapprochement of the proletarians and semiproletarians of different nationalities for a joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeoisie. In order to overcome distrust on the part of the toiler masses of oppressed countries toward the proletariat of the nations which had been oppressing these countries, it is essential "to destroy any and all privileges of every ethnic group, to achieve total equality of nationalities, and to acknowledge the right of political separation to colonies and unequal nations."

The exploiter classes and local bourgeois nationalists overthrown by the revolution endeavored to utilize for their own purposes remnants of the former ethnic hostility in the struggle against Soviet rule. However, all attempts by the forces of counter-revolution, supported by the bayonets of the White Guardists and foreign interventionists, to separate the national regions from the Soviet Republic under the banner of "self-determination of nations" and to destroy the achievements of the October Revolution in these regions were unsuccessful. The multinational toiler masses, in savage clashes with the forces of external and domestic counterrevolution, became convinced through their own experience of the correctness of Lenin's statement that "only the closest alliance with the Russian Republic will be truly invincible to international imperialism, and political separation cannot be beneficial in a situation of struggle against imperialism, since the latter will utilize any division and separation in order to crush Soviet rule; such a separation constitutes a crime" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 40, pp 99-100).

The peoples of the Soviet Republic, having created their nationhood, not only did not disperse to their respective "national quarters," but became increasingly unified on the principles of internationalism, striving toward a solid unity. Their root interests, the tasks of building socialism, and the objective course of historical development dictated the necessity of unification of republics into a single, united nation, capable of guaranteeing both its external security and of solving internal problems pertaining to development of the economy and culture of this country's nationalities and ethnic groups on the basis of utilization of the advantages of socialism.

V. I. Lenin and the party worked out the correct form of a socialist multinational state. Disagreeing with a proposal of "autonomization," that is, all other republics becoming incorporated within the RSFSR, Vladimir Il'ich proposed formation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. "Establishment of the USSR," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "was a direct continuation of the cause of the Great October Revolution, which opened up a new era in the development of mankind and constituted a practical embodiment of the idea of the great Lenin on a voluntary union of free nations" ("Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 4, page 41).

Joining the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, peoples were able successfully to withstand the forces of domestic and external reaction, to consolidate their revolutionary gains, and could count on mutual assistance and support in carrying out the innovative, enormous-scale tasks of building socialism. Under the guidance of the Leninist party, the Russian working class and the Russian people did everything to strengthen trust in them on the part of the working people of other

nationalities. The peoples of the USSR note with profound gratitude that the Russian worker class, which played an enormous role in the joint struggle to destroy Czarism and the exploiter system, gave them selfless assistance in building industry, in placing the economy on a new technological foundation, in training personnel and in development of culture.

An important condition for strengthening the fraternal family of Soviet peoples was the accomplishment of socialist reforms, economic and cultural development taking into account the concrete situation and the specific national features of the republics. The CPSU provided everything necessary for the free and independent development of each of our country's nationalities and ethnic groups.

The point of departure of the party's Leninist nationalities policy was the firm conviction that economic equality of nations is the basis of their equality in all other areas and relations. "From the very first years of Soviet rule," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "our economic and social policy was focused on raising as rapidly as possible Russia's former ethnic hinterlands to the level of development of the nation's center. And this task was successfully accomplished" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS," page 55). Within the Soviet multinational family there was accomplished a genuine renaissance of dozens of peoples; their nationhood experienced development, the economies of outlying regions which had been backward in the past grew at a more rapid pace than that of the USSR as a whole, and the spiritual and intellectual forces of all nationalities prospered. The peoples of the USSR themselves became transformed: their social makeup changed, and the ideological-political and cultural level of the working people rose enormously.

The national economy of the USSR has become transformed into an integral economic system, developing according to a unified plan. The party consistently pursues a course of policy aimed at increasing the material and spiritual potential of each republic and, at the same time, directed toward its maximum utilization for the harmonious development of the entire country. Each republic carries out that part of the national plan assigned to it, places its output into the national fund, and in return receives from that fund everything it needs for the further development of productive resources, science and culture.

Take Kazakhstan, for example. It is currently experiencing a period of genuine flourishing of its economy and culture. Over 250 modern industrial enterprises, large shops and facilities came on-line in this republic in the 10th Five-Year Plan alone. It is becoming a normal occurrence for Kazakhstan to produce a billion poods of grain, a figure which comprises, together with the grain of the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, the foundation of our country's food resources.

Georgia has become unrecognizably transformed during the years of Soviet rule. This republic's industry -- metallurgical, automotive, machine building, chemical and many other branches -- was built virtually from the ground up. And recently oil was discovered here. Today Georgia has entered a new stage of economic development, and at the very highest technological level. Addressing an official meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Georgian SSR and the Georgian Communist Party, in Tbilisi, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed the fact that an atmosphere of genuinely international friendship reigns in Soviet Georgia. Georgians and

Russians, Abkhazians and Ukrainians, Ossetians, Armenians and Azerbaijani, Greeks and Kurds -- working people of more than 70 different nationalities -- are working shoulder to shoulder for the benefit of the republic and the entire Soviet people. The experience of Georgia is one more persuasive confirmation of the correctness of our party's Leninist nationalities policy.

Everybody is familiar with the grandiose socioeconomic changes in the republics of Central Asia. In that region, where prior to the October Revolution agriculture knew only exhausting manual labor, power availability per hundred hectares of arable land is now twice the national average. The scale of transformations which took place in the 1970's in various parts of the RSFSR is enormous. The working people of the Ukraine and Belorussia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Baltic and Moldavia are making a weighty contribution to this country's economy.

The range of items with which the CPSU Central Committee and government of the USSR deal in solving vital problems pertaining to the development of all our country's republics and strengthening their fraternal union is broad and diversified. They include the new law on autonomous districts in the RSFSR, the expansion of irrigation systems in Central Asia, development of reindeer herding in the Far North, sheep raising in Kirghizia, protection and conservation of the resources of Lake Sevan, plus many other serious matters. CPSU Central Committee decrees pertaining to development of the economy and culture of Abkhazia, Tuva and Buryatia, as well as the areas inhabited by the peoples of the North are being carried out in a consistent manner.

As we know, for a number of reasons the non-Chernozem zone of the RSFSR has more difficult conditions than certain other regions of our country. The CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government have specified and are carrying out extensive measures for development of the non-Chernozem zone. "This task is so complicated and urgent that it should be carried out by the joint efforts of all republics and as rapidly as possible," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. "We possess a wealth of experience and know-how in this area. Suffice it to mention construction of the Turksib Railroad, the Ural-Kuzbass, development of the virgin lands, and the rebuilding of Tashkent. We must work just as smoothly and energetically in the non-Chernozem zone" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS," page 56). In conditions of a developed socialist society there is taking place, on a foundation of common goals and ideals, an increasing drawing together of the Soviet republics, with expansion of the scale of cooperation and mutual intercourse among the peoples of the USSR in the economic and intellectual areas. This is an objective process, determined by the laws and patterns of building communism. The comprehensive advance of the national republics is accompanied by a strengthening of the union state. The strengthening of the union state in turn promotes the flourishing of each republic.

Practical experience has confirmed that the socialist federation of union republics is an effective form of unifying the creative and productive efforts of peoples in building a new society as well as in the matter of its defense and an armed rebuff to external aggressive forces. Guaranteed within the framework of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the sovereignty of each republic, its security from any and all encroachments, as is persuasively attested by the world-historic victory of the Soviet people and their multinational Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

Functioning of the USSR as a socialist state of all the people is linked with embodiment of the Leninist principle of free and voluntary unification of nations. In contrast to bourgeois federations, which were formed "by iron and blood," our Union is, to quote V. I. Lenin, "a union of equals, a union which requires common consent" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 48, page 235). Pursuant to the USSR Constitution, all union republics enjoy equal rights, regardless of size of population, size of territory, level of economic and cultural development, or any other attributes. All of them participate, on an equal basis, in the establishment and activities of all-union agencies and enjoy equal representation in the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet (32 deputies each). Each union republic is represented in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the USSR Council of Ministers and Supreme Court, as well as on the standing commissions of both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Democratic centralism in national-state organizational development and in direction of economic and cultural affairs makes it possible to take into consideration both the interests of the entire country and the specific interests of each socialist nation, and serves as a reliable guarantee against any infringement of the rights of the republics, excessive centralization, and against possible manifestations of ethnic narrow-mindedness and localistic tendencies.

A most important Leninist principle of socialist governmental organization of a multinational country is the leadership role of the Communist Party, which is constructed on an international foundation. Unswerving trust in the Leninist Party and confidence in the correctness of its policies, those tasks and plans it advances is a powerful factor in further strengthening the might of the Soviet State, the friendship and brotherhood of our peoples. The resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, which opened up new horizons of building communism before the country as a whole and all republics, will foster development of the objective process of drawing together of the socialist nations, the material and spiritual progress of the Soviet people as a historically new social and international community of people.

* * *

Under the guidance of the Leninist party, the peoples of our country have strode forward to developed socialism as a single, unified family. At this stage in the building of communism, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "reorganization of all societal relations is being completed on a collectivist basis which is internally inherent in the new system. This reorganization encompasses both the material and intellectual spheres, our entire way of life" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS," page 57). Naturally the processes of development of national relations are also involved.

The nationalities question, in the form in which it was inherited from the pre-revolutionary past, has been fully settled in our country, finally and irrevocably. We no longer have any oppressed peoples or backward ethnic hinterlands. The prosperity of the socialist nations, their fraternal friendship and unity have become fact. This achievement can rightfully be ranked alongside such victories in the building of a new society in the USSR as industrialization, collectivization, and the cultural revolution.

Developed socialism carries the nationalities question to a different plane. The point in question now is no longer only friendship among peoples but also a mature,

endurable, inviolable international unity of all our country's nationalities and ethnic groups, and the growing process of rapprochement of socialist nations within the framework of a new community -- the Soviet people. Unprecedented socioeconomic, political and spiritual foundations have been created for this: a mighty economic complex, a state of all the people, a social structure of a single type for all nationalities, flourishing of socialist culture, and the total domination of Marxist-Leninist ideology. All this makes it possible to broaden and deepen cooperation among the republics, to enlist the working people of all nationalities in the common cause of building communism, and more effectively to accomplish the tasks of educating the masses, forming and shaping the new man.

Our party's enormous indoctrinational work has led to a situation where ideological conviction, dedication to the cause of communism, political maturity, enormous vital energy, a high cultural level, knowledge and the ability to apply it, a high awareness of civic duty, socialist patriotism and internationalism, class solidarity with the working people of other countries, industriousness, collectivism and mutual assistance have become integral traits of the Soviet people and the working people of all nationalities.

The solid unity of Soviet nationalities and internationalization of the intellectual life of the Soviet society do not mean that there remain no unresolved problems in the area of nationalities relations. One such problem, which requires close party attention, is connected with intensification of processes of inter-republic migration. According to the figures of the 1979 All-Union Census of the population of the USSR, for example, in eight union republics "other nationality" population comprised more than one fourth of their total population, and more than half in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia. This fact, however, has not always been adequately considered locally in the practical handling of a number of matters pertaining to nationalities policy.

"The population of the Soviet republics is multinational in composition," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. "And it is natural that all nations are entitled to due representation in their party and governmental bodies. Of course with strict consideration of the professional and ideological-moral qualities of each individual" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 56). The congress noted that in recent years the number of citizens of non-native nationalities has increased substantially in a number of union republics. These citizens have their own specific desires in the area of language, culture and customs. The congress instructed the central committees of the Communist parties of the union republics, kray and oblast committees to look more deeply into such matters and promptly to suggest ways to resolve them.

The further drawing together of our country's nationalities and ethnic groups and strengthening of our multinational socialist nationhood constitutes an objective process. It would be wrong, however, artificially to force and accelerate it. There is no need for this. At the same time the party considers intolerable any attempts to restrain the process of drawing together of nationalities and to hinder this process under any pretext whatsoever.

Also remaining on the agenda is the task of fully overcoming the vestiges of nationalism, chauvinism and other prejudices in the consciousness and conduct of

certain individuals. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 26th CPSU Congress: "The CPSU has fought and will always resolutely fight against such alien manifestations to the nature of socialism as chauvinism or nationalism, against all nationalist deviations, be they anti-Semitism, let us say, or Zionism" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 57). The party equally resolutely opposes tendencies directed toward artificially effacing or ignoring national peculiarities.

It is important to note that nationalistic, chauvinistic and other carryovers from the past and distortions are encouraged in every way from the outside, by imperialist propaganda agencies. Bourgeois ideologues deliberately falsify the theory and practice of resolving the nationalities question in the USSR, are undertaking desperate attempts to undermine the unity of the peoples of our country, to weaken the enormous international influence of the historic experience of implementation of a Marxist-Leninist program on the nationalities question, and are making every effort to encourage relapses of backward views and ways which are still encountered.

True to the principles of Lenin's nationalities policy, our party consistently supports internationalization of all aspects of life, opposes petty national exclusiveness, selfishness and conceit, and idealization of patriarchal traditions and customs. Elimination of all such manifestations is in the interest of all this country's nationalities and ethnic groups and promotes the cause of improving interethnic relations, further strengthening of the friendship and brotherhood of peoples, and Communist indoctrination of the masses. The 26th CPSU Congress focused special attention on the necessity of indoctrinating working people in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and pride in belonging to the great Soviet homeland.

Patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of citizens is an essential condition for further strengthening the unity of the Soviet society and fraternal cooperation among the peoples of the USSR. Today it is becoming especially important for all Soviet citizens to gain a deep understanding of the community of interests not only of all our country's nationalities and peoples but of the brother socialist nations as well, a feeling of concern for their development and prosperity, and willingness to defend both one's homeland and the entire socialist community.

The friendship among the peoples of our country has been and remains one of the principal sources of the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces. Our army is an army of friendship and brotherhood of peoples, defender of the freedom and independence of the socialist nations. It protects the unified socialist homeland and is permeated by a spirit of internationalism. Soviet servicemen are characterized by a high degree of political consciousness, an organic combination of socialist patriotism and internationalism, firm discipline, a deep understanding of their military duty, and a close bond with the people. "Our army," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is also a special army in the sense that it is a school of internationalism, a school of indoctrination of feelings of brotherhood, solidarity and mutual respect on the part of all the nationalities and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. Our Armed Forces are a unified, amicable family, a living embodiment of socialist internationalism" ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 4, page 61).

There is today a trend toward further internationalization of military collectives. This is connected with the dynamic socioeconomic and cultural development of all Soviet republics, which enables them to send well prepared replacement personnel into the Armed Forces. The contingent of conscripts entering the army and navy from Central Asia and a number of areas of the Caucasus, where a particularly high rate of population growth is noted, is appreciably increasing. Careful consideration of the demographic factor enables commanders and political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations more successfully to accomplish tasks of unifying multinational military collectives and indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of fraternal friendship and respect for the national sensibilities and dignity of each and every serviceman.

Prospects for the future development of ethnic relations in the USSR are organically linked with the steadily increasing scale of socialization of socialist production and internationalization of all aspects of the affairs of a mature socialist society. The material and intellectual foundations for seeking new, internationalist forms of culture and customs are becoming deeper and stronger. The mutual influence of the spiritual values of peoples is becoming stronger, and common Soviet traits are being born and developing, traits which are characteristic of all nationalities and are becoming affirmed in our unified socialist way of life.

Lenin's ideas of union and friendship of peoples and the party's policy on the nationalities question have greatly enriched revolutionary theory. It is precisely Leninism and CPSU experience in revolutionary-transforming activities which point out reliable ways to resolve such burning problems of the present day as the final elimination of political inequality of nations, overcoming by young nations of the economic and cultural backwardness which was inherited from colonialism, bringing an end to distrust between nations, engendered by the exploiter classes, and unification of nations on a voluntary basis into a fraternal family. The USSR has been the first to solve the vital, complex problem of transition to socialism by formerly backward peoples, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, and a correct combination of the common class interests of working people with distinctive national features.

Our country constituted an example of practical implementation of the program point of communism advanced by V. I. Lenin that the worker class, when it comes into power, will make every effort to effect rapprochement with peoples which have been enslaved by colonialism, "to help them change over to the utilization of machinery, to easing labor, to democracy and socialism" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 30, page 520). The Soviet experience is also instructive from the standpoint that in a multinational country it is necessary to unite and guide the struggle of the toiler masses of different nationalities, to form and shape their political consciousness and to develop in them a direct understanding of national and overall state tasks on the basis of the principles of proletarian internationalism and uncompromising struggle against nationalism and chauvinism.

The significance of Leninist principles of resolving the nationalities question is truly global. They have been adopted by all progressive forces in countries which have chosen the path of social rebirth and progress.

The XXVI CPSU Congress demonstrated genuinely deep penetration into the essence of the socioeconomic, political, spiritual and other processes taking place in the affairs of the multinational Soviet society. It innovatively developed the Leninist nationalities policy and specified a scientifically substantiated program of further strengthening the international unity of the Soviet people -- builder of communism.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1981

3024

CSO: 1801/019

ARMED FORCES

MATERIAL FOR MISSILE TROOPS AND ARTILLERY DAY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 18 Sep 18) pp 31-36

[Article: "Flaming Shield of the Soviet Homeland"]

[Excerpts] On 19 November each year our country festively celebrates a national holiday -- Missile Troops and Artillery Day. It was on this date in 1942 when mighty salvoes fired by 15,000 guns, mortars and rocket launchers signaled the beginning of the great Soviet Army counteroffensive at Stalingrad, which was fated to be the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

The battles on the Volga revealed the enormous role of Soviet artillery as our army's main source of striking firepower. To honor the combat achievements of artillerymen in combat against the enemy, in 1944 annual celebration of Artillery Day was ordered by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Since 1964, in connection with qualitative changes and radical reforms in military affairs which had taken place in recent years, the development of nuclear missile weapons and their assumption of an operational status in the army and navy, and establishment of a new branch of the Soviet Armed Forces -- the Strategic Missile Forces -- this holiday has been celebrated as Missile Troops and Artillery Day. Soviet citizens celebrate both the unfading exploits of the combat veterans and the worthy successors of their combat fame, and they pay just due to the outstanding Soviet scientists and designers, engineers and technicians, and workers of the defense industry -- those who design and build our potent missile and artillery weapons.

This year the traditional holiday of missile and artillery personnel is being celebrated in an atmosphere of great political and practical enthusiasm. Soviet citizens are living and working under the inspirational influence of the ideas and resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. In response to an appeal by leading work forces, socialist competition for successful accomplishment of the targets of the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan is in progress.

The campaign to implement the plans for building communism is taking place in a complex international situation. The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that adventurism and willingness to gamble the vital interests of mankind for their own narrow, selfish purposes are being particularly glaringly manifested today in the policies of the most aggressive imperialist circles.

The military-political course of policy followed by the NATO nations, headed by the United States, boils down to undermining, with any means available, the growing influence of the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community in the world arena and gaining military superiority over them. Stepping up the confrontation with the USSR, U.S. ruling circles are counting chiefly on accelerating the growth of their offensive military might.

An appeal issued by the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World," adopted at its Fifth Session, 10th Convocation in June of this year, once again stated the willingness of the USSR to begin immediate talks on limiting and cutting back arms. The imperialists, however, are intensifying their military preparations. Next year the Pentagon plans to spend more than 226 billion dollars on the arms race. This colossal amount of money will be spent first and foremost on accelerating development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons, establishment of new bases and airfields near the socialist countries, etc.

It is alarming that NATO leaders, under pressure by Washington, are seeking to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe in addition to offensive weapons already in place. This is leading to a greater threat to the peace. The U.S. administration's decision to proceed with the full-scale production of neutron weapons constitutes a challenge to all mankind.

Under these conditions our party considers its sacred duty to continue with redoubled energy implementing a policy of holding the forces of war and aggression in check and taking measures to achieve further strengthening of this country's defense capability. As was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, we are obliged to do so by the international situation. The great combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, stated USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at a Kremlin reception in honor of service academy graduates, has been and remains a major factor in restraining imperialist aspirations toward world domination. The army and navy possess everything they need to offer a decisive rebuff to any aggression, from any quarter.

Soviet servicemen, profoundly aware of their patriotic and internationalist duty, are working day by day to strengthen the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Missile and artillery personnel are making a worthy contribution toward accomplishment of this task, working persistently to build upon their fine fighting traditions. [Portion omitted from the translation pertained to history of development and employment of artillery troops and materiel from 1917 through the end of World War II].

* * *

The historic victory over the shock forces of international imperialism -- fascist Germany and militarist Japan -- strengthened the international position of the USSR and opened up new and favorable opportunities for growth of the forces of socialism, national liberation and democracy throughout the world. During this period a "cold war" against the Soviet Union and other peace-seeking countries began, through the fault of aggressive circles in the imperialist countries. Reactionary forces, relying on the temporary U.S. monopoly in atomic weapons, commenced a policy of open military threats and atomic blackmail.

Under the circumstances the Communist Party and Soviet Government took all measures necessary to develop our own nuclear missile weapons, guaranteeing the security of our homeland. The heroic labor of Soviet scientists, engineers, technicians and workers was crowned with success. The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1947, and by 4 years later the USSR had developed a hydrogen bomb. This brought to an end the atomic monopoly and blackmail on the part of the U.S. imperialists.

At the same time considerable attention was focused on advancing rocketry. Considerable scientific research, design and engineer-technician resources and manpower were enlisted in this task. S. P. Korolev made an outstanding contribution to the design, development and mass production of new missile weapons. By the mid-1950's our country had developed and made operational missiles of various types and classes with excellent performance characteristics.

The year 1957 was an important landmark in the development of rocketry, when the USSR successfully tested a multistage intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to any point on earth.

Our country's development of nuclear missile weapons produced a genuine revolution in military affairs. The organizational structure and the entire fabric of military life and activities changed radically. The most vivid expression of the profound qualitative transformations which had taken place in military affairs was the establishment in 1959, by decision of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government, of a new branch of the Armed Forces -- the Strategic Rocket Forces.

More than two decades have passed since then. During this time missile forces have attained a qualitatively new level of development. They are armed with the most sophisticated missile systems, with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range, capable of delivering nuclear warheads of enormous destructive force with a high degree of accuracy and capable of delivering unstoppable strikes on an aggressor, wherever he might be.

The Strategic Rocket Forces are an important component part of the Soviet Armed Forces. A distinctive feature of these forces lies in the fact that in peacetime they are in a state of continuous readiness for immediate combat employment, and they perform a mission of particular national importance -- they are continuously on alert duty in order to guarantee the security of the sacred borders of our homeland.

The considerable combat capabilities of the Strategic Rocket Forces by no means lessen the importance of the other branches of the Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the position that joint efforts by all military services and arms are necessary to gain final victory in war today. Therefore the CPSU and Soviet Government are taking the necessary measures to improve the other military services and arms as well, including our Ground Forces. Their firepower and striking power have increased immeasurably in the postwar years. Today operational-tactical missiles are the principal destructive force of the Ground Forces. Nor has conventional gun artillery lost its importance. Artillery systems are constantly being improved -- their firepower is increasing, as are their range, accuracy, mobility, and reliability. Our Ground Forces are presently armed with

excellent-quality, powerful, fully motorized gun, howitzer, antitank and rocket artillery.

The combat capabilities of the National Air Defense Forces, Air Force and Navy have also grown immeasurably due to being armed with nuclear missile weapons. The military occupational specialty of "missile crewman" has become one of the most numerous in the army and navy.

Our people are justly proud of the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces are up to the level of today's demands. They possess the latest and most advanced weapons and equipment. But nevertheless the determining factor in their unsurpassed combat power is the fine Soviet servicemen indoctrinated in a spirit of total dedication to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the socialist homeland. They possess a high level of general education and special training, a broad cultural outlook, possess a consummate mastery of combat equipment and weapons, and are prepared at all times to carry out their duty to the homeland.

"The ranks of defenders of the homeland now contain," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. They have not gone through the harsh trials which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are true to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And whenever the interests of national security and the defense of peace demand it, whenever it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet serviceman appears before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, willing and able to overcome any and all difficulties."

Thanks to the tireless concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, the missile forces and artillery possess politically mature and well-trained officers, both in a military and technical respect, capable of successfully performing complex and important missions. More than 75 percent of officers in the missile forces possess engineer training, and more than 90 percent are proficiency-rated specialists, genuine missile experts. The existence of an officer corps which meets today's demands of military theory and practice is a guarantee of additional successes in the area of improving the combat skill of all personnel.

A high level of military-technical training is characteristic not only of the officer corps. With each new conscription, missile and artillery units are receiving increasingly better prepared individuals. In the missile troops, for example, more than 90 percent of enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers possess a higher and secondary education. This enables them to master the complex hardware in a short period of time and to perform alert duty in an exemplary manner.

Carrying out the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, all missile troops and artillery personnel are working persistently to improve their professional skills, are strengthening organization and discipline, and are increasing their vigilance and combat readiness. Missile and artillery personnel are marking their traditional holiday with successful completion of the training year and new achievements in combat improvement and fulfillment of socialist pledges.

Characteristic of the current training year -- the year of the 26th CPSU Congress -- are increased demands on level of combat and political training, a party-conformable demanding and self-critical approach to evaluation of achieved results, and a tireless search for new, more effective forms and methods of training and indoctrination work. In the course of summer training and hard work to achieve high-quality accomplishment of combat training tasks and to meet performance standards, on each and every topic and training item, the absolute majority of missile and artillery units met their socialist pledges. The skill level of missile and artillery crewmen improved, there was an increase in the number of persons rated excellent in training, proficiency-rated specialists, excellent units and subunits. A qualitatively new performance level was achieved in socialist competition -- crews made up of master proficiency-rated individuals appeared in a number of military collectives.

Practice missile and artillery firings conducted this year were a genuine school of military expertise and a difficult test of combat maturity. It is gratifying that the majority of missile and artillery shoots received a mark of excellent. Missile and artillery unit personnel demonstrate increased tactical and technical maturity, expert marksmanship and excellent moral-fighting qualities.

As always, an example in accomplishing tasks of improving the quality of combat and political training and achieving excellent mastery of combat equipment and weapons is displayed by Communists, individuals of a restless nature and inexhaustible enthusiasm, people constantly moving forward. They greatly increase the mobilizing force of socialist competition with their vigorous indoctrinational and organizational work, their skilled dissemination of advanced know-how, and persistent campaign against lack of originality, unnecessary relaxation of demands and situation simplifications in combat training.

The men of the missile unit under the command of Lt Col I. Shelestov -- initiator of this movement in the Strategic Rocket Forces -- march in the vanguard of competition under the slogan "For a high degree of combat readiness and firm military order!" Socialist pledges made by this unit are being successfully fulfilled. All the men have become proficiency-rated specialists, and the majority are specialists 1st and 2d class. One out of every three officers has a master proficiency rating. In this unit 60 percent of subunits and 55 percent of crews are excellent-rated.

The successes of this regiment are secured in large measure by the unity and strength of the military collective, the efforts of which are skillfully guided toward improving all qualitative indices in combat and political training, service and military discipline. The unit is constantly campaigning to surpass performance standards and for mastering related occupational specialties. Behind all this stands the persistent and harmonious work of the commander, party and Komsomol organizations, and of all personnel. And there are more and more such line units. Excellent results in socialist competition were achieved by the missile and artillery units and subunits under the command of officers Yu. Shcheglov, A. Belyakov, Yu. Tsvetkov, Yu. Kravchenko, N. Kovalev, O. Grigor'yev, O. Kuzin and others.

Scientific methods and work forms are being extensively adopted in the practical activities of line units, based on a combined approach to matters of training and

indoctrination. Programmed learning methods and simulator equipment are actively employed. The course of the training process is being better monitored, and more objective criteria are being developed for evaluating the proficiency level of replacement personnel. Adopted as a base is the experience and know-how of leading officers, top methods specialists, high proficiency-rating specialists, as well as scientific projects and recommendations obtained on the basis of the training and indoctrination process in the line units.

The Komsomol organizations of the units and subunits participate actively in socialist competition. Komsomol members and other young military personnel are engaged in a campaign to improve the qualitative indicators of combat readiness and for excellent performance of alert duty. Also widely adopted among young personnel are such patriotic undertakings as "Master proficiency ratings for every weapon crew," "Earn the second-class rating in the first year of service," plus others. Already every other Komsomol member has become an advanced proficiency rating specialist, while 60 percent of Komsomol members are surpassing performance standards.

Just as throughout the Armed Forces, vigorous ideological indoctrination work is being conducted in missile and artillery units, aimed at forming in personnel Communist conviction, total dedication to the Communist Party and the homeland, development of a clear-cut class position and political vigilance in personnel, and instilling of hatred toward the enemies of socialism and willingness to defend selflessly the achievements of the Great October Revolution. The main content of all ideological-indoctrination work consists of thorough, thoughtful study and dissemination of the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, the Lenin ideological-theoretical legacy, history of the CPSU, the writings and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, explanation of party domestic and foreign policy, demonstration of the successes of the Soviet people in building communism, and exposure of the aggressive schemes of imperialism.

Delegates to the 26th CPSU Congress, leader-Communists and experienced propagandist cadres take active part in this important work. Also characteristic is the fact that ideological-indoctrination work is performed directly in the subunits and crews standing alert duty. This makes it possible to reach each individual serviceman and to instill in missile and artillery crewmen a feeling of personal responsibility for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Missile forces, artillery unit and subunit personnel are deeply cognizant of the fact that the Soviet people have entrusted to them reliable and formidable weapons and have entrusted them with the most honorable, most responsible job -- to stand vigilantly and reliably on guard, protecting the national interests and security of our great socialist homeland. Greeting their holiday, missile and artillery personnel are ranked even more solidly behind the Communist Party and are countering the aggressive intrigues of the enemies of détente with tireless vigilance and continuous combat readiness. Just as all the fighting men of our glorious Armed Forces, they are on guard at all times, ready at every moment to carry out their patriotic and internationalist duty with honor -- reliably to defend the sacred borders of the Soviet homeland and all the nations of the socialist community.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1981

3024

CSO: 1801/019

ARMED FORCES

TROOP INDOCTRINATION ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 18 Sep 81) pp 71-75

[Article: "Procedure of Performance of Military Service, the USSR Law On Universal Military Service Obligation"*]

[Text] The purpose of studying this topic is to help young army and navy personnel firmly assimilate the procedure of performance of active compulsory service in the USSR Armed Forces and the basic provisions of the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation.

Two hours shall be allocated to this class. It should be held by the lecture method and a lively, extensive discussion. The following topic items should be covered within the allotted time: 1. Procedure of performance of active compulsory military service by army and navy personnel; 2. Basic obligations, rights and privileges of compulsory service personnel; 3. Thoroughly know and conscientiously carry out the obligations of a member of the USSR Armed Forces.

It is desirable to state in a brief introduction that military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is one of the most important of the obligations imposed on Soviet citizens by our state and the USSR Constitution. Fulfillment of this obligation and awareness of one's duty to defend the socialist homeland bring deep satisfaction to army and navy personnel. This finds fullest expression in enthusiastic socialist competition for steadfast strengthening of discipline and order and all-out increase in vigilance, military performance capability and combat readiness of troops and naval forces. Young military personnel have the noble and responsible task of consolidating and building upon the achievements of their comrades in arms in the past training year, the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, of becoming excellent rated in combat and political training, gaining a master proficiency rating, and honorably carrying out one's patriotic mission to defend the beloved homeland.

* The class on this topic should be presented to young army and navy personnel after studying the topic "Defense of the Socialist Homeland and Military Service -- Sacred Duty and Honored Obligation of Citizens of the USSR."

1. Procedure of Performance of Active Compulsory Military Service by Army and Navy Personnel

In proceeding with presentation of the material covering the first topic item, one should note that the basic demands on performance of military service are stated in the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service Obligation," which specifies the principles and procedure of manpower acquisition for the USSR Armed Forces, preparation and training of young people for military service, the process of induction, performance of military service, discharge into the reserves, and service in the reserves. The law also specifies the rights, obligations and responsibility of military personnel and persons subject to induction into military service. Its provisions are directed toward further increasing the nation's defense might, all-out strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces, and steadfast improvement of their combat readiness and fighting efficiency.

Pursuant to the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service Obligation," military service consists of active military service in units and on naval ships, and service in the reserves. The law specifies that all male citizens of the USSR, regardless of origin, social and property status, race or nationality, education, language, attitude toward religion, type and nature of occupation, and place of residence, shall serve a term of active military service in the Armed Forces.

Persons in active military service shall be called military personnel, and persons in the reserve shall be designated reservists. All such personnel are subdivided into enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, petty officers, warrant officers, and commissioned officers. Officer personnel in turn subdivide as follows: junior officers (from lieutenant to captain (captain-lieutenant) inclusive); field grade officers (from major (captain 3d rank) to colonel (captain 1st rank) inclusive); senior officer personnel (general officers, flag officers, marshals).

Males who have reached the age of 18 years shall be inducted into service in the USSR Armed Forces. The USSR Law "On Universal Military Service Obligation" specifies that conscription into military service shall be held twice each year: in May-June and in November-December, and in April and October in addition for troops stationed in remote and certain other localities. For those who are inducted in May-June, the term of active military service shall be figured from 1 July, and for those persons inducted in the latter half of the year -- from 1 January of the following year.

The day an inductee reports to the military commissariat for travel to his unit (ship) shall be considered the moment of commencement of military service. The day personnel receive their discharge documents constitutes the moment of termination of active compulsory military service.

When new recruits are entered on the rolls of their unit (naval recruits -- in the appropriate naval arm), they shall be given the primary military rank of private (seaman). After this they shall receive basic training, during which they learn requirements of military service and their duties, and study the provisions of the oath and military regulations. They attend classes in drill and tactical training. Recruits also familiarize themselves with their personal weapon and learn how to use it. Upon completion of basic training, conscripts swear the military oath and

are given suitable job assignments. Before reporting for duty on a naval ship, naval conscripts go through training in their future military occupational specialty in training detachments.

A soldier (sailor) fully masters his job duties directly in his unit (ship). Persons assigned to jobs which require a proficiency-rated specialty earn a proficiency rating after acquiring practical experience and passing the necessary examinations.

The next higher military ranks, private 1st class and senior seaman, are usually awarded to the best privates and seamen under the condition that they are assigned to corresponding jobs, for which this rank is appropriate.

The instructor should tell the students that compulsory-service personnel can subsequently become warrant officers. But they must first serve at least one year in active compulsory service, after which they must undergo a course of study at a school where personnel of this category are trained.

In the course of the lecture (discussion) it is desirable to explain to the young military personnel that noncommissioned officers are their immediate superiors in the army and navy. Training of this category of military personnel is accomplished for the most part in training units. The best of the young replacement personnel are selected as candidates for junior commanders. After completing a course of training and passing the specified examinations, personnel enrolled in training units are assigned the rank of "junior sergeant" (in the navy -- "petty officer 2d class"). Subsequent promotions are to the rank of "sergeant" ("petty officer 1st class"), "senior sergeant" ("chief petty officer") and "master sergeant" ("master chief petty officer").

The primary sergeant or petty officer ranks may also be awarded in the unit and on the naval ship to those enlisted personnel who are performing the duties of junior commanders and who have received marks of good and excellent in combat training and performance of duties, and who display exemplary military discipline. They must first pass tests on the specified training curriculum.

It is advisable that during the class the instructor presents edifying examples of performance of duty by leading enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers of their subunit, unit, and naval ship, and discuss their experience in mastering combat skills and the successes they have achieved in socialist competition. In the lecture (discussion) the instructor should call upon the men to emulate the finest personnel in their collective, stressing that the process of military personnel improvement is continuous, requires great industriousness, persistence, strict observance of regulations, and continues throughout the entire term of active military service.

What are the lengths of military service? The USSR Law "On Universal Military Service Obligations" specifies: two years for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers of the Soviet Army, naval shore units and aviation, border and internal security troops; three years for enlisted personnel and petty officers on naval ships, vessels, and in combat support shore units, and in border troops naval units.

Lengths of service are specified as follows for persons possessing higher education and inducted into active military service: one year and six months for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers of the Soviet Army, naval shore units and aviation, border and internal security troops; two years for enlisted personnel and petty officers on naval ships, vessels, and in shore combat support units, and border troops naval units.

Enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and petty officers as a rule serve in those units and on those ships to which they were assigned following training in training subunits. Military personnel in compulsory active military service may be transferred only in connection with organizational measures or for other important reasons, as well as for medical reasons, on the basis of the findings of a military medical board.

It is further desirable for the instructor to tell personnel that following discharge from the army and navy, military personnel are transferred to the category of reservists and serve in the reserves.

Completing presentation of the first topic item, the instructor should note that the CPSU and Soviet State display paternal concern for the Armed Forces. In particular, graphic confirmation of this is the procedure of manpower acquisition, as well as the procedure of performance of active military service, and determination of other matters pertaining to strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet Army and Navy. All these matters are resolved in full conformity with Leninist principles of Soviet military organizational development, the points of our military doctrine, and the provisions of Soviet laws.

2. Basic Obligations, Rights and Privileges of Compulsory Service Personnel

In proceeding with presentation of the material of the second topic item, the instructor should point out that our nation gives its defenders, on a basis of equality with other citizens of the Soviet State, extensive rights and personal liberties. When discussing this, the instructor should first of all mention the right to material security. He should explain to the men that military personnel receive pay and allowances, food, clothing and lodging according to standards specified by the USSR Council of Ministers. Compulsory service enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers are fully provided for by the state, and all of the enumerated categories are given free of charge. Letters sent by and to these military personnel are also mailed free of charge.

The right to good health is an inalienable right of military personnel. It is provided by a well organized medical service, by free, highly skilled medical care for servicemen, including medicines free of charge.

Just as all Soviet citizens, our military personnel have the right to an education. During the period of compulsory active military service, enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers work tirelessly to deepen their political knowledge, studying specific curricula, and learn in the army and navy a new occupational specialty or increase their skills in the trade they learned prior to induction. Servicemen discharged into the reserves are accepted for enrollment at higher educational institutions on equal terms with persons who have had two years of employment, while for a period of two years following discharge from the Armed

Forces they are accepted to enrollment at technical schools on a non-competitive basis, under the condition that they receive acceptable marks in the entrance examinations.

The right to rest and recreation, specified by the Fundamental law of the USSR, also applies to military personnel. In conformity with this right, the daily routine allocates servicemen 8 hours out of every 24 hours for sleep. In addition, they are allocated the time essential for personal needs and requirements. Enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers receive a day off each week. Training and work activities are not conducted on days off or on national holidays.

The instructor should further state that our military personnel possess the right, on an equal basis with other citizens of the USSR, to participate in management of government and public affairs. They elect and can be elected to Soviets of People's Deputies, and they take active part in sociopolitical activities in party, Komsomol, and other public organizations. Many servicemen work productively as representatives of army and navy volunteer inspection agencies and sit on military tribunals as people's assessors.

Military personnel enjoy wide access to our cultural achievements. For this purpose there exists in the army and navy an entire network of enlisted men's clubs, officers' clubs, and libraries. Each unit has its own television sets, motion picture projection units, and local radio broadcasting stations. Servicemen regularly attend theaters, museums, and exhibits. Get-togethers with prominent Soviet writers, scholars, leaders in science and culture are arranged for them.

In conformity with the USSR Constitution, military personnel are given considerable freedom of scientific, technical and artistic activity. Many take active part in amateur performing arts activities and are active in art studios, ensembles and literary associations operating under the auspices of army and navy newspapers. Technical innovation activity by military personnel is extensive in the army and navy.

The propagandist should emphasize that, alongside the extensive socioeconomic and political rights and freedoms which our laws give this country's armed defenders, exceptionally high demands are also imposed on them. The instructor should note that the principal duties of military personnel are specified by the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws, the Statute on Performance of Compulsory Active Military Service, and by orders issued by the USSR minister of defense. The military oath also states the obligations of military personnel in concise but very capacious form. Swearing of the oath by the enlisted man is of great moral and legal significance. From the moment he swears the sacred oath of loyalty to the homeland, each member of the Soviet Armed Forces receives all those rights which are due him by virtue of military service and carries out specific obligations of military service. Our military regulations specify demands on Soviet military personnel more fully and in greater detail. They regulate in a detailed manner the life, daily and combat activities of army and navy personnel. Unswerving fulfillment of these demands is a law governing the life of Soviet servicemen. During this instruction class the propagandist should read to the men the provisions of articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 139, 140 and 141 of the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations, which define the general duties and obligations of military personnel as well as the duties and

obligations of the army (navy) enlisted man. It is desirable that the propagandist explain in detail the substance of each of these articles, stressing the importance and significance of strict and precise observance by all personnel of military duties and obligations, order and regulations established in the unit and ship.

The instructor should note that those military personnel who work hardest in mastering military affairs, who are the most disciplined and efficient, can receive various commendations and rewards for their patriotic efforts and contribution toward further improving combat readiness. It is desirable to enumerate the system of commendations and rewards applicable to enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers (see Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, Article 22), to display the record of service card of the best personnel of the given subunit, unit, or ship, comment on what personnel did to receive a commendation, and to call upon the men to emulate them. It is also a good idea to remind them of those punishments which can be imposed for negligent and remiss military personnel (see Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, Article 48).

After this the propagandist proceeds to relate the privileges and preferential benefits established for servicemen. First of all he should note that time spent in active military service in the USSR Armed Forces counts toward one's overall employment record. Not later than one month following application, executive committees of local soviets, as well as executive officials of enterprises and establishments must offer a job to military personnel discharged into the reserves (taking their occupational specialty and experience into account). Persons who held a specific job prior to induction into the military are entitled to return to their former job.

Compulsory-service personnel are entitled to reoccupy the housing they occupied prior to induction into the military.

Persons who were inducted into active military service from educational institutions are entitled upon discharge to the reserves to reenroll to continue study at that educational institution at which they were previously enrolled.

Our state also gives servicemen a number of preferential terms regarding taxes. The instructor should enumerate the preferential tax provisions, especially emphasizing the concern of the CPSU and Soviet Government for the families of military personnel. In discussing this topic, it is desirable to note that local authorities are authorized to offer specific privileges and exemptions to the families of military personnel only upon receipt of a special document issued by the unit commanding officer which covers the entire period of military service.

The instructor must then present the idea that the rules and procedures established in the army and navy are directed toward creating for military personnel optimal conditions and opportunities for successful performance of their honorable obligation in the ranks of the Armed Forces, comprehensive development of the individual, and unswerving improvement of moral-political and fighting qualities. At this point it is important to acquaint young servicemen with the daily routine of the subunit, unit, naval ship, and to explain to them that it has been set up taking into account the basic requirements of military service and the specific features of the given military collective, and provide for appropriate living and working conditions for personnel.

The propagandist should comment that one of the most important guarantees ensuring observance of the rights to which the serviceman is entitled is the procedure established in the army and navy for appealing unlawful actions by officials. In conformity with the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, a serviceman may submit a complaint on actions and orders by commanders (superiors) which are unlawful in respect to said serviceman, on violation of the rights and benefits established on the basis of military service, or of unsatisfactory rations, pay or allowances. A complaint shall be submitted to the immediate superior of that person against whose actions the complaint is made, and if the complainant does not know through whose fault his rights were infringed, the complaint shall be submitted through the normal chain of command.

At the same time regulations require that every commander (superior) resolutely and firmly demand of subordinates observance of discipline and order and not ignore a single breach of regulations. In case of breach of discipline or public order by subordinates, a commander is obliged, taking circumstances into account, either to remind the individual of his service obligations or to impose disciplinary punishment.

A serviceman bears liability for material damage caused by him in the manner specified by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The most serious liability for military personnel is the legal liability for persons who have committed military crimes. The conditions and procedure of bringing military personnel to criminal liability as well as the limits of this liability are strictly specified by Soviet laws.

In completing presentation of the material of the second topic item, the instructor must stress that service in the USSR Armed Forces is difficult but very honorable. The people have entrusted their fighting men the most modern weapons and combat equipment. They are entrusted with protecting the most sacred thing -- their socialist homeland, their peaceful labor, and the security of our friends and allies. This trust is a great obligation for each and every serviceman. At the same time it evokes in Soviet military personnel a feeling of just pride in belonging to the glorious USSR Armed Forces and a striving to carry out their sacred constitutional duty in the best possible manner.

3. Thoroughly Know and Conscientiously Carry Out the Obligations of a Member of the USSR Armed Forces

The propagandist can find material on this topic item in the articles "Defense of the Socialist Homeland -- Sacred Duty," "The Military Oath -- The Serviceman's Oath of Loyalty to the Socialist Homeland," and "USSR Armed Forces Regulations -- Law Governing the Serviceman's Life," published in No 16, 17, and 18 respectively of the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, 1981, as well as in the following articles published in this issue of the journal: "Discipline and Follow-Through -- Most Important Moral-Fighting Qualities of Soviet Servicemen" and "Fighting History and Traditions of the Unit (Ship), Combined Unit, and District (Fleet)."

In presenting this topic item it is important that the propagandist base his presentation on the experience of development, training and performance of the leading men of his subunit, unit, or ship. In conclusion he should note that in

order to bring things into conformity with the USSR Constitution and subsequent improvement of legislation pertaining to national defense, on 17 December 1980 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued an ukase entitled "On Introduction of Changes in the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation." This is a new manifestation of the concern of the Communist Party and Soviet State for the USSR Armed Forces, strengthening of the defense capability of the Soviet nation and increasing its might and prestige.

The ukase emphasizes that the inexhaustible sources of the strength and invincibility of the USSR Armed Forces are Communist Party guidance and leadership, inseparable unity with the people, the advantages of the socialist societal system, Soviet patriotism, and socialist internationalism. Defense of the socialist homeland is one of the most important functions of the state and is the business of the entire people.

A number of new provisions were added to the Law, specifying the obligations of Soviet citizens regarding performance of their honorable military duty, with fuller specification of the obligations of government agencies, public organizations and officials pertaining to ensuring national security and strengthening of its defense capability. The grounds and procedure of granting military induction deferments to students enrolled at day (correspondence) higher educational institutions and students enrolled at specialized secondary schools were specified more precisely. The law specifies for reservists summoned to training camp payment of full average wages for the entire period at camp.

Revisions in the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation, adopted by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, will go into effect on 1 January 1982.

Completing presentation of material on this topic, the propagandist briefly describes the tasks facing the men of the given subunit, unit, or naval ship in the new training year and urges the men to work conscientiously to master military affairs and to perform productive military labor for the sake of the security of our great socialist homeland and in the name of the triumph of communism.

Students can be asked the following questions in the course of the lecture (discussion): 1. What is the procedure of performance of compulsory active military service by army and navy personnel? 2. What are the peculiarities and specific features of service in the given subunit, unit, or ship? 3. What are the basic rights, privileges and obligations of compulsory service personnel? 4. Why is it essential for the Soviet serviceman thoroughly to know and ably to carry out his duties and obligations? 5. Relate the principal tasks facing the subunit, unit, or naval ship, and those demands which are imposed on the serviceman by a high degree of continuous combat readiness.

In the course of preparation for this class it is desirable to arrange for the men to hear a phonograph recording of V. I. Lenin's speech "Appeal to the Red Army" and to view feature and documentary films on the subject. Appropriate visual aids should be utilized in this class, and the instructor should refer to works of fiction and military memoirs.

Literature for Propagandists

V. I. Lenin, "Speech at a General Worker-Red Army Conference in Rogozhsko-Simcnovskiy Rayon on 13 May 1920," "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 41, pp 120-121.

Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, articles 31, 32, 62, 63.

L. I. Brezhnev, "CPSU Central Committee Report to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 66.

USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation, chapters I, II, IV, VIII.

"On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," CPSU Central Committee Decree of 26 April 1979.

Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Statute on Performance of Compulsory Active Military Service in the Soviet Army and Navy.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1981

3024

CSO: 1801/019

ARMED FORCES

TROOP INDOCTRINATION ON DISCIPLINE AND DUTY PERFORMANCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 18 Sep 81) pp 76-79

[Article: "Discipline and Follow-Through -- Most Important Moral-Fighting Qualities of Soviet Servicemen"]

[Text] The purpose of studying this topic is to help army and navy personnel more thoroughly understand and grasp the essence and significance of Soviet military discipline and to explain the commander's role in maintaining firm observance of regulations and the necessity of precise efficiency and absolute obedience to commanders and superiors.

Two hours are allocated for study of this topic. It is advisable to conduct this class by the method of lecture and a lively, comprehensive discussion. In presenting the material, it is desirable to examine the following topic items:

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the role and significance of firm military discipline.
2. Soviet commanders -- loyal sons of the people and executors of party policy in the army and navy.
3. Absolute obedience and follow-through -- the main thing in military discipline.

In his introductory presentation the instructor should note that the young servicemen have begun their military service at a most portentous time. Our people are working enthusiastically to carry out the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. At the same time the Soviet Union, together with all peace-loving people throughout the world, is continuing its persistent campaign for peace, overcoming the vigorous efforts of the most aggressive circles of imperialism, aimed at preparing for another world war. At the same time, in view of the unchecked arms race unleashed by the West at U.S. initiative, the atmosphere of hostility provoked by NATO leaders toward the Soviet Union, and open threats and attempts by imperialism to meddle in the affairs of the socialist nations, the CPSU declares straight out to those overseas lovers of military adventures that our love of peace should not be taken as a sign of weakness. "The experience of the Great Patriotic War," stressed USSR minister of defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "is persuasive confirmation of the fact that the socialist nations possess everything they need in order reliably to defend their peoples. The resources and might of the nations of the socialist community are sufficient to repel aggression, and nobody will ever succeed in bringing them to their knees."

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Role and Significance of Firm Military Discipline

When proceeding to present the material on the first topic item, the instructor should note that V. I. Lenin time and again drew attention to the exceptional importance of firm military discipline in achieving victory over the enemy.

"If you consider," Vladimir Il'ich emphasized in 1920 at the Ninth Party Congress, "what in the final analysis was the basis of the fact that such a historic miracle took place that a weak, enfeebled backward country defeated the world's most powerful nations, we see that it is centralization, discipline, and unprecedented self-sacrifice" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, page 241).

Our party is inalterably true to Lenin's behests on the necessity of all-out strengthening of discipline and organization in the army and navy. It proceeds from the position that absolute discipline, follow-through and obedience on the part of personnel are important components of a high degree of combat readiness of troops and naval forces in peacetime and their battleworthiness in war.

The propagandist should point out that military discipline is becoming increasingly more important in present-day conditions. This is connected with a sharp aggravation of the international situation through the fault of imperialism and its myrmidons, as well as with the present stage of development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The instructor should note that a war, if the imperialists succeed in starting one, will assume an unprecedented class acuteness and uncompromising character. Combat operations in such a war will involve the extensive employment of unprecedented weaponry, including nuclear missile weapons. This will greatly expand the spatial scope of the modern operation and engagement, will increase their intensity, and will cause the situation to change swiftly and abruptly. In such conditions every serviceman will need particular courage, the special skill and ability to fight, staunchly to withstand numerous trials, unconditional follow-through, conscientious obedience, and firm, truly iron military discipline.

As we know, the operation of modern weapons is grounded on the joint efforts of various specialists. "Today," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "when a decisive role in military affairs is played primarily by crew-served weapons and when success in employment of these weapons depends on the skilled and coordinated actions of many individuals, a high degree of organization, continuous composure and flawless efficiency on the part of each individual is of exceptional importance. Even isolated manifestations of complacency and lack of discipline on the part of military personnel can lead to serious consequences" ("Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 2, page 50). This is why our party demands of commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, and from every military collective unabating attention toward matters of all-out strengthening of military discipline, indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of strict observance of the demands of the oath and regulations, and a resolute campaign against relics of the past in the consciousness and conduct of individual servicemen.

The instructor should then relate to his men exactly what military discipline is, on what it is grounded, and what demands are imposed on military personnel. The propagandist will be assisted in this by the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR

Armed Forces. He should read to the young servicemen articles 1, 2, and 3 of these regulations and clearly explain the content of each.

It is then important to stress that all military life and activities of Soviet servicemen are rigorously regulated by the demands of regulations. Regulations constitute the code of laws governing military service and concentrate a wealth of experience in military organizational development, training and indoctrination of personnel. They define the rights, general and specific duties of military personnel, relations between personnel, the rules and procedures of internal routine in units and on naval ships. This is why observance of the demands of regulations by each and every serviceman constitutes an essential condition for precise performance of service and a high degree of combat readiness of troops and naval forces. (The propagandist can obtain more detail on this in the article "Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces -- Law Governing the Serviceman's Life," published in the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, 1981).

Completing presentation of the material on the first topic item, the instructor should once more stress that the behests of V. I. Lenin and the demands of our party oblige each and every defender of the homeland tirelessly to strengthen military discipline and order in the subunit, unit, and ship. This is the obligation and moral duty of all military personnel.

2. Soviet Commanders -- Loyal Sons of the People and Executors of Party Policy in the Army and Navy

It is desirable to begin presentation of the material of this topic item with a description of the role of officer cadres as given by USSR minister of defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. "Officer cadres play the principal role in the development of the Soviet serviceman and in ensuring continuous Armed Forces combat readiness," stressed the minister of defense. "They are the foundation, the backbone of the army and navy.... The homeland has entrusted to them its most precious possession -- our outstanding young people, whom they are to teach military affairs, to indoctrinate and, when necessary, to lead into battle. And Soviet officers are honorably justifying this trust, carrying out their military duty with a high degree of responsibility." More than 90 percent of the officer corps are Communists and Komsomol members. More than half of our officers possess military higher and military specialized education. They are loyal sons of the people, executors of party policy in the army and navy. (The propagandist will find material on this topic item in an article entitled "CPSU Activities to Strengthen the Nation's Defense Capability at the Contemporary Stage," in the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 15, 1980). In this class it is important to concentrate the men's main attention on the role of officer cadres in maintaining firm military discipline and in indoctrinating enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers, and warrant officers in a spirit of absolute efficiency and obedience.

Maintaining exemplary observance of regulations, conscientious discipline and a high degree of organization is one of the determining conditions for successful accomplishment of the responsible tasks facing troops and naval forces. A central position in this large and exceptionally important business is played by officer cadres at the regiment and warship command level. It is they who stand closest to

enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, who are called upon first and foremost to indoctrinate personnel of subunits, units, and naval ships, to know well the moods, desires and needs of their subordinates and to take these thoroughly into account in their daily practical activities.

Soviet officers are deeply aware of the entirety of responsibility resting on their shoulders and do a great deal to strengthen discipline, law and order. The absolute majority of unit and ship's officers are a model to emulate both on and off duty. During the class the instructor should name the best officers in his subunit, unit, or ship -- thoughtful indoctrinators of their subordinates, showing that their activities aimed at strengthening discipline are grounded on a campaign for firm observance of regulations in military collectives and for creation of a healthy moral atmosphere in relations among military personnel.

It is important to emphasize that our officers, as regulations demand, resolutely nip in the bud the slightest breaches of internal discipline on the part of their subordinates, departures from the rules and procedures of guard and garrison duty, alert duty, and rely extensively on the noncommissioned officers in disciplinary matters, and display great concern regarding their authority. They work vigorously to enhance the indoctrinational role of drill and seek to achieve strict observance of the rules and military courtesy and regulations governing wearing of the military uniform.

Particularly responsible tasks in this area are assigned to one-man commanders. They are empowered to issue orders and instructions, to commend and reward subordinates and, when necessary, to punish them severely. But the commander's authority and prestige are grounded primarily on fair demandingness as specified by regulations, on his closeness to his men, his willingness and ability to share with them the burdens of military service. This is one of the character traits of the Soviet officer. This is why our commanders are distinguished by respect for the personal dignity of their subordinates and constant concern for them.

It of course does not follow from this that the officer can follow the path of unnecessary relaxation of demands. Lack of demandingness on the part of individual commanders and their indulgent attitude toward breaches of regulations by subordinates do serious damage to discipline and therefore are intolerable in the army and navy. It is precisely firmness of leadership and command which is the most important condition for strengthening military discipline.

Of course the point is not to make punishments harsher but rather to reach a proper combination of measures of persuasion and coercion, increasing the indoctrinational significance of disciplinary practice and the intolerability of replacing strict demandingness with rudeness. It is for good reason that unit and ship's officers see as their most important task the job of continuously unifying military collectives, enhancing their role in the campaign against manifestations of lack of discipline and incorrect relations among military personnel.

Deputy commanders for political affairs bear considerable responsibility for organization of indoctrination work and strengthening of military discipline. The effectiveness of their activities is determined not by the quantity but rather by

the quality of conducted political measures and their close link with the daily lives, training and service activities of personnel. It is precisely thorough knowledge of the actual state of affairs in military collectives, the moods and aspirations of enlisted personnel, and a skillful individual approach to the men which enable political workers to organize their activities pertaining to strengthening military discipline in a purposeful manner and to achieve positive results. It is desirable that the instructor discuss the best political workers in the given unit or warship.

Completing presentation of the second topic item, the instructor should state that Soviet officers devote all their knowledge and energy to training and indoctrinating defenders of the homeland. Totally dedicated to the cause of the Communist Party, the homeland, and their people, Soviet officers make a worthy contribution toward strengthening military discipline and increasing combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces.

3. Absolute Obedience and Follow-Through -- The Main Thing in Military Discipline

In proceeding with presentation of the material of the third topic item, it is important to stress that follow-through, absolute obedience to command personnel are the main thing in discipline, its core, genuine military valor and the heart of military service. Disobedience, failure to carry out an order is a military offense.

The instructor should explain to the men that follow-through is first and foremost unreserved, fast and precise execution of a commander's order, of all his instructions, and a high sense of responsibility for the assigned task. Follow-through presupposes the resolve of an enlisted man to carry out his orders regardless of danger, regardless of risk to life, in any and all circumstances. It is not surprising that V. I. Lenin considered follow-through to be one of the most important attributes of revolutionary discipline and organization, placing it alongside heroism in significance.

A politically aware serviceman accepts a commander's order with his entire heart and soul. He carries it out not mechanically, but intelligently and with thought, as a Soviet patriot should, aware of the fact that the commander was placed in his responsible position by the homeland. And when the commander gives an order, he is doing so on behalf of the homeland. An order is a command of the homeland, received from the lips of the commander, and it should be carried out at all costs. The Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces state: "An order by a commander (superior) has the force of law for his subordinates. An order shall be carried out absolutely, precisely, and promptly."

But there can occur in today's combat a situation where the commander is not immediately available and there is nobody to give orders. How should the serviceman then proceed? The serviceman with follow-through has a golden rule on this score: in his commander's absence he is also to proceed strictly according to regulations, to perform his duties just as assiduously as if the commander were right there. Thus follow-through does not exclude intelligent initiative by the individual. On the contrary, it promotes the development of initiative and decisiveness in one's actions.

The habit of absolute obedience makes the serviceman organized, brave and a person of initiative to the highest degree. Conscious obedience suppresses the feeling of fear, prevents timidity from taking over, eliminates indecisiveness, and at a particularly critical moment mobilizes a soldier's entire will, energy, and maintains his resolve to perform a heroic deed.

At this point the instructor should cite concrete examples from the experience of the unit or warship in order to show how a high degree of organization, follow-through and obedience help enlisted personnel master their weapons and military equipment, perform skillfully and with initiative at exercises and on cruises, and help them perform guard duty and stand alert duty in an exemplary manner. It is important to point out thereby that leading personnel do not avoid difficulties, do not attempt to dump them onto the shoulders of others, but seek to overcome these difficulties at all costs, endeavor to act as their commanders teach them, as is required by the circumstances of modern combat. In obeying their commanders and higher-echelon superiors, carrying out their orders and instructions, servicemen understand that they are obeying the requirements of the soldier's duty.

When stating that young servicemen go through a school of maturation under the supervision of their commanders and political workers, the instructor should explain to the men that much in their development also depends on themselves, first and foremost on effort, self-discipline, and the persistent desire of each to master his military occupational specialty as quickly as possible and to become a genuine expert at military affairs.

The propagandist should stress the importance of the military collective in strengthening discipline and follow-through. Such a collective possesses enormous indoctrinational force and promotes the development of the finest character traits and correction of shortcomings, defects, and negative habits. The excellent moral-political and fighting qualities of the serviceman are honed and tempered and the habit of follow-through and obedience formed precisely here, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust, demandingness and concern about others, high principles and responsibility.

We must note that the reinforcement of such a habit in military personnel takes place faster when noncommissioned officers work more aggressively to strengthen order and discipline in the unit or ship. Noncommissioned officers, the immediate superiors of enlisted personnel, comprise the numerically largest detachment of Soviet command personnel. Noncommissioned officers are at all times among their subordinates, know their personal qualities well, and penetrate deeply into all aspects of the training and service performance of each individual. On all matters enlisted men turn to the noncommissioned officers -- their immediate superiors, without obedience to whom firm discipline is impossible. The instructor should tell about the best junior commanders of the given subunit, unit, or ship, and show what contribution they are making toward strengthening the discipline of their military collective.

Further improvement of this work depends in large measure on party and Komsomol organizations. They are called upon to examine in an aggressive and concrete manner questions pertaining to the personal exemplariness of Communists and Komsomol

members, their participation in sociopolitical affairs, and more demandingly to evaluate the state of affairs in military collectives.

The instructor should further state that the Soviet serviceman is a man of great courage, discipline, valor and ingenuity. Having developed this point toward the end of the class period, the propagandist can end the lecture and discussion with an appeal to the young servicemen to work selflessly to improve their military skills, tirelessly strengthen discipline and order, maintain a high level of combat readiness, and make a worthy contribution toward implementation of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

In the process of the lecture and discussion the instructor can ask the men the following questions: 1. What is Soviet military discipline? 2. What are the demands of discipline on army and navy personnel? 3. The Soviet commander -- organizer of personnel training and indoctrination. 4. Why must the serviceman unquestioningly carry out the orders and instructions of commanders and superiors? 5. In what are manifested the follow-through and discipline of the serviceman?

The instructor should recommend that the men study during available evening hours the 11th chapter of the political instruction textbook "Na strazhe Rodiny" [Guarding the Homeland] (Voyenizdat, 1978) and acquaint themselves with other available sources on the subject.

Literature for Propagandists

V. I. Lenin, "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Victory Over Kolchak," "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 39, pp 152, 155, 156.

V. I. Lenin, "On Labor Discipline," "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 40, page 232.

L. I. Brezhnev, "CPSU Central Committee Report to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 50, 51, 58, 60, 66.

"Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation," PRAVDA, 24 June 1981.

D. F. Ustinov, "Against the Arms Race and Threat of War," PRAVDA, 25 July 1981.

D. F. Ustinov, "Speech at a Field Inspection of Troops Participating in the 'West-81' Exercise," PRAVDA, 13 Sep 1981.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1981

3024

CSO: 1801/019

ARMED FORCES

TP00P INDOCTRINATION ON COMBAT TRADITIONS AND HISTORY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 16 Sep 81) pp 80-83

[Article: "Fighting History and Traditions of the Unit (Ship), Combined Unit, District (Fleet)"]

[Text] This subject is of great cognitive and indoctrinational significance for servicemen. During this class personnel become acquainted with the most important traditions of the USSR Armed Forces and learn about the fighting history and present-day activities of their district, fleet (flotilla), combined unit, unit, or ship. Study of this topic will enable young servicemen to understand more fully the honorable obligations of the defender of the homeland -- successor and continuer of the glorious traditions of the fighting men of the older generation, evoking in each man an endeavor to make his contribution toward their consolidation and development, toward further increasing the combat readiness of one's military collective, and to respond with deeds to the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Two hours are allocated for study of this topic. It is advisable to conduct the class by the method of lecture and lively, extensive discussion. It is recommended that the following topic items be covered in the course of studying the material:

1. Essence and significance of the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces.
2. Know thoroughly the combat history and traditions of your unit (ship), your combined unit and district (fleet).
3. Young defenders of the homeland -- successors and continuers of the combat glory of the fighting men of older generations.

In his brief introduction the instructor should note that the Soviet Armed Forces, established by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, have a history which is unprecedented in heroism and courage. They loyally serve their people and their homeland, carrying out with honor the Leninist behest "to guard the achievements of the revolution, our people's government, the soviets of soldier, worker and peasant deputies, the entire new, truly democratic system against all the enemies of the people...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 35, page 216).

Our army coped brilliantly with these truly historic missions during the years of civil war, totally crushing the unified forces of the White Guardists and interventionists.

The Soviet Armed Forces covered their combat banners with unfading glory in the struggle against German fascism and Japanese militarism. Our victory in the Great Patriotic War convincingly confirmed V. I. Lenin's prediction that the Soviet Republic would withstand all attacks by hostile forces and "will stand firmly, as a beacon of international socialism and as an example to all toiler masses" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 35, page 279).

Soviet citizens have been living and working in conditions of peace for almost four decades since the end of the Great Patriotic War. This is a great achievement of the Leninist peace-seeking foreign policy which our party, together with the brother parties of the nations of the socialist community, is vigorously and consistently pursuing in the international arena. It is to the credit of the Soviet Armed Forces, which constitute an indestructible bulwark of world peace and a powerful means of restraining the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and its accomplices. Indoctrinated by the CPSU in the glorious revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of their people and in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism and Communist conviction, the fighting men of the Soviet Army and Navy hold high their glory-covered combat banners, carry out their patriotic and international duty in a worthy manner, and are reliably guarding the great revolutionary achievements of socialism.

1. Essence and Significance of the Combat Traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces

Presentation of the material of this topic item should begin with a reminder that the combat traditions of the USSR Armed Forces constitute historically established customs and moral rules, which have become a standard of behavior of military personnel and are connected with performance of combat missions and military service. These traditions actively impel servicemen conscientiously to serve the socialist homeland. They are inseparably bound with the revolutionary and labor traditions of the Communist Party and Soviet people.

Our combat traditions are socialist in character. Their principal content is as follows: total dedication to the socialist homeland and continuous readiness for its armed defense; mass heroism and self-sacrifice in battle, boldness, resoluteness, and initiative in wartime and in time of peace; unswerving loyalty to military duty, the military oath, and the combat banner; collectivism, indestructible military comradeship and mutual assistance; respect and love for one's commander and protection of him in battle; tireless improvement of military skill and boosting the combat readiness of the subunit, unit, and warship; a campaign for a high degree of organization and discipline; loyalty to internationalist duty and the combat brotherhood with the fighting men of the nations of the socialist community. This content of fighting traditions also defines the high degree of their effect on personnel, their role and place in military indoctrination.

Relating the most important combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, the instructor should reveal the essence of each of them, pointing to the succession of the heroic deeds of our fighting men. (The propagandist can find material on this in the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 15, 1981). The instructor should illustrate his lecture on the most important combat traditions with incidents from the history of his unit or ship, and should remind the men of the new traditions born on the combat training fields in peacetime, on leaders in combat and political training, on those who today march in the vanguard of the struggle for

Implementation of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, who through their industriousness, performance and discipline are building upon the glorious deeds of their predecessors.

On completing presentation of the material of the first topic item, it is important to emphasize that the serviceman's combat skill and military development, achievement of excellent results in military service do not happen by themselves. Only persistent daily labor, a striving to achieve unswerving observance of the demands of regulations, strict and precise observance of procedures and regulations governing performance of duty in the unit and naval ship, effort and initiative at drills and exercises, constant organization, follow-through and vigilance open up the way to the heights of military fame. And that serviceman who will unswervingly follow these precepts will be able rapidly to take his place in the combat ranks, will gain the respect of his fellow servicemen, and will become a genuine defender of the homeland. Every young serviceman should strive toward this from his very first days in the military. With this he will confirm his inalterable dedication to our outstanding combat traditions and will make a worthy contribution to the cause of further increasing the combat readiness of his subunit, his unit, or ship.

2. Combat History and Traditions of the Unit (Ship), Combined Unit, District (Fleet)

In proceeding to present the material of the second topic item, the instructor should comment that each military district (fleet), to which conscripts have come for their military service, has its own rich combat history, which is a part of the heroic biography of our valiant Armed Forces. As an example he might refer to the history of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District. The combat biography of the fighting men of the Transbaykal was born in the harsh years of the civil war. Prominent in the early pages of its history were famed Red commanders and loyal Leninist-Bolsheviks S. G. Lazo, V. K. Blyukher, I. P. Uborevich, S. S. Vostretsov, and many others.

The men of the Transbaykal Military District displayed mass heroism and a high degree of fighting skill in the Great Patriotic War. During this difficult time for our country, the Transbaykal Military District became a genuine forge, producing cadres for the army in the field, sending to the most difficult sectors of the struggle against the German-fascist invaders well trained, toughened Siberian divisions and regiments, vigilantly guarding the Soviet borders beyond the Baykal.

The fighting men of the Transbaykal covered themselves with unfading glory in the war against imperialist Japan. Together with the men of the First and Second Far Eastern fronts and their Mongolian brothers in arms, they completely routed the million-man-strong Kwantung Army in short order, forcing Japan to surrender and thus winning the final victory in World War II.

We must note that the Transbaykal always has been and remains a fine combat school for our enlisted men, commanders and political workers. Many prominent Soviet military leaders served and acquired a wealth of experience and conditioning at various times in the troops of this district. In 1935-1936 Comrade L. I. Brezhnev was serving in the military in Peschanka, near Chita. In 1978, during his trip to the cities of Siberia and the Far East, Leonid Il'ich visited his old unit, inspected

its facilities, its combat glory museum, became acquainted with the process of combat and political training, and conversed warmly with unit personnel. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev made the following entry in the Visitor's Book: "Dear officers and enlisted men! This area is memorable and dear to me.... Thank you for preserving the traditions of the fighting men who defended our homeland during the Great Patriotic War. Be worthy of those who, willing to sacrifice their lives, fought for the sacred cause of defending the borders of our Soviet homeland. I wish you all good luck!"

This message invariably inspires district personnel to accomplish new successes in combat and political training. The fighting men of the Transbaykal in the 1980's, just as their predecessors, clearly understand that they are guarding important borders of the homeland and are doing everything to ensure that these borders are reliably defended against any encroachments by our enemies.

During the class session on this topic in navy political instruction groups, the instructor should relate the fine traditions of our fleets. He could cite as an example the fighting history of the twice Red-Banner Baltic Fleet. This fleet was one of the most active forces of the revolutionary struggle by the working people of Russia against the Czarist autocracy. The armed uprisings of the men of the Baltic Fleet during the years of the first Russian revolution in Libava and Kronshtadt, in Sveaborg and on the cruiser "Pamyat' Azova" will remain forever in the memory of our people. In the 1917 February Revolution the men of the Baltic Fleet took the side of the insurgent people. They became a loyal support of our party and played an eminent role in the struggle for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Most difficult trials fell to the lot of the men of the Baltic Fleet in the harsh years of the Great Patriotic War. In combat against the German-fascist invaders, the fleet's surface units, submarines, aircraft and coast artillery sank 1,205 enemy warships, transports and auxiliary vessels. More than 100,000 enlisted men, petty officers, officers, general and flag officers of the Baltic Fleet were awarded Soviet decorations and medals for their courage and heroism. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 137 of these, and four officers were twice awarded this lofty title.

New generations of navymen sacredly preserve in their hearts the legendary deeds of the heroes of the Baltic Fleet. There has been established in the fleet the ritual of performing military honors at memorable sites of Baltic Fleet fame, the coordinates of which are entered onto navigational charts. Ships' crews assemble in formation at these sites, salute the flag, and on state holidays wreaths are placed on the water.

The propagandist should relate in detail to the young servicemen about his district (fleet), about its combat history and glorious traditions, about its heroes and the successors to its combat fame. He will find this material in books dealing with the districts (fleets), in other literature sources, as well as in museums and combat glory rooms. In relating about the district (fleet), the instructor should stress the fact that the Order of Lenin was awarded to the Moscow, Leningrad, and Transbaykal Military districts, as well as the Moscow Air Defense District. The other districts and fleets hold the Order of the Red Banner, while the Baltic Fleet was awarded this decoration twice.

Proceeding to relate the fighting history and traditions of the combined unit and unit (ship), the propagandist should remind the young servicemen of their full designation, relate to them their combat history, the decorations they have been awarded, as well as other decorations from the war years and peacetime and about the heroic deeds performed by their fellow soldiers in the past and today. The propagandist can illustrate his presentation with the combat history of one of the most famed combined units of our Armed Forces -- the Order of Suvorov Red-Banner Guards Taman' Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin. From the very first weeks of the Great Patriotic War it took part in savage combat with the enemy. A total of 33 heroes of the Soviet Union were nurtured under its colors.

Since 1946 this division has taken part in parades on Red Square. It was given this honor for its fine successes in combat and political training in peacetime. And there are many such combined units in our army, just as there are many famed units. It is desirable to cite examples of such units, emphasizing that love of one's combined unit, unit, ship, pride in their glorious fighting past, in their achievements of today, and a striving to make a worthy contribution toward further strengthening and development of the finest traditions of one's military collective is characteristic of all our enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers.

Completing presentation of the material of the second topic item, the instructor should mention that army and navy personnel are serving with pride under the colors of our combined units, units, and warships. They are striving at all times and in all things to emulate the deeds of the combat heroes and are maintaining combat readiness at the very highest level.

3. Young Defenders of the Homeland -- Successors and Continuers of the Combat Glory of the Fighting Men of Older Generations

When proceeding with presentation of the material of the third topic item, the instructor should remind the men that it is an honorable and responsible matter to be the successor of the glorious fighting traditions of our army and navy. Each and every young serviceman is pledged to guard, preserve and build upon that which was obtained at the cost of heroic efforts, at the cost of the blood and lives of our country's finest citizens. The propagandist should mention that the servicemen of the 1980's are further developing and strengthening the remarkable traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces with a conscientious attitude toward training and performance of duty, flawless conduct, excellent knowledge and performance of one's duties, mastery of one's combat equipment and weapons, the ability to stand up under all the burdens and deprivations of military service, and constant readiness to devote all one's resources and energies and, if necessary, to give one's life in carrying out one's sacred constitutional duty to the homeland. Addressing the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated that they are "true to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And whenever the interests of national security and defense of peace demand it, whenever it is necessary to aid victims of aggression, the Soviet serviceman appears before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, prepared to overcome any and all difficulties" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 66).

The instructor should then relate to the men what traditions were born and exist today in all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, on the patriotic

initiatives of personnel, on military rituals and ceremonies, and their meaning. Completing presentation of material on this topic, it is important to mention once again that the glorious combat legacy, the heroic traditions of the combat veterans, their outstanding accomplishments and deeds, as well as the achievements of today are a great moral acquisition of our servicemen and a powerful stimulant in their combat improvement. The successors and continuers of the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, they are working persistently to master the weapons and equipment entrusted to them, the techniques and methods of their combat employment, and are taking active part in socialist competition for carrying out the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Soviet servicemen are deeply aware of their responsibility to the party and people for maintaining their units and ships in a high state of combat readiness, ensuring an immediate and devastating rebuff to any aggressor, and for further developing and adding to the fighting traditions. "Great is that people," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the official opening ceremony for a memorial complex in the hero-city of Kiev, "which constantly feels a living bond with its history, which can take all the finest elements from its historical traditions and make this an achievement of the present day. This remarkable quality is inherent in the Soviet people in full measure." This outstanding quality is also characteristic in full measure of Soviet servicemen, loyal sons of their heroic people.

Personnel can be asked the following questions in the course of the lecture (discussion): 1. What are the principal combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces? 2. What is the meaning and significance of these traditions? 3. Relate the fighting history of your combined unit, unit (ship). 4. What does it mean to be successor to and continuer of the combat glory of the older generations?

It is desirable that the class be held in the museum or combat glory room, with extensive utilization of available exhibits. This will promote more solid mastery of the subject.

It is recommended that the instructor use the following filmstrips: "Unit and Ship's Colors -- Symbol of Military Valor and Glory," "Cherish the Honor and Fighting Fame of the Armed Forces, Your Unit and the Honor of Your Military Rank," "Be Worthy of the Fame of Our Fathers," plus others. It is useful to reinforce one's ideas with excerpts from memoir literature and fiction, letters and tape recordings of addresses to the men by veterans of the given unit, ship, combat veterans, and parents of military personnel. It is desirable to run the following feature films for the men during evening hours: "Chapayev," "Aleksandr Matrosov," "Two Soldiers," "Officers," as well as segments of the documentary epic "Great Patriotic War." It would be useful to arrange for personnel to meet, on the eve of or following this class, veterans of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, as well as veterans of the combined unit, unit, or ship.

The men should be given the recommendation to study in the evening Chapter 14 of the political instruction textbook "Na strazhe Rodiny" [Guarding the Homeland] (Voenizdat, 1978).

Literature for Propagandists

V. I. Lenin, "Appeal to the Red Army," "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 38, pp 234-235.

V. I. Lenin, "Speech at a General Worker-Red Army Conference in Rogozhsko-Simonovskiy Rayon on 13 May 1920," "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 41, pp 120-121.

Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Preamble, Articles 31, 32, 62, 63.

L. I. Brezhnev, "CPSU Central Committee Report to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 32, 36, 58, 66, 75.

L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the Official Dedication Ceremony at the Memorial Complex in the Hero-City of Kiev," PRAVDA, 10 May 1981.

L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation," PRAVDA, 24 June 1981.

L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya."

"On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," CPSU Central Committee Decree of 26 April 1979.

"To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World," USSR Supreme Soviet Appeal, PRAVDA, 24 June 1981.

D. F. Ustinov, "Speech at Field Inspection of Troops Taking Part in the 'West-81' Exercise," PRAVDA, 13 Sep 1981.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1981

3024

CSO: 1801/019

ARMED FORCES

WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING ON PARTY CADRE POLICY

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 10, Oct 81 (signed to press 23 Sep 81) pp 24-26

[Article by Maj Gen Avn V. Korolenko: "The Party's Cadre Policy"]

[Text] The urgency of the topic "The 26th CPSU Congress on the party's cadre policy. Current requirements for the political, professional and moral qualities of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers (career servicemen)" is determined by the significant attention which the 26th CPSU Congress devoted to the problems of preparing cadres. The audience has to familiarize itself with the basic principles of the party's cadre policy in the Armed Forces and to thoroughly comprehend current requirements for military cadres and their role in the training and indoctrination of subordinates.

Six hours are allotted for study of the topic, 2 hours of which must be set aside for a lecture and 4 hours for a seminar in accordance with the following plan:

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the party's cadre policy as the most important condition for successful solution of the tasks of building socialism and communism.
2. The 26th CPSU Congress on the necessity for further improvement in the qualitative composition of cadres and perfection of the style of work.
3. Shore-based and seagoing warrant officers—the immediate assistants of officers in the training and indoctrination of personnel and increasing the combat readiness of units and subunits.

1. The Communist Party always has devoted and is devoting paramount attention to cadre policy, a mighty lever of influence on the course of social development. Cadres are the decisive force of the party and the state, and they have a leading role in building socialism and communism and in strengthening the country's defensive capacity.

The basic principles of cadre policy were formulated by V. I. Lenin. When the political line has been determined, he pointed out, the center of gravity is shifted to the selection of managers, to implementation of specific measures to carry out the party's policy. Emphasizing that "policy is conducted through people," that "the linchpin of the situation is in people, in the selection of people," Vladimir

Il'ich required that those selected for leadership work be "people with a sober mind and a practical attitude, persons who combine a devotion to socialism with the ability to organize without fanfare (and in spite of turmoil and fanfare) the strong and harmonious work of a large number of people..." The selection and placement of cadres is not a technical matter, but a political one. V. I. Lenin carefully studied workers' political and professional qualities. In his note of August 1920, Vladimir Il'ich asked that one worker be described as to his suitability for a new position: a) from the point of view of conscientiousness, b) from a political standpoint, c) with regard to his knowledge of the work, and d) his administrative capabilities.

The most important principle in the party's cadre policy is the selection of persons according to political, moral and professional qualities. In the process, their ideological conviction, adherence to party principle, correct understanding of CPSU policy and activity in the struggle to implement it, as well as their moral qualities, professional maturity, and ability to creatively resolve existing problems are taken into consideration above all.

"Testimony of maturity," V. I. Lenin stressed, "is not given by handwriting or a certificate; it is certified by experience and practice." Indoctrination in efficiency, responsibility for the state of affairs, objectivity in evaluating results achieved, and implacability toward shortcomings are an important part of work with cadres. Deeds are the touchstone on which one gets to know the true value of a person; thus Comrade L. I. Brezhnev defines the chief criterion for evaluating the qualities of any worker.

One of the basic principles of the party's cadre policy is the principle of correct combination of old cadres, grown wise with experience, and young cadres, of ensuring the continuity of leadership. "Our cadre policy," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted, "has been aimed at advancing promising young workers equally with consideration for old cadres and maximum use of their experience and knowledge. This is an obligatory condition for the continuity of our party's course and its revolutionary traditions."

An integral part of the party-wide and state cadre policy is work on the preparation, placement and indoctrination of military cadres. They are the champions of the military policy of the party and state among the troops, the bearers of the class spirit of the army and its combat traditions.

In all stages of building the Soviet Armed Forces, the Communist Party has devoted and is devoting vast significance to the preparation of military cadres, guided by the Leninist precept that with the command personnel of the Red Army coming from the people and dedicated to their interests, the victory of communism will be ensured.

Military cadres consist mainly of officer personnel, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and career servicemen, and in a broader sense, the sergeants and petty officers in first-term active military service. They are the most skilled of the personnel and have appropriate preparation to train and indoctrinate servicemen. The command, political and engineering and technical cadres organize the soldiers' combat preparation and indoctrination, foster love for the military profession, train them to handle weapons and in the fundamentals of combat equipment,

develop their moral and fighting qualities and conscientious discipline, and strengthen order and organization among the troops.

All the work to prepare and indoctrinate military cadres is conducted in the spirit of the requirements of the Communist Party, which considers manning of the Armed Forces as one of the most important objectives of its activity to strengthen their combat might and combat readiness.

In the early years of Soviet rule, the task of preparing military cadres was solved by advancing to command and political work the party members who had had combat experience in the ranks of the Red Guards, assignment of noncommissioned officers, soldiers and sailors dedicated to the revolution to positions as commanders, as well as drawing in military specialists from the ranks of former officers and generals of the Russian army and navy. With the aim of accelerating the preparation of commanders from among the workers and peasants, short-term command courses and schools were established for them. In December 1918, the first Soviet military academy was opened. The system of military educational institutions of the Soviet state and the planned preparation of command, political and technical cadres for its Armed Forces were begun. Owing to the tireless concern of V. I. Lenin and the efforts of the Communist Party, by the end of 1920 a significant number of military cadres, over 80 percent of which were representatives of the workers and peasants, had been prepared. This was one of the decisive conditions for the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces over internal and external counterrevolution.

During the years of peaceful socialist construction the Armed Forces were regularly replenished with well-trained military cadres dedicated to the Communist Party and the Soviet Motherland. At the same time, a system of training and building up reserves took shape through the territorial military training of students of higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, as well as of reserve officers from sergeant personnel who had completed active military service. In the 1930's, in connection with the technical modernization of the army and navy, considerable attention was devoted to command and engineering and technical cadres. Military technical academies and schools were established for this. By 1941 we had 203 secondary military schools, 19 academies, 10 military faculties attached to civilian higher educational institutions, and seven higher military and naval schools. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the overwhelming majority of Soviet military cadres possessed high military-political and combat qualities and more than half of them were VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] and Komsomol members.

During the war years command personnel were replenished through mobilization of reserve officers, advancement to officer positions of soldiers and sergeants who had distinguished themselves in combat, and mainly through their preparation in military educational institutions, which annually turned out 400,000-500,000 officers. They passed a severe test in the course of the war, demonstrated high professional skill, organizational abilities, heroism and courage in the battles for the freedom and independence of the Soviet Motherland. In fierce battles they showed their superiority over the military cadres of fascist Germany and imperialist Japan. The Great Patriotic War ended with the outstanding victory of the Soviet people also because, as the CPSU Central Committee noted, "socialism... trained outstanding soldiers and military leaders."

2. The Leninist theses on the questions of cadre policy are being developed continuously in accordance with the new tasks of communist construction. In conformity with the conditions of developed socialism, these theses were stressed with particular emphasis and were further developed in the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress. Noting that our country had entered a new decade with a mighty economic and scientific and technical potential and an army of millions of prepared cadres dedicated to the profession, the congress aimed its efforts at a qualitative and effective solution of the complex issues of the new stage of communist construction.

The 26th CPSU Congress directive that exactingness toward cadres for fulfillment of established goals, good organization and accuracy in work, and strict observance of planned discipline in all units must be reinforced, and that their businesslike attitude, responsibility and initiative and a Leninist style of work must be developed is important in principle. The CPSU Central Committee Report emphasizes that "the question concerns development of a style of work in which efficiency and discipline are combined with bold initiative and enterprise. Practicalness and a businesslike attitude with a striving toward great goals. A critical attitude toward shortcomings, with a firm confidence in the historic advantages of the route we have chosen."

A great contribution to development of the party's cadre policy in the present stage is being made by Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the USSR Council for Defense, and Marshal of the Soviet Union. More confidence in the cadres and reinforcement of their role and responsibility are linked with his activities. We find much that is instructive and helpful in the speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and in his books "Malaya zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye," and "Tselina" [Small Land, Rebirth, Virgin Soil]. In this regard, one cannot help recall the words from his book "Vozrozhdeniye": "We have tried to bring about a considerate attitude toward cadres and have valued the party goodwill which already has been established in our organization. I never have been a supporter of the rude and loud or, as they call it, the 'strong-willed' method of leadership." And in recollections of the Great Patriotic War Leonid Il'ich emphasizes: "If a person even made a mistake, no one has the right to insult him with a shout. The habit of raising one's voice at persons...is disgusting to me. Neither an economic manager nor a party administrator should forget that his subordinates are subordinate only in service and that they are not serving a director or a chief, but the work of the party and the state. And in this relationship everyone is equal. Those who permit themselves to deviate from this unshakable truth of our system are hopelessly compromising themselves and degrading their authority."

In connection with the radical changes in military affairs and the increasing demands made upon military cadres in recent years in accordance with party and government decisions, a number of important measures aimed at improving the system of their training and indoctrination and further development of the Soviet military school have been implemented. Nearly all secondary military schools have been reorganized into higher military schools, the network of educational institutions preparing engineering and technical personnel for all branches and arms of

the Armed Forces has been expanded, and new curricula and training programs, textbooks and training and methods materials have been developed. Military academies, schools and training units (centers) have received modern military machinery, control facilities [sredstva upravleniya], new equipment, and so forth. The scientific proficiency and professional skill of teaching personnel have been improved. As a result of all this, training of military cadres has been significantly improved and the number of officers with higher military education has been sharply increased. By the mid-1970's nearly all commanders of brigades and higher had higher military education. On the whole, nearly every second officer has had a higher military education or a military specialized education.

An important theoretical and practical meaning is contained in the position formulated in the CPSU Program that the party will tirelessly look after the command, political and technical cadres of the army and navy recruited from the best representatives of the Soviet people, who are utterly dedicated to the work of communism. It considers it necessary that command personnel persistently master Marxist-Leninist theory, have high military and technical training, and meet all the requirements of military theory and practice.

In the current stage of development of military affairs, requirements for military cadres have increased immeasurably. In this regard, further improvement is necessary in the entire system of their training and indoctrination, in military educational institutions as well as among the troops and in naval units. As Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, minister of defense, points out: "It is necessary that the commander, political worker, and staff officer of any rank always bear in mind that the combat potential of any formation, unit or ship can be fully realized only when personnel prove to be capable of skillfully applying new tactics and surpass the enemy in the art of conducting combat and battle."

Thanks to the constant concern of the party and government, the Soviet Armed Forces today have at their disposal first-class command, political, staff, engineering, and other categories of cadres. For them the years following the 25th CPSU Congress were a many-sided school of political conditioning and acquisition of rich experience in management of the training and instructional process in subunits, units, on ships, and in formations and task forces. Certain social characteristics of our military cadres are noteworthy. For example, 92 percent of officer personnel are communists and Komsomols. While 5 years ago 41 percent of the generals, admirals and officers in the Armed Forces had a higher military education and a military specialized education, now 68 percent of them have it. Today nearly all commanders of regiments and commanders of ships of the first and second ranks have a higher military education.

Cadres in other socialist countries are being trained and indoctrinated on common ideological-political and military-theoretical foundations with the Armed Forces of the USSR. The firmly established combat collaboration of fraternal armies, based on unity of goals and tasks to ensure the reliable security of the socialist countries, contributes to mutual enrichment of knowledge and experience, achievement of new successes in combat and political preparation and in methods of training and indoctrinating personnel. In close collaboration, their professional skill is being improved, the inviolable friendship of brothers in arms and soldier-internationalists is being reinforced and developed, and glorious combat traditions are being augmented. Unity of views on problems of military art and the organization and conduct of current operations is formed in joint exercises.

3. Shore-based and seagoing warrant officers--officers' immediate assistants--constitute a large detachment of professional military cadres. Complex and responsible tasks are entrusted to them. They lead crews and teams, head radar stations, serve as first sergeants of companies and batteries, head Komsomol organizations, and work as instructors, technicians, mechanics, and so forth. The successful solution of tasks in the training and instructional process and the formation of military specialists depend to a large extent on the level of their personal professional preparation, political maturity, discipline and initiative.

In past years warrant officers have made a sizable contribution to the training and indoctrination of servicemen of the army and navy, the reinforcement of discipline and the increase in combat readiness. The majority of them have proved themselves to be politically mature persons and experts in equipment and armaments.

In the Northern Fleet, for example, the name of Senior Seagoing Warrant Officer Dmitriy Sergeyevich Zaguzov, delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, petty officer of a team of electricians on the submarine "Magnitogorskiy komsomolets," is well known. An excellent specialist, whose knowledge and skill have been verified time and again at different latitudes, he also is a skillful teacher, combining strict demands on his subordinates with a paternal concern for them, sincere sympathy for persons with implacability toward any deviation from the military manuals.

There are quite a few shore-based and seagoing warrant officers like communist Zaguzov. A significant number of servicemen in this category have been awarded orders and medals for successes in training and indoctrination of subordinates and mastery of new equipment. The number of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers who have taken examinations as external students in accordance with the programs of secondary military schools is increasing. Upon becoming certified as specialists, they work successfully in team and technical positions.

The establishment of the military ranks "senior shore-based warrant officer" and "senior seagoing warrant officer" are partial changes in the order of advancement in military service--one more testimony of the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for reinforcement of the Armed Forces of the USSR and for increasing the role and authority of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers.

The new military ranks are conferred on shore-based and seagoing warrant officers who have served irreproachably in this capacity for 5 years or more, with not less than 1 year in positions manned by senior shore-based or seagoing warrant officers or officers. Of course, not only the term of service is taken into account in considering this matter. It is necessary that the shore-based or seagoing warrant officer have high ideological conditioning and professional preparation, have demonstrated initiative and persistence in solving problems facing the unit or ship, know how to train and indoctrinate subordinates, and have served as a model in carrying out his military duty and in observance of requirements of the military oath and military regulations.

The place of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers in a combat order is first and foremost where military skill is being forged. In order to be at the level of the demands made upon military cadres by our party, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers should have thorough political and specialized knowledge and be able to use methods of training and indoctrinating subordinates. It is important first of all that those connected with training and indoctrinating subordinates have a secondary military specialized education, the acquisition of which is considered one of the basic forms of improving their professional preparation.

An absolute majority of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers are communists or Komsomols. Their immediate responsibility is to take an active part in the work of party and Komsomol organizations and in political work among the masses. In conformity with requirements of the CPSU Central Committee decree "On further improvement in ideological and political education work," it is necessary to achieve much effectiveness and specificity in the measures being carried out, taking into account the tasks facing personnel. Shore-based and seagoing warrant officers are doing much to increase the effectiveness of socialist competition, the meaning of which consists of challenging every soldier to strive himself to achieve successes and help his comrades. In this matter it is important to make use of the advanced work experience which exists in all units and subunits. For example, Guards Senior Warrant Officer I. Krivenko has commanded a platoon of marines for over 15 years. All these years the platoon has held the title of excellent, and leads in the competition for fulfillment of the decisions of the party's 26th congress.

Communist conviction, love for their profession, and a sense of constant responsibility for fulfillment of their military duty--these qualities are inherent in shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and all military cadres of the army and navy.

In the recent greeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers sent to the graduates of academies, it was stated that the officer of today must demonstrate initiative and a creative attitude toward the work assigned, self-critically evaluate the results achieved, master the art of working with people, and combine high exactingness with a tactful and considerate attitude toward subordinates. This applies to shore-based and seagoing warrant officers to the full extent.

Under the current conditions, when the military threat from the aggressive forces of imperialism is increasing and the Armed Forces are faced with the task of reliably defending the socialist Motherland and being in constant combat readiness to guarantee an immediate rebuff to any aggressor, the demands upon military cadres to maintain high combat readiness and improve the field, air and sea training of personnel is becoming even more important. "While in the past the requirement to be in a condition of high combat readiness has been shown to be mainly for troops located in immediate proximity to borders," stressed Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, minister of defense, "it now applies to the entire Armed Forces, to the entire system of military administration."

The role of military cadres also is increasing with regard to reinforcement of the indoctrination of soldiers in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and the combat collaboration of the armies of socialist countries.

Indoctrinated by the Communist Party, military men of the army and navy, true to Leninist behests and glorious combat traditions, in a unified order of battle [v yedinoe boyevom stroyu] with the fraternal armies of states participating in the Warsaw Pact, vigilantly stand guard over the achievements of socialism and the security of the peoples, prepared to give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor. Every time, it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, that the interests of the country's security and the defense of peace require, when the victims of aggression must be helped, the Soviet military man faces the world as an unselfish and courageous patriot and internationalist, prepared to surmount any difficulties.

The high evaluation of the Soviet Armed Forces given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the party's 26th congress inspires personnel to attain new successes in military work.

The duty and responsibility of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers for the combat readiness of units and ships, for the training and indoctrination of sergeants and petty officers, soldiers and sailors, are high. To be conscious of this duty and responsibility means to tirelessly increase their political and military knowledge and to spare no efforts in military work for fulfillment of the complex tasks advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Lenin, V. I., "The Urgent Tasks of Soviet Power," "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 36, pp 193-206.
2. Lenin, V. I., Speech on "Day of the Red Officer," 24 November 1918. Op. cit., Vol 37, p 200.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), Central Committee Report of 29 March." Op. cit., Vol 40, pp 254-257.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), Political Minutes of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee of 27 March." Op. cit., Vol 45, pp 110-123.
5. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the CPSU], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112.
6. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials on the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp 50-51, 71-72.
7. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, Ch 2.

8. Brezhnev, L. I., "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [On Guard for Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979.
9. Ustinov, D. F., "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1981

8936
1801/034

ARMED FORCES

FOLLOWUP ON COMPLAINT ABOUT WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 10, Oct 81 (signed to press 23 Sep 81) p 30

[Letters to ZNAMENOSSETS editorial staff in response to article "Behind the Line of a Report"]

[Text] This is what an article by Col V. Devin, printed in the May 1981 issue of the magazine, was called. It criticized shortcomings in indoctrination work with warrant officers of unit "X," where certain responsible individuals have not been thoroughly examining the lives, training and service of subordinate warrant officers, have not been demonstrating the necessary concern for their ideological conditioning and professional growth, have been indifferent at times to the needs and inquiries of the category of servicemen named, and have not rendered them assistance in resolving official and personal problems. All this has not contributed to consolidation of the unit's warrant officers. Individuals, including V. Zaynulin and A. Mar'yev, have submitted reports [raporty] with a request for early discharge from the ranks of the Armed Forces.

In connection with the article's publication, the editorial staff received a letter from the political directorate of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. It notes that the statement concerned is objective and important. The problems raised by the magazine have been thoroughly reviewed in the political section, as well as in conferences of the unit's commanders and political workers. Specific measures have been stipulated to improve work with the warrant officers. The inadmissibility of an indifferent attitude toward persons and the need for more attentive consideration of servicemen's complaints and applications were pointed out to Comrades V. Gurlev, V. Monakhov and other officers.

A detailed response to the magazine statement also was received from unit "X." It states that discussion of the article in the unit's party and Komsomol organizations, at meetings of warrant officers in May and June of this year, at official conferences of officers and warrant officers, and also at a meeting of the Komsomol committee indicated that the cases cited by the author actually took place.

Now attention toward warrant officers has been intensified in the unit. Supervision of the regularity and quality of their classes in political studies has been increased. The best trained officers are being brought in to deliver lectures to the warrant officers, and military justice employees have addressed them twice. More concern is being demonstrated for the warrant officers' military-professional

preparation, and supervision over the quality of classes in commander training has been improved. The confident and competent actions and initiative shown by the overwhelming majority of warrant officers in tactical field firing exercises is a practical result. In particular, Warrant Officers E. Yasevichyus, S. Gorshenin, Yu. Yershov, V. Mitrokhin and Yu. Ryabov, as well as Senior Warrant Officer A. Gusev, holder of the Order of the Red Star, and others distinguished themselves. For their skillful actions in training, more than 65 percent of the unit's warrant officers have been provided with incentive by a higher command element.

The personal responsibility of the chiefs of troop functions and branches and sub-unit commanders for the training and indoctrination of warrant officers has been increased. In particular, some of these officers have been heard at official conferences and at meetings of the party bureau. Attention to newly arrived servicemen has been increased. As an example, Yu. Rybakov, assigned to the position of supply depot chief, talked with the commander of the unit, his deputy for political affairs, the secretary of the Komsomol committee, and the chief of the troop function. In addition, Maj N. Kozlov personally familiarized himself with the housing conditions under which the Rybakov family was living. They required improvement without delay. Taking this situation into account, Rybakov and his family were allotted living space in a comfortable house, in spite of the short period of time the warrant officer had been in the unit. After publication of the article, apartments also were provided for Warrant Officers E. Yasevichyus, V. Il'inykh and S. Korovin. Living space in family dormitory facilities was assigned to Warrant Officer A. Mar'yev. The problem of an apartment for Warrant Officer V. Zaynulin will be resolved in the fourth quarter of this year. In the meantime, his family continues to live with relatives after considering a room in family dormitory facilities unsuitable.

Individual discussions have been held with all warrant officers. The unit's Komsomol committee, by eliminating neglect in work with warrant officer Komsomols, has tried to ensure that they are all included now in Komsomol assignments and are participants in the All-Union Leninist test [zachet] "Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress--in Practice!"

The steps taken are having a beneficial effect on the official and personal activities of the warrant officers. Now none of them, including V. Zaynulin and A. Mar'yev, will think about a transfer to the reserve.

The letter signed by the unit's commander and his deputy for political affairs concludes with the words: "Publication of the article 'Behind the Line of a Report' was timely and helpful. It helped us to see shortcomings and errors in work with warrant officers, to do everything necessary to eliminate them, and to continually keep this matter in sight."

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1981

8936

CSO: 1801/034

ARMED FORCES

ACTION TAKEN ON WARRANT OFFICER'S COMPLAINT

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 10, Oct 81 (signed to press 23 Sep 81) p 31

[Letter to ZNAMENOSETS editorial staff: "There Might Not Have Been a Complaint"]

[Text] The letter received by the editorial staff was disturbing. Reserve Warrant Officer Yaroslav Oleynik reported resentfully that he was discharged with the right to a pension, but his personnel record which came to the voyenkomat [military registration and enlistment office] turned out to be incomplete. As a result, they are holding back his pension and are not issuing the documents. Voyenkomat employees and he himself have applied to the unit and requested that the necessary information be sent, but they have not received a response. This procrastination already has lasted for 8 months.

Yes, the case, let us say frankly, is amazing. In the unit where the warrant officer was serving they treated callously a person who had given many years of military service, and not only did not correct the error, but did not even answer him.

As later events showed, the problem finally was resolved favorably. The editorial staff's inquiries were answered by Maj Gen N. Laguteyev, deputy chief of the political directorate of the Transbaykal Military District, and Col P. Churkin, chief of the military district's personnel directorate [upravleniye kadroy]. They reported that Comrade Oleynik's personnel records already have been put in the prescribed order and sent to the voyenkomat for his place of residence. Maj I. Yakovlev, the unit's staff officer, has been severely disciplined for the irresponsible attitude toward performance of official duties and incorrect handling of documents for the discharge of Warrant Officer Oleynik.

So justice triumphed and punishment has been given. But at what price? For a long time the warrant officer could not realize his legal right to a pension and find work because of the lack of documents. And he suffered a loss in morale, of course. The editorial staff and a directorate of the military district were involved in investigation of the complaint. And all because the responsible individuals provided with powers, whose sense of responsibility for their assigned work has been dulled, have not yet been transferred locally, callousness, indifference and nonchalance toward a person's fate come to light. It is impossible to explain or justify this in any way. But if they had shown elementary attention for the person, there might not have been a complaint.

As analysis of the editorial staff's mail shows, many problems which readers take to the editorial staff can and should be resolved locally. But in reality, as we see, this does not always happen.

In this regard it is appropriate to point out that the party's Central Committee, in its decree "On measures for further improvement in work with letters and suggestions from workers in the light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress," requires that the personal responsibility of managers and functionaries for correct organization of work with letters, suggestions and verbal appeals by workers be improved, and emphasizes the necessity of taking steps operationally on the substance of the problems raised and giving sound and timely responses to those who state the problems. These requirements should be steadfastly carried out by everyone.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1981

8936

CSO: 1801/034

ARMED FORCES

PARTY POLITICAL WORK

Role of Party Collective Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank S. Bystrov: "Under the Protection of a Protector"]

[Text] The party meeting lasted for six hours. Here nothing like it has been remembered for a long time, just as they do not remember an instance where the personal case of a communist trying to be awarded co-authorship of an instrument was placed on the agenda. This was attempted by the secretary of the commission on invention, Engineer-Captain Lieutenant Yuriy Moiseyevich Genin.

From his point of view, this entire story is not worth a plugged nickel. However, the party organization perceived it differently. And it is not even a matter of the fact itself. By his act, Genin stimulated the strongly electrified atmosphere in the collective to discharge.

Well known in the unit is the skillful worker, Warrant Officer [nichman] S. Novikov, who designed and created a "microfaradometer"--a small instrument which permits speeding up the check and selection of capacitors when adjusting electronic equipment. Engineer-Captain Lieutenant Genin recommended sending the "microfaradometer" to the VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] of the USSR. But when the instrument was ready for dispatch, Warrant Officer Novikov learned with surprise that now he is not the author, but only the co-author with Genin whose name appears first in all documents. Secretly "downgraded" to co-author, Novikov related what had happened to communist Engineer-Captain Lieutenant A. Stolbov, knowing him to be an honest, sympathetic and principled officer.

Delving into the essence of the matter, the latter submitted a statement to the party organization of the training center and requested an official investigation of what had happened. The party bureau invited communist Genin to its session, inviting him to provide an explanation concerning the incomprehensible co-authorship. Genin behaved aggressively. The bureau, not satisfied with his answers, ordered a party inquiry, assigning it to Engineer-Captain Lieutenant Yu. Son. But it proved to be a difficult matter to conduct the inquiry. Genin, as communist Yu. Son later noted at the meeting, hindered clarification of the truth in every possible way and, in turn, declared at the meeting that this was not an inquiry but the squaring of personal accounts. By the way, had any other communist conducted the inquiry Genin could have

said the same thing since his interrelationships with many officers had become very strained. And, according to Genin's words, this began when, one day, going away for two months, the chief of the training center, Engineer-Captain 2d Rank V. Kholenkov, left him in his place.

Returning to the events of that time, it should be said that Genin interpreted his new position uniquely: he decided to "show authority." He threatened the senior officer present, M. Mon'ko, with the guardhouse. Several times, as they say, he "pounced" on Engineer-Captain Lieutenant V. Zheleznyakov, in which regard, as the communists assert, only because of personal enmity. By the way, soon after this Zheleznyakov was elected to the party bureau at a party election meeting and then was elected secretary. And only several days later, finding a formal cause, he wrote two more severe reprimands in Zheleznyakov's service record.

So it turned out that the party organization evaluated highly the professional and moral qualities of its comrade which differed categorically from the opinion of the acting chief. By the way, this contradiction is not by chance. Genin always found a common language with the collective (if he found it) with difficulty. Many doubted his party qualities. At the party meeting which examined Genin's personal case, there were recommendations that he be excluded from the party. However, after hot debates the communists approved the decision of the bureau to issue him a severe reprimand with an entry in his record card.

By the way, the editors of the newspaper NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYAR'YA [Guarding the Polar Region] had prepared a topical satire under the heading "Santa Maria." This is the name of an elegant souvenir--the model of a frigate which was made by the hands of skilled workers from the training center. In a room which was camouflaged so that you can look but not find, Senior Seaman V. Semenov and Seaman Yu. Shishov created extremely attractive knickknacks...on the personal assignment of Comrade Genin who then distributed the souvenirs as he saw fit. Genin's arbitrariness which was mentioned above was also described in the topical satire.

Alas, the topical satire was not published.

When a person feels the condemnation of the entire collective, this exerts a very strong educational influence. Most likely, the training center's party organization would have reeducated Genin long ago, too, if he had not enjoyed the strong but not always correct support of the force staff. The topical satire also would have played its role if it had been published.

Support--this is a good word. But only if protection, which is often transformed into "cover up," does not stand behind it.

The representatives of the force staff who attended the party meeting, Engineer-Captain 1st Rank M. Korotkov and Engineer-Captain 2d Rank P. Kotelyanskiy, applied considerable effort to whitewash Yu. Genin. A special attempt was made by Pavel Pavlovich Kotelyanskiy who even went so far as to accuse the meeting, calling it collusion: "The thought arises," he said from the rostrum, "that all this is concocted and has no educational significance." What should Genin regret here, what should he confess? And so he left the meeting with the attitude of one offended. He said he wanted the best, for with his co-authorship the instrument would go

through all echelons more rapidly. But they decided to square accounts with him....

Now, evidently, the time has come to digress to the more distant past, when Comrade Genin applied for membership in the party. It was almost five years ago, so that reference to recent conflicts no longer has significance. Really, the communists who spoke for Genin at that first party meeting no longer serve here and were not at the examination of the personal affair. But here are some lines from the minutes of the meeting on accepting officer Yu. Genin as a candidate member of the CPSU:

Engineer-Captain Lieutenant V. Sipatov:

"Yuriy Moiseyevich has a number of substantial shortcomings: minor careerism, arrogance, and intolerance toward criticism. He ignores invitations to open party meetings, considering it an empty waste of time. I believe that he is pursuing personal goals by joining the party now...."

Engineer-Captain 2d Rank V. Konovalov:

"It is unwise to accept Genin as a candidate member of the CPSU so that he can correct his shortcomings in the period of his candidacy...."

Of eight attending, five spoke out against showing confidence in Genin's bearing the title of communist.

Let us say directly, an unpleasant thing happened then. Both for Yuriy Moiseyevich and for those who recommended him. Who gave the officer a recommendation so imprudently? It turns out, communists and officers of higher headquarters, E. Zenkevich and M. Korotkov, who are very respected and occupy a strong service position. Comrade Zenkevich does not serve in the force now, but we met with Engineer-Captain 1st Rank M. Korotkov. He said very many good words about the organizational and professional (and, at the same time, "penetrative") qualities of Yuriy Moiseyevich.

Yes, Genin is a "penetrative" person, but is this sufficient grounds for recommending him for the party?

It is good that the communists of the party organization did not experience any vacillations with respect to him and refused his acceptance into the party. But.... Genin is really a persistent and penetrative person. Waiting for the time when his main opponents would be absent and enlisting good support from above, he nevertheless managed to join the party. How he performed his duties as a communist which are written in the CPSU Regulation is evident from the minutes of the party bureau session at which his report was heard. "It was decreed: to point out to Comrade Genin his incorrect approach to ideological-indoctrinational work with the personnel, his underestimation of the role of party-political work in military service, and his lack of desire to raise his ideological-theoretical level."

...When the materials for this report were studied, a session of the party commission which examined the personal affair of communist Genin took place. The meeting's decision was not approved. Instead of a severe reprimand with an entry in his record card, he was given a severe reprimand....

Quality of Political Worker Cadres

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen A. Agafonov, chief of personnel directorate, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "In Step with the Times: On Some of the Problems in the Selection, Assignment, and Improvement of the Quality Composition of Political Worker Personnel"]

[Text] Recently, in speaking at a conference where questions of improving indoctrinational work in the large unit were discussed, Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Shibin said: "More than 95 percent of our soldiers and sergeants have a higher, secondary, or secondary technical education. They are people with high spiritual demands and a developed sense of dignity. Work with them imposes exceptional demands on the personality of the political worker...."

In the regiment where Shibin serves, the average age of the deputy company commanders for political affairs is 23 years of age, and of political workers of the battalion echelon--26. Let us add to this that the absolute majority of the political workers of the company and battalion echelon have a higher education.

The personnel are young, and this is a special feature of our time. This also presents a certain difficulty.

In the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, great attention was devoted to problems of improving the qualitative composition and assignment of supervisory personnel. The congress' requirements are also the main reference points in advancement to the post of political workers. Being the political leaders in the collective, they must actively carry the ideas of the party to the masses of the servicemen and achieve the specific realization of its decisions. We stress--specific. The Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army General A. A. Yepishev, repeatedly stressed that today the labor of the political worker is evaluated by how deeply he understood the tasks put forth by the party at the 26th CPSU Congress and how they are realized in close collaboration with the commander on the assigned sector in the interests of raising the ideological tempering of the men and the organization, discipline, vigilance, and combat readiness. Here this also determines the authority of the political worker and party leader and, if you desire, his contemporaneity and value for the matter.

Unfortunately, the professional, political, and moral qualities of candidates for advancement are not always evaluated from these positions. Recently, I asked one of the responsible comrades to describe a person whom he had recommended for a promotion in duties.

"He will work no worse than his predecessor," he answered.

"But will he be better?"

"Well, better--I don't know, but worse--no. Become familiar with his recommendations and testimonials...."

Of course, we became familiar with the officer's personal file. But we also learned some facts which do not describe him in the best light. Why not a word about them in the recommendations?

When you read the description of one officer or another, it happens that you automatically catch yourself thinking: does what has been said correspond to reality. Such a rosy personality which is devoid not only of any shortcomings, but of even the most usual human weaknesses is pictured in the documents. For some reason, some comrades believe that with advancement to a post one should indicate only favorable qualities. Well, and if a person is relieved as unable to cope, he must be blackened. Therefore, one-sided recommendations originate which are written as if using carbon paper.

This, for example, is what happened with the advancement of Lieutenant Colonel A. Solov'yev. If you believe the testimonials about him, he is a competent, conscientious political worker. But finding himself in a higher post where he was entrusted with the independent solution of an entire series of important problems, he showed himself to be an irresponsible person and placed his personal interests above service duty. It is hardly necessary to say that the erroneous advancement brought great harm to the cause and engendered in the collective a nervous atmosphere, unhealthy rumors, and doubts on the devotion to principle and competence of those who described Solov'yev and petitioned for his assignment to such a responsible post.

A person is complex and his character is many-faceted. And it is very important to evaluate him from all sides, in which regard, evaluating him objectively. One should not be satisfied only with noting, as often happens, organizational abilities and professional competence. This does not exhaust the requirements imposed on the leader's personality. It is just as important to consider whether he is able to implement the party line with all his activity, whether he is a model of devotion to principle and moral purity, and whether he is able to understand people.

In this connection, the following historical fact is recalled. In one of the telegrams, V. I. Lenin requested that he be given a testimonial on a comrade who occupied a supervisory post in the country's fishing industry from the standpoint of conscientiousness, and from a political position, knowledge of the matter, and administrative abilities. As you see, Vladimir Il'ich attached exceptional significance to such qualities as conscientiousness, responsibility, and competence of cadres.

The Lenin approach to the selection and assignment of personnel and their indoctrination was, is, and remains what determines the entire personnel policy of our state. The 26th Party Congress attached exceptional scale to this important question. The personality qualities of the leader and the political and moral consequences of his activity have been raised to a great state level. "The style and methods of leadership are a question which is important for the entire party, for the entire people," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the congress.

This is exactly how the problem of personnel is approached in the majority of political organs of the Armed Forces. Here is a typical example. The question of advancing the deputy commander for political affairs of one of the companies to a higher post was examined in the political department of the Guards Kantemirov Tank Division. In the course of a talk, this officer was asked many questions. What class is his qualification, is he an expert? How does he shoot and drive a combat vehicle? What obligations were assumed by the communists of the subunit and how are they being accomplished? What has he done specifically for their realization?... They analyzed whether the officer is able to understand his subordinates, whether he is sensitive to their demands, whether he is self-critical, and whether he has a sense of the new. It can be said that the person was checked as to how much he corresponds to that concept of the present-day leader which was formulated by the congress.

We never heard from the personnel of this large unit's political department the request: reinforce us with personnel. But there are such requests. For example, quite recently one of the chiefs of political organs appealed to us for such assistance. In so doing, he referred to the fact that individual comrades from among those who had been advanced earlier proved to have been erroneously appointed. But it was the political department itself which had advanced them.

As it turned out, people were advanced hastily, without a deep study of their professional qualities. But this is not the only point. They were not concerned here about training a reserve for advancement. There were few who were noted ahead of time and were trained for prospective movement to a higher post and were experienced in the work. And there always are opportunities for this. One of the senior political workers took off on leave or on detached service. He is replaced by others. It would be extremely useful to use such instances to check and temper officers in a post a step higher than the one occupied.

Strange though it may seem, in some places problems began to arise in the assignment of political workers to propagandist work. Here, they refer to the fact that one or another officer has no inclination for activity of this type. What is strange here is the fact that doubt is cast on the ability of the political worker to be a propagandist. But he is required to be one, whatever the official post he occupies.

I should like to say several words about such a category of political workers as deputy chiefs of political organs. Instances have become more frequent where officers are assigned to this post, knowing ahead of time that, if required, they cannot cope with duties a step higher. But you see, this post must be occupied by a person who is capable of heading a political department with time.

Life teaches that it still is not everything to select personnel. It is no less important to organize their command and professional training effectively. What does "effectively" mean?

It means tying training with practical deeds and with the specific tasks facing the personnel of the unit or ship and realizing the lines of the congress and the instructions of the Soviet minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. There can be no justification of a situation where, in a number of large units and units and on individual ships, training with political personnel is organized out of touch with today's problems in improving organizational, political, and intraparty work.

In this regard, they proceeded along the correct path, for example, in the political department of the large unit where Lieutenant Colonel V. Faletskiy works. Here they examine consistently and deeply at assemblies, seminars, practical scientific conferences and in the course of measures on the exchange of experiences the most important questions in the activity of the military collective and they approach creatively the practical solution of the problems raised by the congress. Measures are well thought out separately with experienced and young officers. Of course, personal experience is a great matter and a great value. But only in the case where it is combined with an innovational approach to the matter. If a person is accustomed to working one way and not another, the experience may fetter him. And it must not be a burden which hampers forward movement. On the other hand, young political workers have much energy and ardor. But an emotional approach toward the organization of political work does not compensate for a shortage of knowledge.

In planning professional training, a differentiated approach is necessary to exclude such instances where political workers of the company, battalion, and even regimental echelon are occupied in the same group. The tasks which they accomplish are far from the same and their training should be structured accordingly. Special thought is required by the professional training of young secretaries of party committees and bureaus who come to the leadership of party collectives in the course of forthcoming reports and elections in the party organizations of the Armed Forces. Individual instruction should become one of the basic methods for their training.

Party monitoring of the work of personnel is very important. The party Central Committee has attracted attention to this once again in its decree, "On further improvement in the monitoring and checking of execution in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress." A tested form for raising the responsibility of leaders consists of their reports and listening to them at sessions of party committees and political organs. The task is seeing that they proceed in a more exacting situation.

The next recommendation of officers begins in January 1982. It is a very important campaign. The solution of a number of problems of personnel policy in the Armed Forces depends on its successful conduct. Much should be done in the course of the recommendation by political organs and party organizations. Their objective party opinion and state approach to the solution of personnel problems are the guarantee of the successful accomplishment of the difficult tasks in training and indoctrinating the personnel and a further rise in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Principledness of Communist Discussion Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Sep 81 pp 2-3

[Article by Col Gen M. Sobolev, deputy chief of Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy: "One of the Chief Party Qualities"]

[Text] A discussion of the letter from Major V. Semenyuga, "The Principledness of a Communist," has taken place on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for more than three months. The editors received more than 600 responses. Many of them were published on the pages of the newspaper. What is noteworthy is the fact that the conversation concerned not only the principledness of the communist as one of the most important party qualities, but also the forms and effectiveness of party work, the attitude of

party members and candidates to their service duty, and party spirit in the highest understanding of this word. The letter, "Principledness of a Communist," became a subject for discussion in the overwhelming majority of party organizations of the Armed Forces. All this, unquestionably, will contribute to a further increase in the activity of communists and a growth in the influence of party organizations on all aspects of the troops' training and life.

At the 26th CPSU Congress it was stressed that our society is at a new level of development where moral problems and the upbringing of the personality of the builder of communism are thrust to the foreground in an organic tie with the accomplishment of national economic tasks. The role of the party as the directing and guiding force of society is growing. Today, any party organization, holding to the general party course, accomplishes tasks which are more difficult than had to be done formerly. If we take our army and navy party collectives, they also approach their practical activity from general party positions. The course toward the intensification of production finds reflection under armed forces conditions in the struggle for intensification of the training process and high quality of combat and political training. The well-known proposition concerning the acceleration of scientific and technical progress is embodied in the struggle to master new equipment, to create a contemporary training-material base, and its effective use. The tasks posed by the party in the field of ideology bear a most direct relation to the work practice of armed forces party organizations which are called upon to be centers of daily ideological-indoc-trinational activity.

The tempo of life, its transient nature, and the complicatedness of many social processes place on the agenda new and ever more difficult problems. The search for reserves in the productivity of our soldierly labor, for the improvement of socialist competition, and for ways to raise the quality of ideological work is continuing. At the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said to the primary party organizations: "A little more initiative, a little more principledness--this is what I should like to wish them from the congress rostrum!" This also pertains completely to the party organizations of the Armed Forces.

Many of the participants in the conversation on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, including Lieutenant General N. Shevkun, Colonel Ye. Sovokin, Major N. Trigub, and others were absolutely correct in stressing that the principledness of party organs and of all communists now consists primarily in the fact that they approach all their deeds and actions from positions of the high demands of the 26th Party Congress and that raising principledness of communists to a state level is one of the most important duties of political organs, party committees, and party bureaus.

Principledness is a specific concept and it has many components. But the determining one, perhaps, is the communist's striving to conduct the party line firmly always and in everything and the ability to stand up for one's convictions. Principledness should be militant and working to raise the combat readiness of the subunit, unit, ship and to strengthen military discipline and firm procedures as laid down by regulations. Just as any deep river absorbs streams and riverlets, the level of combat readiness of units, ships, and large units affects the state of combat readiness of the district, group of forces, and fleet and, in the end, the combat potential of the Armed Forces.

The 26th Party Congress defined the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces as the strong alloying of high technical equipping, military skill, and unconquerable morale. Let us look at our party work from these positions, let us cast a glance at practical deeds through the prism of party principledness, and let us analyze how it affects the accomplishment of the specific tasks facing the military collectives.

The party and the government are tirelessly concerned about the technical equipping of the Armed Forces. The practical response to this concern is in the striving of the personnel to make a deeper study of the equipment entrusted to them, to service it in a quality manner, to operate it skillfully, and in the constant improvement of the training-material base. Many of the letters of readers which responded to the letter of Major V. Semenyuga report on how the communists approach the solution of these problems in a principled manner. They achieve the quality and effective use of simulators, simulator complexes, and other technical means of instruction on each lesson. In particular Lieutenant Colonel V. Kocheshkov, Major V. Dyrnov, and others wrote about this.

However, there is another type of response, the authors of which report that the question of intensification of the training process was repeatedly discussed at party meetings and sessions of the party committee. Correct decisions were adopted but, as they say, nothing happens.

It is not decisions which are needed on each occasion, but practical deeds. The principledness of the party commission consists of raising the responsibility of the communists with all forms of its activity. It causes satisfaction that many authors of letters move this question to the foreground and consider it necessary to intensify the monitoring and checking of execution, to stiffen party demand for the accomplishment of decisions, and to punish more severely those communists whose words differ from deed.

However powerful our equipment may be, by itself it does not bring victory in battle. Victory depends on the degree of training and military skill which, in peacetime, are determined by the knowledge, ability, and practical skills of the personnel. And this was confirmed convincingly once again by the exercises "Zapad [West]-81."

It is symbolic that they took place on land which had been tormented by the iron of past engagements and strewn with the ashes of burned villages and cities. The heirs to the frontline glory marched over the same roads as those traversed by their grandfathers and fathers in battles. The situation on the exercises was as close as possible to a combat situation. The successful result of the exercises and the experience of combat and party-political work accumulated in the course of them, where all problems were resolved from profoundly principled positions, is a good school for the troop collectives at the concluding stage of the training year.

This experience should be introduced on each lesson and there should be a struggle for each minute of training time and for the accomplishment and exceeding of each standard, using for this all the moral resources which socialist competition provides.

Very much depends on the principledness of communists, the party organ, and the party organization. Instructive in this regard are the letters of Lieutenant Colonel N. Krasnoshchek, Majors Ye. Pakhomov and V. Gavrilov, Captain I. Kosenko, and other

readers. Using specific examples, they prove convincingly that the principled position of the communists and party organ is the reliable shield against indulgences in combat training and against simplification in the organization of the training process and that socialist competition, if it is not on paper but in living deeds, harbors inexhaustible possibilities to raise military skill.

Meanwhile, in our practice we sometimes still encounter instances where, in the pursuit of imaginary successes, individual communists strive to embellish the state of affairs. What this path leads to was shown graphically in his letter by Lieutenant Colonel T. Yerizhokov who described how the subunit commanded by Major V. Knyazev surrendered its positions and lost the name of leader. And one of the reasons was the commander's lack of principles, his lack of desire to make an objective estimate of the state of affairs in the collective, and attempts at eyewash in accountings and reports to higher echelons.

In real combat, there will be no time to perfect knowledge. There will be neither time nor a pause there to make up what has been omitted in combat training. The hours lost because of the unjustified separation of people from combat training for various types of administrative work (there were also many letters about this in the mail of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) will not be made up and will not return. Simplifications and indulgences turn into such losses in battle for the unit and subunit that it will be very difficult to make them up.

The uncompromising nature of combat operations requires the bravery of each fighting man--from soldier and seaman to general and admiral and the highest mobilization of their spiritual strength. For victory, as Vladimir Il'ich Lenin said, depends on "...the spiritual condition of those masses which are shedding their blood on the field of battle."

The morale of the personnel and the moral atmosphere of any collective are determined to no small degree by the work style of the military cadres and by their efficiency, personal example, and party principledness in the solution of various problems. The subject of principledness under army conditions cannot be examined apart from the concept of "unity of command." Complete authority is concentrated in the hands of the commanders. They step forth as the conductors of party policy in the Armed Forces, rely on the party and Komsomol organizations in daily work, and use their mobilizing force and creative activity to raise the combat readiness of the units and ships. Strengthening unity of command and the commander's authority and instilling confidence and respect for him and an understanding of the unquestioning execution of his orders and instructions are one of the most important directions of party work in the troop collectives.

In a number of letters which the editors received, the thought is stressed that the words "unity of command," "party spirit," and "principledness" are inseparable and that the moral atmosphere of the collective is directly linked with the ability of the leader to direct the activity of the party organization, be principled in everything, and consider the educational consequences of each of his administrative steps. The readers present a great number of examples where the principled position of the commander and his correct decision on various questions painlessly resolve any conflicts in their very incipency.

However, there also are examples of another type which show how a lack of principle in the evaluation of facts and actions on the part of the communist-leader leads to the birth of rumors and idle talk which immediately influence a worsening of the moral climate in the collective. What alerts us is the fact that some comrades interpret in their own way the provision of Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy concerning the impermissibility of criticizing orders and instructions. They believe, they say, that any criticism of a senior in rank is "insubordination." Actually, orders and instructions are not discussed but, as Captain 1st Rank P. Yegorov correctly writes, we do not have the right to remain silent about abuses, dishonesty, coarseness, and so forth because, in this case, the communist goes out from under the influence of the party organization.

The ground will be cut out from under the feet of such cases where unity of command is implemented strictly on a party basis and where the sole commander combines demandingness with sensitivity and attention to people and himself participates actively in party work and, by his personal principledness, instills this quality in his subordinates.

Of course, it is not so simple to be principled always and in everything. Firmness of spirit and bravery, a high sense of citizenship, and a keen conscience are needed for this. A fighting man's qualities are needed.

Alas, they are not given to everyone by birth. It happens that principles are kept in the consciousness of a person very unsteadily and do not stimulate him to active action. And if they are not stimulated in such a person and his party conscience is not alarmed, he becomes a "taciturn" person. This is what many authors of letters call those who try to live quietly and unnoticed, keep silent at party meetings when urgent questions are discussed, and who try not to interfere in anything as long as it does not touch them.

Principledness must be instilled--almost all participants in the readers' conversation are unanimous on this. The instilling of principledness is influenced by the entire system of ideological work, the level of party relations, an atmosphere of exactingness and mutual demandingness, and the status of criticism and self-criticism in the collective. Its basis is provided by high ideological conviction and realization of the social significance of one's soldierly labor. This thought is supported and developed in their letters by Lieutenant Colonels V. Kotel'nikov and A. Konovalov, Guards Captain of Technical Service G. Malets, and others. Principledness is instilled by the entire tenor of life of the party collective which, in turn, depends on the status of intraparty work--the most correct barometer which determines the degree of activity of the communists' life position.

Many of the authors of letters to the editors reflect on the quality of our party meetings and stress that they are the main school for instilling principledness. A correct thought is expressed by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel V. Matveykov, who states that they play such a genuine role only in the case where the communists raise their collective conversation to the level of general party concerns. A problem, phenomenon, or specific goal can be evaluated correctly only by looking at it from positions of the development of our society and the party's program goals. At the same time, as many responses confirm, such a yardstick is still not always used in approaching the conduct of party meetings in political organs, party committees, and bureaus, and

in some party collectives they still have not become a genuine school for the indoctrination of communists.

It must be remembered that businesslike, constructive criticism is the most important means for improving the organizational and ideological-indoctrinational activity as well as the work style of commanders, political workers, and party organizations, the organization of socialist competition, and the strengthening of discipline and combat readiness.

Each case of the suppression of criticism should be perceived as an extraordinary occurrence in the life of the party organization. Each suppressor of criticism should be held answerable to his party comrades. That is why the principled position of political organs, party committees and bureaus, and the entire collective of communists is so important here. That is why it is so important to provide an objective evaluation of the content of criticism.

The readers call attention to the uniformity of the questions discussed by the primary organization, and some of the important questions of the life and activity of primary party organizations seem to remain in the shadows. But it is also necessary to speak of the moral ill-breeding of individual communists and about self-conceit, egoism, money-grubbing, and so forth because the manifestation of such a psychology is entering more and more into contradiction with our notions of the personality of the Soviet man.

The instilling of principledness in communists is not a matter of one day; it is a long-term and purposeful process. It begins with the day that a person is accepted as a candidate CPSU member and proceeds continuously. Party assignments, reports and listening to accounts, and participation in the execution of the party organization's decisions are generally known forms of this work. Political organs, party committees, and party bureaus must analyze their content more often and more deeply, adopt measures directed toward raising the quality and effectiveness of intraparty work more efficiently, and evaluate its effectiveness in a more principled manner. In instilling principledness in communists and encouraging its manifestation, they should see that it is dictated by the interests of the matter.

A useful conversation took place on the pages of the newspaper. It is believed that it will find active continuation in the course of the election campaign which is now taking place in the party organizations of the Armed Forces. It is the duty and obligation of political organs, party committees, party bureaus, and all communists to evaluate objectively their achievements at the concluding stage of the training year, to analyze the reasons for shortcomings and missed opportunities, to draw correct conclusions for the future, and to approach the practical affairs of the collective from principled party positions. The 26th CPSU Congress commits us to this.

6367

CSO: 1801/011

AIR FORCES

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN AIR TRANSPORT AVIATION UNITS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 18 Sep 81) pp 43-47

[Article by Maj Gen Avn V. Kolchanov, deputy chief, Political Department, Air Force Military Transport Aviation: "By Means of Party Influence"]

[Text] A most important factor in successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned to units and subunits is an improvement in the level of purposeful activity by party organizations and its influence on the state of affairs. Party organizations see their main obligation as strengthening their influence on forming an elevated ideological-moral atmosphere in military collectives, by means of their characteristic forms of work and, on this basis, achieving high-quality accomplishment of tasks of combat and political training, and strengthening military discipline and organization in all units and subunits.

The increased level of combat skill of aircrews, subunits and units as a whole persuasively attests to the fact that stable, high results of combat training and indoctrination of personnel are impossible without further development of the initiative and activeness of party organizations. Many of them have amassed a wealth of practical experience. They have begun penetrating more deeply into the root questions of combat readiness and aircrew flying proficiency. This was precisely how things were in ensuring accomplishment of combat training tasks in the winter period of training and especially during the period of preparation for and holding of troop and naval forces exercises under the direction of USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov. In the course of these exercises military transport aviation political workers and party organizations concentrated the attention of Communists on matters pertaining to smooth operation of control entities, group smoothness of subunits, and improvement of airborne assault tactics. Practical confirmation was obtained for the system of shortening the time required to deliver troops into a limited area, and personnel became enriched with skills of readying equipment in different variations of combat employment.

The party organization in which officer I. Luk'yanchuk is a party committee member has amassed instructive experience in organizational and political work on increasing party influence on the quality of combat training. All matters connected with ensuring effective training and indoctrination are examined in a most concrete and specific form. The reasons for deficiencies in combat training are analyzed at party committee and party bureau meetings, and concrete measures are

taken to correct errors of omission and to raise the level of theoretical knowledge and practical skills of aircrews and technical personnel.

For example, navigator deficiencies in young aircrews became evident in the course of summer training. Particularly fluctuating results in practical airborne assault activities were achieved by the subunit in which Maj S. Motovilov serves. The party committee looked into the reasons for this deficiency and took measures to strengthen party influence on improving the air proficiency of aircrew personnel. Experienced specialists party members N. Brilev, A. Anikin, and A. Burlakov, experts at their job, were sent to the party organization of this subunit to assist it. They interviewed pilots, navigators, and crew chiefs and analyzed objective monitoring data together with leader-Communists, as well as utilization of drill sessions in developing coordinated actions by aircrews en route. Party committee member navigator 1st class Capt A. Burlakov flew several missions with young aircrews as a practical airborne assault instructor. It was determined that some aircrews would become nervous en route to the objective. Endeavoring to perform the mission as well as possible, some crew members performed with inadequate coordination, which hindered them from achieving consistently high results. These observations and conclusions were discussed at an enlarged meeting of the party committee, and in the subunit -- at a party meeting with the agenda "Ways to increase party influence on the navigation training of young aircrews." A sharp discussion was held. Party members S. Motovilov and N. Kul'beda acknowledged that they had been paying inadequate attention to the navigation training of young aircrews.

The resolution passed at the meeting specified concrete measures to strengthen work with individuals and pertaining to exchange of experience and know-how among the top specialists. The party committee made a recommendation to the flight activities section of the unit's methods council -- to discuss methodology of navigation training of young aircrews and to submit the necessary recommendations to all subunits. Questions pertaining to strengthening party influence on navigation training of aircrews were examined at seminars of secretaries of party organizations and party group organizers, as well as aircrew and navigator leader personnel. All these efforts had a positive effect on the performance of the subunit's aviators.

The military proficiency and morale of pilots, navigators and aviation specialists as well as their preparedness and capability to perform combat missions are regularly tested at exercises. Recently all flight training missions have been accomplished with marks of good and excellent exclusively. Such success is determined by a number of factors, including the increased skill of aircrews and reliability of equipment. The airborne troopers, who well know the value of the aviator's labor, invariably repeat: "We trust you." The airborne assault troops acquire this confidence at the airfields, troop pickup zones, landing zones, on the ground and in the air.

The military aviators prepare for every exercise as for an examination. Each exercise tests not only the skill and coordination of aircrews, the smooth teamwork of subunits and the level of control and tactical thinking, but also effectiveness of party-political work and the ability of political agencies and party organizations to mobilize Communists and all personnel for high-quality performance of their assigned tasks.

Party measures play an important role if they are well thought through and prepared. For example, on the eve of an important exercise the political section in which Maj V. Sapunov works recommended that party organizations discuss the question "The organizing role of Communists in preparing for and carrying out exercise tasks." Political section and staff officers presented reports at meetings. In conformity with the decisions, an exchange of know-how was conducted among the leading categories of specialists, pertaining to preparing for an exercise, and instruction sessions were held for party and Komsomol activists, agitators and political information people. The missions of the exercise and preparations for it were broadly reflected in visual agitation. These and other measures conducted by the Communists affected training results: all subunits received high marks. Similar work was done more extensively and in greater detail on the eve of the "West-81" [Zapad-81] exercise. Previous experience played a positive role here.

Other forms and methods of party influence which have proven effective in practice are also extensively utilized in many units in the course of combat training. Communists actively participate in explaining to personnel the missions of an exercise, ways to accomplish them, commander orders and instructions, and in organizing joint political rallies for airborne assault troops and aircrews, resulting in mutual pledges in the area of accomplishing a high-quality airborne assault operation. Extensively employed measures include get-togethers between veteran and younger specialists, talks by veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and release of special issues of wall newspapers, news bulletin operational news sheets and printed news flashes publicizing outstanding performers. Trooping the colors to the departure point has considerable indoctrinational and mobilizing significance.

Experience in joint party work in military transport aviation and in airborne assault subunits is being amassed. Here is an indicative example of such teamwork at the "West-81" army and navy exercise.

...The mission was to put airborne assault troops precisely into the designated area quickly. The difficulty of the mission was increased by bad weather.

At the initiative of the political agency in which officer N. Astakhov serves, a joint meeting was held for assault troopers and aircrews. Every trooper became acquainted with the following statement made by the aircrews: "Dear fighting friend! You are on board a powerful aircraft, which is capable of delivering you precisely to the destination in any weather. The aircrew assures you that you will be delivered on schedule. We wish you success in carrying out your combat mission!"

The fliers kept their word: all aircrews delivered men and equipment precisely on target and received high praise from the command authorities and the heartfelt gratitude of the airborne assault troops.

Socialist competition is becoming increasingly more important in improving the quality and effectiveness of combat training and the forming of excellent moral-political qualities in aviator personnel. Party organizations, guided by the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, All-Union Central Trade Union Council and Komsomol

Central Committee entitled "On All-Union Socialist Competition for Successful Fulfillment and Overfulfillment of the Targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan," are directing the initiative of Communists and all personnel on developing competitiveness even more extensively in the campaign to increase combat readiness, for excellent mastery of new aircraft equipment, adoption of advanced know-how, and fuller utilization of all the capabilities of each collective. They proceed from the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev that what we need is not a lot of talk and unrealistic undertakings but rather businesslike initiative, which proceeds upward and is reinforced organizationally.

Recently there have developed in the military transport aviation units and subunits such valuable initiatives, widely supported by personnel, as "Excellent performance by each duty crew," "All practical airborne assaults with maximum accuracy and precision," and "Perform all servicing procedures with excellent quality." When learning to operate new equipment, subunit personnel successfully compete for shortening the time required to preflight aircraft, as well as flawless performance of flight assignments. Performance results are totaled up each time crews are relieved. This fosters development of a spirit of competitiveness, significantly improves the quality of repetition learning, and develops a feeling of personal responsibility for strict observance of documents regulating flight operations procedures.

Socialist competition under the slogan "For excellent combat readiness and firm observance of procedures!" is taking place on a large scale. Party organizations, making every effort to support the initiative of outstanding personnel, concentrate their efforts on ensuring extensive publicity, comparability of results, and the opportunity for practical reiteration of advanced know-how and organization of comradely assistance. Particular attention is devoted to encouraging competition directly in the aircrews, detachments and groups, and creation in each collective of an atmosphere of genuine innovative search, activeness and mutual assistance.

...Crew party group organizer Communist V. Antipov suggested at an open group party meeting that they discuss the matter of how to disseminate the initiative of leading aviation-specialists -- to meet daylight performance standards when operating at night. The discussion was followed by concrete proposals. They are presently being successfully carried out in a number of subunits.

Other forms of work are also being used in the campaign to increase the effectiveness of socialist competition, including seminars and conferences of secretaries of party organizations and party group organizers, and presentation of reports and summaries by party members on their exemplariness in meeting socialist pledges. Particular concern is focused on ensuring a vanguard role by CPSU members and probationary members, which in large measure predetermines the sociopolitical and professional activeness of all personnel.

The strength of party influence on the practical affairs of military collectives is directly dependent on how they carry out the demand that party organizations be transformed into a center of daily ideological indoctrination activity. Confirmation of this is the purposeful work done by the Communists of the subunit in which Capt Yu. Onorin serves as party bureau secretary. Their daily efforts are directed toward ensuring skillful, comprehensive utilization of all means of

ideological influence and making indoctrinational work more flexible and effective. Party activists are constantly concerned to ensure a high ideological level and effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training of officers and political instruction for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, and help group instructors conduct all classes in a close link with the tasks being performed by personnel. Bureau meetings hear reports by party members who are instructors of Marxist-Leninist training groups and political classes, dealing with study of the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, as well as brief reports on this subject by other comrades. Subunit commander Maj V. Sidorenko, delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, takes most active part in this work, and shows daily concern for forming in his subordinates a vigorous attitude toward life and achieving high results in training and discipline. The steady training progress made by the men of the squadron attests to the effectiveness of indoctrination activities. The majority of the members of this leading group of airmen are excellent rated in combat and political training.

There are also many other party organizations in military transport aviation with activities promoting the achievement of the highest training results by personnel. The political section closely studies their experience in order to help other party organizations work more persistently to improve the forms and methods of their work, to strengthen monitoring and verification of execution of decisions, and to evaluate in a more highly principled manner the contribution of each party member to the combat training and indoctrination of personnel, and to respond acutely to deficiencies.

Improvement of the activities of party groups is of great importance in increasing the activeness and aggressiveness of primary party organizations. Their purposeful work directly among the personnel of subunits, detachments and aircrews is a guarantee of the men's success in military labor. This is confirmed by practical experience.

The specifics of military transport aviation are such that frequently accomplishment of a combat mission or special assignment depends on the actions of individual crews. Frequently they perform complex missions in small groups or individually, remaining for an extended period of time away from the main base. Here again the role of the party group advances to the forefront -- a force which unifies an aircrew. The party nucleus among pilots and navigators, engineers, technicians and other specialists has increased appreciably as a result of improvement in the matter of selecting for party membership top personnel of the leading categories. This made it possible to establish party groups on each aircraft and to ensure a higher level of their influence on aircrews and the quality of mission performance.

We must admit that there are still many unresolved problems in the work of party organizations and party groups. Not all of them are fully utilizing their capabilities to increase party influence on the life and activities of units and subunits, and some lack principledness in evaluating the state of affairs. Many do not properly employ individual forms of indoctrination and the proven practice of receiving party member reports and summaries. A good deal of formalism occurs.

Party organizations are the political nucleus of military collectives. They unify and cement army ranks. Therefore it is important to work persistently to improve their organizational activities and more fully to utilize their strength and influence in accomplishing all tasks.

Preparations are now in progress, under the guidance of political agencies, for report-election meetings, at which the question of the role and place of the Communist in enhancing the authority and increasing the aggressiveness of party organizations will of course also be discussed. The purpose of these meetings is once again to analyze the contribution of CPSU members and probationary members to the common cause of the campaign to increase combat readiness. Such a formulation of the question will help each party member more acutely perceive his own personal responsibility for the status of indoctrinational work and the results of military labor in a given military collective, and unquestionably will exert the most beneficent influence on the attitude of one's fellow soldiers toward carrying out their professional duties. Political section workers view achievement of such results as a guarantee of a favorable indoctrinational effect on accomplishment by personnel of the tasks of combat and political training, and further strengthening of military discipline.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh S11", 1981

3024

CSO: 1801/019

GROUND FORCES

TACTICAL MISSILE DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNIYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 8 Oct 81) pp 40-41

[Article by Eng-Col V. Knyaz'ko: "The Tactical Missile"]

[Text] We can easily find in an encyclopedia the classical definition of the term "tactics." It is a component of military art--that component which embraces the theory and the practice of conducting combat with subunits, units, ships and formations.

It is not difficult, using this definition, to understand the meaning of "tactical missile" as well. Such a missile is "tactical" in the sense that it is used mainly in the interest of the units and formations conducting the battle. A battle (not an operation!), regardless of the type--offensive, defensive or encounter.

The Ground Forces, the Air Forces and the Naval Forces have tactical missiles. They can be launched from land-based mobile launchers, from bombers, fighters, helicopters, surface ships and submarines.

The Ground Forces have self-propelled launchers. They are highly maneuverable and have good cross-country capability. Structurally, a launcher consists of two parts: an artillery section and a self-propelling section. The artillery section includes the launching rail, on which the missile is attached, a rotating frame, elevating gear, traversing and balancing mechanisms, sighting devices and electrical equipment. The self-propelling section, sometimes called the chassis, is taken in its entirety from the IS-2 tank. Imagine a tank, that impressive armored vehicle, from which the massive turret with the armament has been removed and replaced with a launching rail. This would roughly describe the structure of a launcher.

Now it is clear why a missile launcher has all the elements of maneuverability inherent in a tank. This includes average speed, cross-country and turning capability. Furthermore, the launching rail and the missile have not greatly altered the weight and dimensions of the combat vehicle as a whole.

The missile weighs approximately 4,900 kilograms, with the warhead accounting for 1,200 kilograms. The missile is 10 meters long, and the diameter of the missile section is slightly more than 0.6 meter.

There is no need to discuss cross-country capability: Like that of all tracked vehicles it is fairly good. The unit exerts a specific pressure on the ground comparable

to that produced by a grown man. It has a range of several hundred kilometers. The launcher has excellent turning capability. Like a tank, it can turn practically in place.

With these combat features the launcher can make long trips in any season and at any time of the day, rapidly deliver a tactical missile to the launch position and strike at the enemy with accuracy.

After it has arrived at the launch site and occupied the prescribed position, the unit must be rapidly readied for the launching. At the command "Into battle!" the mechanic-driver must open the main valve. The missilemen then remove the cover from the unit and the straps from the missile, level the launcher and connect the remote control panel.

In the meantime computers are preparing the initial firing data. They know the coordinates of the launching position and of the target and can calculate the firing range. In order to determine the final sight setting, however, they must consider all possible variables, including weather conditions.

"And what does the weather have to do with it?" one might ask. Does the weather actually affect a missile launching? Yes, it does. Using the classical methods of classification, the given weapon model can be defined as follows: "a single-stage, free-flight, solid-fuel, ramp-launched tactical missile."

Notice that the missile is not guided on its flight path. In other words, it moves on a ballistic trajectory, the same as an ordinary stone thrown by a person. The missile engine operates for only a very brief period of time. All of the solid fuel which almost fills the 10-meter-long hull of the missile burns up in 4.7 seconds. The missile is literally "shot" into the air, flying toward a target located tens of kilometers from the launching site.

During this time the missile can encounter unexpected elements. While the wind in the launching area may be blowing in one direction, as an example, it may be blowing in the opposite direction entirely up there in the air, and with a force several times greater. The missile is subjected to the "sail effect" and may be carried off to the side, with a deterioration of striking accuracy. And striking accuracy is the most important combat indicator for any missile. It must be adequately high. This is especially important when firing only one missile at a time.

The meteorologist "handles" the weather. He connects a cylinder to a sounding balloon, which rapidly fills with gas. At a prearranged signal the sounding balloon goes up, driven by air currents, and begins to test the atmosphere in the flight path sections. This is an important and responsible operation. A special portable station records the position of the sounding balloon in the air at prescribed times. The force of the wind at various altitudes and its direction are determined from these data. These variables are taken into account by the computers.

While on the subject of such an important combat characteristic of a missile as its firing accuracy, we should explain certain technical solutions to the problems proposed by Soviet designers. Let us mention at least the phenomenon of the missile's turning motion on the flight path. We know from our physics course in school that any

lever is characterized by two factors--force and lever arm length. And thrust eccentricity acts as a sort of lever affecting the missile in flight with the missile engine operating.

Just what is this generally harmful phenomenon? Certain permissible errors are always made when a missile is produced and assembled at the plant. The axis of the missile engine, along which the rocket thrust is directed, therefore does not coincide exactly with the missile's longitudinal axis. The designers reduce the degree of displacement to the minimum, but it still exists. And in the 4.7 seconds during which the missile engine accelerates the missile, the force factor which develops causes it "to drift" away from the prescribed flight path. It is impossible to predict the direction of the drift in advance.

If the missile had an onboard control system it could eliminate the deviation itself. We have stressed the fact that this missile is unguided, however. The designers have suggested that the missile be designed so that it rotates in flight. The physical effect would be that while a force tending to push the missile to one side would act upon it at a given moment, a moment later, when the missile had rotated 180 degrees, this force would be offset by the same degree of force pushing it in the opposite direction.

The technical realization of this proposal would not be so very difficult. The launching rail itself imparts an initial turning motion to the missile. The launching [guiding] rail fully justifies its name: "It assures a prescribed azimuth and elevation angle during the missile launching. It also has another function.

A helical T-shaped guide runner, along which the missile anchor runs during the launching, is attached to the longitudinal beam of the launching rail. In flight, however, after the missile has left the launcher, it turns by itself, figuratively speaking. In order to understand how this happens we need to turn to the missile design. We can see from the drawing that it consists of two main parts--the warhead and the power unit. The latter is a two-chamber, solid-fuel unit. It consists of a forward combustion chamber and a rear combustion chamber. Note the nozzle cap of the forward chamber. This is a so-called intermediate nozzle cap, which has a reducer cone for connecting it to the rear combustion chamber. There are 12 nozzle openings around its circumference, the axis of which is declined from the missile's longitudinal axis at an angle of 15 degrees. This prevents the emitted gas jet from striking the rear chamber hull, since the jets of incandescent gas are directed backwards and to the side.

There is one other peculiarity, however. The axes of the nozzle openings differ from the generating axis by 3 degrees. This is a slight angle, to be sure, but it is adequate to produce a reactive force which creates a torque imparting a rotary motion to the missile around its longitudinal axis.

When the aiming process has been completed, the commander orders the crew into the shelter.

The specialists lean over the panel. All of the transparencies on the panel are already lighted up, confirming the readiness of the missile and the launcher. This means that all of the systems and mechanisms have been checked and adjusted. Their parameters are within the range of permissible error.



Finally, the brief, staccato command "Launch!" comes. The black button is depressed, and the electrical circuits close. The missile engine begins to start up. How does this occur?

Current is fed to explosive charges through the contacts of powder squibs. The incandescent filament ignites the solid fuel compound. The beam of fire created ignites the black powder in the forward chamber igniter. The temperature and the power gas pressure build up rapidly in this closed area. Literally within a few moments they reach levels at which the solid fuel in the forward chamber begins to burn. The incandescent gases expand in all directions, but there is only one place for them to go--through the opening in the nozzle cap. They burst into the rear chamber through this cap and flow around its igniter, the beam of fire from which "activates" the Semi-charge.

The engine starting process is so rapid that both combustion chambers practically begin functioning simultaneously. The metal plugs which seal the nozzle under ordinary operating conditions are pushed out by the pressure of the powder gases. The combustion products begin flowing out through all the nozzle openings. Jet thrust is immediately created, and the missile begins to move on the launching rail.

"Begins to move" is putting it mildly, of course, but it is a technically accurate statement. The fiery vortex literally blasts the missile from the launcher. The eye can barely follow the oblong body as it grows small above the edge of the forest and disappears in the distance, the roar of the missile engine still pounding in the ears and clouds of smoke rolling over the launching position in waves....

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1981.

11049
ISS: 1801/031

NAVAL FORCES

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK ON A SUBMARINE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 18 Sep 81) pp 48-54

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Tkachev: "With Faith in Man"]

[Text] A submarine's deputy commander for political affairs, just as all other officers, has a great deal to do prior to putting out to sea for an exercise. He must prepare for and conduct a party and Komsomol meeting. He must, working together with the party organization secretary, distribute Communist manpower in such a manner that each and every member of the crew will be under their daily influence. It is necessary to select and confirm watch crew party group organizers for the duration of the cruise and to instruct them, Komsomol activists, and the compartment agitators. And dozens of additional various necessary tasks rest on the shoulders of the political worker.

Capt-Lt Yu. Tatariyev ran himself ragged, traveling back and forth up and down the long stairway, running down the steep hillslope from the shore base to the docks, where his submarine was moored. By deep-rooted habit Yuriy Semenovitch endeavored personally to visit all action stations and to become involved in all aspects of preparations prior to putting to sea. And wherever the deputy commander for political affairs happened to be, on the boat or at the crew's shore quarters, everywhere people turned to him with their own personal and, in their view, important problems and requests requiring immediate action.

"Comrade Captain-Lieutenant, let Petty Officer 1st Class Gul' go home with all the men being discharged into the reserves," requested cook Sn I. Myasnikov, embarrassed and agitated. "Believe me, I can handle the job. You'll see, there won't be any complaints about the food...."

"Prepare yourself, Myasnikov, for working unsupervised in the galley," Tarariyev interrupted him, knowing that he was about to get a long argument and explanations. "And understand that personnel who have completed their term of enlistment are requesting to stay for this cruise not because they do not trust you, their replacement. It is simply that love of the sea and one's ship are expressed here strongly on the eve of parting."

POs 1st Class A. Gus'kov and L. Kashko, commanders of the engine-room departments, came to the political worker with petitions for their colleague, PO 2d Class

A. Argunov, that he not be assigned to a construction party. "He has learned his lesson; things in his department are now running smoothly," argued Gus'kov. "And we will vouch for him: Andrey is a reliable man to have along...."

"Very well, Argunov may remain on the boat," replied the deputy commander for political affairs, bringing smiles to the petty officers' faces.

Each such brief conversation was echoed by joy in Yuriy Semenovich's heart, for to some measure it was a result of his work with personnel.

Of all the young replacements who had arrived last fall, Seaman Myasnikov proved to be the least prepared for difficult submarine duty. Out at sea, submerged, in the stuffiness of the compartments, permeated by the smell of engine oil, everybody finds it difficult to stand watch, to perform at drills and exercises, but it is particularly unpleasant for cooks, working on a hot electric stove. But the crew must be fed four meals a day, plus dinner for the night watch. The work load was too much for Myasnikov. Nor could cook-instructor PO 1st Class Ye. Gul' manage alone -- a person can do only so much. In addition, the young seaman was not advancing well in training -- he was barely earning a mark of fair in political instruction classes and special training.

Frequently during the midday meal the men would good-heartedly joke: "Once again this 'culinary technical school' was doing the cooking -- he has transformed the meat into a shoe sole," and there was a layer of fat in the soup. There were also suggestions made that Myasnikov should be transferred off the boat. But the political worker firmly insisted: We shall train and indoctrinate this new man. He himself paid more frequent visits to the galley to check how Petty Officer 1st Class Gul' was imparting his experience and know-how to his subordinate. The boat's Komsomol committee proceeded to help out. With time the sailor grew both intellectually and physically. He developed into a good cook, and he was no longer at the tail end in training.

The situation with Petty Officer 2d Class Argunov was a different story. He is an excellent specialist and knows diesel engines like the back of his hand. But he has a latent laziness and is obstinate. He did not particularly trouble himself with training his subordinates, and he liked to grumble, both with and without cause. Tarariyev happened to witness one occasion when he was holding forth in a group of junior command personnel.

"I'll tell you, boys, there is no worse fate than to serve on a boat with a crew trying hard to become leading performers," stated Argunov. "I have talked with petty officers on other boats; they highly praise that performance which is criticized here. You work, you work, but...."

"Why have you fallen silent, Argunov? Go ahead, spit it out," the political worker said to Argunov, who had stopped.

"Do you say I am exaggerating?" the latter blurted out, overcoming his momentary confusion. "On this boat even if you fall flat on your face, just make sure that you do it better than the others."

"The entire crew pledged to make this boat excellent rated. And everybody is working hard to make his combat readiness better than that of others. With the exception, to be sure, of those who prefer a soft life. These guys' replacements," the political worker gestured toward the petty officers, "are already performing at 2d class level, while your Kalachev is hopelessly lagging. Nor has he joined Komsomol yet. Does this do you honor?"

"Incidentally, Comrade Captain-Lieutenant, I have done alright for myself. When I was assigned to this boat, I too became a proficiency-rated specialist ahead of schedule. As far as Komsomol is concerned, let Pasmak, our secretary, worry about that."

"You are drawing the wrong parallels, Argunov. Prior to military service you graduated from technical school, majoring in motors. You knew engines like an open book. But Kalachev is beginning from zero. Is there a difference? Moreover, if it is a matter of indifference to you whether or not your subordinate is a Komsomol member, you are a poor section commander."

The other petty officers got into the conversation and took their comrade in hand: Quit making a fool of yourself, they said, for you yourself know you are wrong. Argunov cooled off, soberly weighed the arguments, and reached the same conclusion. Or perhaps an influence was exerted by the fact that, learning about this incident, Yu. Abramov, the boat's Komsomol committee secretary, summoned the petty officer-Komsomol member to an impartial interview. At any rate Sn O. Kalachev soon, with the section commander's assistance, had prepared for and successfully took the tests for second class. And of course it was not without the petty officer's influence that Kalachev joined Komsomol.

The incident would seem to be ended. But shortly before the exercise the political worker learned that unit headquarters ordered that two men be assigned to a party which would be building some facility. At this point Tarariyev recalled Argunov's complaints about the difficulties of serving on a submarine. Was this hot air, or does a person truly feel a burden from the demanding atmosphere prevailing in the collective? This was a good opportunity to determine the answer to this question. The deputy commander for political affairs told the commanding officer about that recent conversation, and they decided, as a pedagogic experiment, to suggest to Petty Officer 2d Class Argunov that he change his environment. Of course it would be a shame to lose a good specialist if he decided to go. But the political officer assured the commanding officer that Argunov would not leave the boat, and he was correct. When he informed Argunov of the opportunity to transfer to an easier duty assignment, the latter requested permission to remain with the submarine. He then sent men to plead for him.

Pre-departure preparations were at an end. The traditional brief political rally on the pier, after which the submarine headed out to sea. It submerged at the designated point. For some time now electric light would be replacing sunlight, and they would be noting the passage of days and nights only by the clock. The mission assigned the crew required maximum secrecy of actions. And the submariners were filled with resolve to carry out these actions excellently and staunchly to overcome all difficulties. There was probably not a single man on board who did not announce this to his comrades at the party and Komsomol meetings and at the political rally.

From the very outset there commenced competition among the men for excellent performance results for each day at sea and to earn the privilege to be called the best watch crew imeni Hero of the Soviet Union M. V. Greshilov. Taking a tour of the compartments, talking with the men and seeing them at work, the commander and the political worker noted with satisfaction that inner composure and exceptional conscientiousness in the men, where there is no need to urge the men or to appeal to them to carry out their duties in a responsible manner. But of course it is essential to ensure that this lofty moral enthusiasm does not weaken. And there are plenty of men to do this. One out of every five crew members is a CPSU member or probationary member. Communists at all echelons of the submarine crew continuously influence the spirit of the men and inspire them by personal example to work earnestly.

The sonar operators are working hard. When submerged deep, sonar operators are the boat's eyes and ears, its vigilant sentries. Their vigilance and skill predetermine in large measure the safety of a mission, concealed penetration of an "enemy" ASW defensive line, and the success of torpedo attacks. The duty operators are fully concentrated, listening carefully to the numerous sounds of the sea, understandable to them alone.

"The entire crew is counting on you," the political worker reminded the sonar operators.

"We shall not let them down," chief sonarman WO N. Urenkov replied for all of them. "We have talked it over and have unanimously pledged to detect targets at maximum range, to classify them accurately, and to maintain solid contact."

On the eve of the 26th CPSU Congress master proficiency-rated Urenkov was accepted to probationary party membership. He is a person of excellent professional and moral qualities, a person who does not speak empty words. Thanks to him and group commander Sr Lt A. Vorontsov, in the current training year all sonar enlisted personnel and petty officers have boosted their proficiency by one rating. And there has not yet been a single instance of sonar operators missing a target or incorrectly determining its coordinates.

In Compartment No 1 the torpedomen are for the umpteenth time meticulously checking and adjusting instruments and mechanisms. Their pledge in the year of the party congress to receive not worse than a mark of excellent on torpedo shots has also been met up to the present time.

"Remembering that bitter lesson, we now follow the rule: check 10 times, and then fire," stated Sr Lt Yu. Pankov. "Our Abramov over there, the Komsomol secretary, gets the young men focused on ensuring a 100 percent guarantee of weapon reliability. I have a question, Yuriy Semenovich: When we reach our position, will we hold our regularly-scheduled lecture or postpone it until we return to base?"

"Why postpone it? As soon as we have an opportunity, we shall hold it. Are you ready for the class?"

"When have I not been ready?" the officer answered the question with another question, in a bantering tone.

Party member Pankov is in charge of lectures publicizing the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress. He has a responsible and conscientious attitude toward this party assignment. Thanks to this, the men are more deeply assimilating the basic conclusions and points of the Central Committee Report. And the commander of Combat Department-3 also carries out his professional duties conscientiously. Everything runs with precision and smoothness in his subunit: training classes, drills, care and maintenance of equipment are always handled in a high-quality manner, with firm observance of regulations maintained in all things. This officer made his only mistake last year: he counted on the shore specialists, failed properly to check a torpedo, and the shoot was a failure. This resulted in a serious discussion being held both at a boat party meeting and by the combat department Komsomol members. The torpedomen drew proper conclusions from the mistake.

On-schedule arrival at the designated distant sea area where the submarine, remaining concealed, will be conducting reconnaissance, and when the exercise commences will detect a detachment of "aggressor" warships, will attack the main target, and will engage in a "duel" with an "enemy" submarine, will depend primarily on the men of the engineering and navigation departments. But one can also now be reassured about these subunits, which in the past have caused much grief to the commander, the political worker, and the entire crew. Visiting many action stations in Combat Departments 1 and 5, the deputy commander for political affairs once again made sure that there was a businesslike attitude here as well, and that the men cared a great deal about the boat's honor and the outcome of the forthcoming exercise.

Perhaps it would be appropriate at this point to make a small excursion into the past. Two years ago, when Tarariyev was assigned to this boat as deputy commander for political affairs, it was known as the worst in the unit, and not without reason. The crew was constantly violating regulations. There were few party members on the crew, and those that were were not doing a very good job, to put it mildly.

The young deputy commander for political affairs was gratified only by the fact that he immediately reached full mutual understanding with the commanding officer, who himself had been assigned to the boat only a few months previously, with the executive officer, and the secretaries of the party and Komsomol organizations. Working together, they sought an answer to a difficult question: how to turn the boat around and make it a leader? They agreed to begin with strengthening discipline and to devote maximum attention to the worst departments, the engineering and navigation departments, and particularly to their commanders.

The engineering department produced more disciplinary offenses and various unpleasantnesses than all the other departments combined. The main reason for that situation in this department lay in the disorganization of the engineer officer, I. Agishev. He knew the equipment well, but he was woefully ignorant in all matters pertaining to education science, psychology, and indoctrinating personnel. He bristled in response to adverse comments directed at him.

"But who am I supposed to work with?" he asked the political worker defiantly in one of their conversations. "I am lacking an electrician's mate, and for a

year now the main propulsion assistant has been unable to pass the tests qualifying him for taking over on his own. Warrant Officer Langovich should be removed from this boat."

"But you, Comrade Agishev, are not really working hard with any of the men," replied the political worker. "Warrant Officer Langovich is sitting around doing nothing only because you are not giving him specific assignments and are not checking his progress in training. You lack adequate contact with the department party group organizer and Komsomol organization secretary...."

Many such conversations were held. The commanding officer, the deputy commander for political affairs, and the party organization secretary spent a great deal of time and expended a good deal of energy on setting this party member-officer on the right track. They tried to convince him, to teach him, and even punished him, but it was like water off a duck's back. For a while he would shape up, but then once again he would get lax. At a discussion of the latest unseemly action by CPSU member Agishev, one of the party members suggested that he be expelled from the party. The commanding officer and the political worker persuaded the comrades to refrain from such an extreme measure and not to lose all hope in this man.

Tarariyev worked patiently to help the officer. Together with subunit party group organizer officer V. Baranov and Komsomol organization secretary PO 1st Class V. Pasmak, he enlivened political indoctrination work in the department. At the political worker's recommendation, the submarine's party organization secretary proceeded to work on strengthening the party group in Combat Department 5. And the subunit commander, feeling the reliable support of the party group day after day and seeing how the Komsomol organization was increasingly more actively influencing the men, was maturing and changing his work style. In time his disciplinary and party punishments were canceled. He passed the test for the master proficiency rating. He recently was promoted to the next higher rank. In many performance indices the engineering department is now equal to the other departments.

The navigation department is now also one of the boat's best departments. Today Tarariyev finds it hard to believe that their predecessors had called the engineer officer a man without initiative, ability, or prospects.

"Let us not rely on somebody else's opinion," the commanding officer said to his deputy commander for political affairs. "We shall help Kulakov believe in himself, and he will come around. I put his record of service card with all the punishments recorded on it, into the safe, and suggested that we give it a fresh start."

This faith gave inspiration and strength to the young officer. With his commanding officer's support and assistance, he enthusiastically set about his training and improved rapidly as a navigator. But he did not work much with his subordinates. "There seems to be some kind of pattern here," Tarariyev stated in surprise: as a rule, in a lagging subunit the commander does not have the ability to see things through others, and does not want to bother with them. While he was still serving as chief of the political section for Komsomol work, he noted

this weakness in Kulakov, who at that time was a member of the submarine's Komsomol committee, and now he became fully convinced that all this officer's problems derived from this weakness. On one occasion, when the gyrocompass went out of commission due to an oversight on the part of PO 2d Clas Yu. Popruga, the commander of Combat Department 1 was sincerely indignant: "What do they teach them? They have a secondary school diploma, and yet they do not know the simplest laws of electricity."

"That's right, blame the school," the political worker advised. "Blame his parents as well: they failed to bring their son up right, and for this reason Popruga started drinking. But ask yourself a question: what is our purpose here? Come to the open party meeting being held today; we shall be discussing precisely that subject."

Prior to this the deputy commander for political affairs had a long conversation with the secretary of the navigation department Komsomol organization, CPSU probationary member A. Derkach.

"We do not yet have a real collective," the latter frankly admitted. "Commanding officer, petty officers, and Komsomol members -- everyone doing his own thing. It would seem that we are all pulling in the same direction, but the result is the same as that of the swan, the crayfish and the pike...."

Tarariyev asked the young Communist to speak at the party meeting on this subject.

"You see what happens, Viktor Romanovich," he said sympathetically to Kulakov after the meeting, noting that he was taking things hard. "A seaman can see further than the subunit commander."

"Yes, through the eyes of the deputy commander for political affairs," commented Kulakov, not without irony.

"I swear I had nothing to do with it. Everything Derkach said were things which were troubling him. But I shall not deny that I recommended that he speak. Incidentally, you know our policy about people who have been seen drinking heavily. How would you like Derkach to be made section commander in place of Popruga?"

"Good idea," replied the commander of Combat Department 1. "He is a little short on knowledge at the present time, it is true. Well, no problem, we shall teach him."

It is correctly stated that there are no ready formulas for approaching an individual. A single psychological jolt proved sufficient to bring a change in Kulakov's development as a commander as well. He proceeded to work on indoctrinating his men, and his department was one of the boat's first to earn the title of excellent. He was accepted to party membership. This spring Kulakov successfully passed the tests for the master proficiency rating, and thanks to his assistance the commander of the navigation group, the boat's party organization secretary Lt M. Pantelayer, equally successfully passed the examination before the fleet commission for unsupervised operation of his department.

The moral atmosphere within the crew gradually changed. A collective is made up of people. And if its leaders, pulling them all along toward high goals, see

each individual and believe in each one, patiently correct those who make mistakes and support those who need help, as a rule the collective grows strong.

Judging by all indications, the former commanding officer and political worker lacked the pedagogic skill possessed by their successors. When the new commanding officer and deputy commander for political affairs reported to their new duty assignment, they brought new ideas with them. Open party meetings began to be held on a regular basis, and anyone attending them would see that the party members cared a great deal about the boat's honor and combat readiness, and that officers, warrant officers, and petty officers entered their family one after the other. And meetings of military personnel, which in the past had not been held all too often, and for the most part "staff" speakers addressed those meetings, took on a different coloration. Provocative questions began to be raised at these meetings: "Are we capable of raising our boat among the leaders?" "What do you view as your duty to the homeland?" "Our crew is a unified family in which friendship is the main wealth".... Weekly Lenin readings and lessons, interesting youth debates, cultural excursions to sites of combat glory, to museums and theaters were becoming increasingly popular. And at political instruction classes, no matter how sharp an answer would be given, a mark of excellent or good would no longer be given if you had any job performance marks against you.

The following exchange of information was taking place with increasing frequency among officers and warrant officers: "Yesterday the deputy commander for political affairs visited me in my quarters," "The commanding officer and his wife visited me," "Have you heard that they are giving Warrant Officer Vyshchipan a room in the dormitory?" "They finally put Urenkov on the waiting list for housing. The skipper and the political officer went to combined unit headquarters and got them to do it. Nikolay will now stay with the boat".... Similar news would be discussed in the crew's quarters: "The deputy commander for political affairs has been corresponding with my parents," "With mine too," "With mine too".... "They made repairs on Yuriy Moninets's mother's house and hauled in fuel. He wrote to the party rayon committee, who reprimanded the kolkhoz chairman for lack of attention toward the family of a serviceman"....

Faith in and concern for a person engender in his heart not only a feeling of gratitude but also a striving to perform his duty in an exemplary manner and increase his sense of responsibility to the collective. Everyone who was previously considered "difficult" and "incorrigible," who were burdened down by domestic and family problems are now serving irreproachably. Those men who have been discharged into the reserves and officers who have received promotions write letters back to the political worker as the dearest man to their heart, thank him for what he taught them, inquire about how things are going in the crew, which had become to them enduringly close and dear, an unforgettable school of indoctrination.

Obviously it was not only through the efforts of the commanding officer and political workers that there was created in the collective an atmosphere of solidarity and mutual demandingness, an attentive attitude toward others, and a common striving toward lofty goals. Following their example, the officers consolidated this healthy moral-political climate on the boat. They consolidated it, relying on the most active assistance by the party and Komsomol organizations. Before the crew made the decision to pledge to make the submarine excellent-rated, Communist and

Komsomol activists spoke with each and every seaman and petty officer, persuading them that the collective could attain this goal. Official rituals of acceptance of young personnel into the family of submariners and handing over action stations to them by personnel being discharged into the reserves, honoring of winners in socialist competition, with award of special certificates, plus many other genuinely emotional forms of indoctrination of personnel were elaborated and incorporated through the keen intellect and creative initiative of Communists and members of the Komsomol committee.

Perhaps one virtue of Captain-Lieutenant Tarariyev as an organizer of party-political work is the fact that he does not endeavor to do everything himself, but has the ability to take into account collective experience and know-how and to offer each activist an area of application of creative initiative. On this cruise as well, at the suggestion of party organization secretary Lt M. Panteleyev, a discussion on theory was held for the officers, on the topic "The party -- the intellect, honor and conscience of our era," and at the initiative of watch party group organizers officers V. Andreyev, B. Dizha, and O. Timofeyev, winners in the competition for excellent performance on each day at sea, shared with their fellows their know-how and experience in vigilant standing of underway watch, the editor of the radio newspaper, Capt-Lt V. Krislatyy, organized a roll call of action stations to determine readiness and willingness to achieve high-quality accomplishment of missions at the exercise, and the Komsomol committee received reports on the same subject from Komsomol members who were crew chiefs and section commanders. A strong, aggressive mood is maintained among the crew through the daily political influence of officers, Communists and Komsomol activists on the consciousness of the men.

At the exercise submarine crew members were compelled to operate in a very complex and difficult situation. Time after time the submarine was very close to being detected by the "enemy." Time and time again situations arose where literally seconds decided the success of a maneuver preceding a torpedo attack. But thanks to the composure, responsibility and skill of each and every submariner, the crew worked its way out of critical situations and gained the seconds needed for victory. The navigator and the commander of Combat Department 5 did a fine job. WO N. Irenkov and his men did an extremely praiseworthy job. The torpedomen hit their targets with extraordinary accuracy. Personnel who made a contribution to the successful exercise included WO S. Langovich, PO 2d Class A. Argunov, Sr Sn Yu. Moninets, and Sn I. Myasnikov....

Later, back in base, the crew stood at attention while an order issued by the fleet commander was read to them, announcing that the submarine had been awarded the honorary title of excellent, news which brought a song to the heart of each and every crewman. The collective had achieved ahead of schedule its main pledge in the year of the 20th CPSU Congress.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1981

REF ID: A601019

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES: CAPABILITIES DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 10, Oct 81 (signed to press 23 Sep 81) pp 14-15

[Article by Col Gen V. Vishenkov, chief of the Main Staff, Strategic Missile Forces, and delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress: "Our Combat Potential"]

[Text] Plenty of time has passed already, but to me this event is still just as precious and memorable, all the same. Here are the doors of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses swinging open and representatives of the heroic Soviet Armed Forces entering the conference hall with a measured tread to the sounds of a ceremonial march. The moire ribbons of decorations on the staffs of the battle colors flash in the light of the soffits, the silk of the banners sparkles with a red flame, and on the chests of many soldiers the Hero Stars gleam and their government awards and medals for military valor tinkle from time to time. The composure and self-control in the faces of the motorized infantrymen, missilemen, aviators, assault troops and sailors, the proud and restrained awareness of their force and might and their readiness for a feat of arms in the name of the Motherland and the party of Lenin... And the delegates greet the envoys of the army and navy with stormy applause.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev spoke warmly and sincerely about our army in the Central Committee Report. "A strong alloy of high technical equipment and invincible morale—this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces." And when I think of the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers who stand alert duty by the formidable missiles, I associate these words completely with the Strategic Missile Forces as well.

I am a supporter of my troops, I have served with them for many years, and I will be speaking about them. They possess immense combat capabilities: missiles make it possible to carry out military actions in any season or time of day regardless of weather conditions, and ensure exceptionally high reliability in the destruction of different targets at any distances. A high degree of automation in the processes of preparing missiles for launch, rapidity of the collection, transmission, reception and processing of data, and the application of modern control and communications facilities—all this is our troops today.

Missilemen are justifiably proud of this mighty force, and we speak of it not for the purpose of threatening anyone. The Soviet state does not seek confrontation with any state in the West or the East. This was again solemnly declared at the fifth session, 10th convocation, of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

But as historical experience attests, in order to reliably defend the achievements of the Great October Revolution and to protect the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, our friends and allies, force is necessary. And we have it.

Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, has noted: "The Armed Forces now have at their disposal everything necessary to give a timely and decisive rebuff to any aggression, regardless of where it comes from. The immense destructive might of the nuclear missile weapons with which our army and navy have been equipped has been and remains an important factor in restraining military adventures."

The military and political situation in the world and the nature of a war which aggressors can unleash against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, the immense destructive might of current offensive weapons, and the calculation of aggressive forces on a surprise attack dictate the necessity for high political vigilance. This is most apparent in the country's high defense potential and the combat readiness of its army and navy. V. I. Lenin warned: "...We must accompany our steps toward peace with intensification of all our military readiness." The 26th CPSU Congress has set the same task before military men.

Combat readiness has many component parts. And the combat training of soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers, their military skill, does not come in last place. It is impossible without thorough knowledge of the combat equipment which exists in the armaments of units and subunits, without bringing the skills in operating them up to automation, and accurate and strict observance of every point of instruction in servicing complexes and conducting regulated operations—that is, everything that we call broad technical improvement. Skill also is impossible without the fine coordination of the activities of specialists and the irreproachable teamwork of combat crews. Missile weapons are collective weapons, and the complexity and diversity of measures for their maintenance and use require strong practical skills and the efficiency and coordination of all soldiers. This is one of the most necessary conditions for the effective use of the fire capabilities of our formidable weapons.

In the course of my duties I often have occasion to be among the troops. It is gratifying to see how commanders, political organs and staffs are striving for soldiers' complete mastery of equipment and armaments in short periods of time, and are successfully resolving problems of coordinating crews in which yesterday's schoolboys or students, workers or kolkhoz farmers, who only a few months ago put on the black coveralls of missilemen and were accepted for alert duty for the first time, stand alongside experienced experts who have actual missile launches behind them. And when you encounter examples of economical, considerate training and indoctrination of new detachments of high-class specialists—and there are quite a few of them—you mentally note that in spite of the fact that twice a year the aces of operational efficiency leave for the reserves, the ranks of expert missilemen are not being diminished. Their replacement is reliable.

The experience of our right-flank units is particularly significant. The missile unit which until recently was led by Lt Col M. Kolosov, a delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, who has now been advanced to a higher post, is well known in the Armed Forces. For 2 years this unit's collective was the initiator of socialist competition among our troops, and the unit won the title of excellent for 9 years in succession.

Today the baton of the initiators was taken by missilemen of the excellent unit commanded by Lt Col I. Shelestov. At a general meeting held on the eve of the 26th CPSU Congress, they pledged to raise the level of combat readiness even higher, to carry out all combat training missions and specialized tactical exercises with an "excellent" evaluation. The soldiers are striving to achieve a 100-percent class proficiency, and every sergeant and warrant officer will master a specialty in a related field by the end of the year.

Time went by. Not so long ago employees of the Main Staff visited this unit: the initiators are keeping their word.

What is the secret of the pacemakers' success? I will dwell just on several key points. And namely on the constant and purposeful struggle of every person in the unit—from soldier to commander—to fulfill socialist pledges, on the steady attention of the staff and party and Komsomol organizations to the problems of preparing and carrying out competition, and on the personal example of activists in mastering military skill. And also on the planned work to improve the training materials base and increase the systematic skill of officers, warrant officers and sergeants.

Owing to this, the capabilities of the training staff, with the aid of which different variations of working out the assigned tasks are created, are utilized to the full extent. In carrying them out, missilemen acquire the skills of coordinated actions in the servicing and combat employment of armaments and equipment in difficult situations, including artificially created emergency situations. In such a thoroughly thought out and carefully organized process of training and indoctrination, not only does the soldiers' military skill increase, but a psychological conditioning takes place, the collective is united, and its discipline and efficiency are improved. The detachment of highly trained commanders to whom the outcome of an engagement can be entrusted is increased.

There are many experts in military specialties, real experts in their fields, in every unit, in every subunit. And not only among the officers—the persons who received special preparation in higher engineering schools and academies, but among the warrant officers and sergeants as well.

Warrant Officer V. Bobrakov, a CPSU member and honors student, is well known in our units. He is an expert in radio communications, having demonstrated his professional qualities time and again in establishing a radio channel with a user under the most severe weather conditions and when subjected to different types of interference. His chest is decorated with the medals "For excellence in military service" first and second classes. Bobrakov has been assigned to an officer's position at present.

Warrant officers—the experts in military specialties, experienced commanders and trainers—are the most valuable possession of our units. For example, Senior Warrant Officer P. Kushnirchuk, one of the first in the Missile Forces to earn this military rank, is the commander of an excellent platoon. Subordinates are changed, but the subunit retains its superiority in socialist competition year after year.

Kushnirchuk was selected as a member of the bureau of a primary party organization, and was awarded the "Decoration of Honor" order for successful mastery of complex combat equipment. Warrant Officer I. Volokhov, supervisor [starshina] of a leading subunit who has been awarded medals "For excellence in military service" first and second class; Warrant Officer P. Shcheglov, an expert in military affairs [master voyennogo dela]; Warrant Officer N. Davydov, a specialist first class; and many other immediate assistants to officers are widely known among us.

I did not say "widely known" accidentally. It is really that. The experience of Senior Warrant Officer Kushnirchuk and Warrant Officers Shcheglov, Davydov, Bobrakov and Volokhov has been disseminated by the training and methods councils of the units in which they are serving and have been brought to the attention of all the junior commanders. Commanders, political organs, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations are making persistent efforts to ensure that the pacemakers' experience is adopted by all specialists. Such work has been applied especially well in the unit led by Comrade I. Shelestov.

Here in unified political days [politdni], Leninist readings, lectures and discussions on materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, in oral magazines, technical quizzes, in question-and-answer evenings and regularly held "Warrant Officer Days," the officers' immediate assistants take a most active part, assisting commanders not only in training the soldiers and in cultivating among them the skills of experts in military matters, but indoctrinating them in steadfast moral qualities: through ideological conviction, citizenship responsibilities [grazhdanstvennost'], patriotism and internationalism—everything which the Central Committee Report called the indestructible morale of the Soviet soldier, the most important ingredient in the combat potential of the Armed Forces.

When we speak about it—the indestructible morale of Soviet soldiers—we mean its firm foundation: the socialist social and state system, the communist world outlook which has become firmly established in the consciousness of the Soviet people, and Marxist-Leninist ideology. In fact, the might of the army's morale is in the moral strength of the Soviet people, in the active manifestation of its inspiring features such as heroism and courage, discipline and comradeship, and personal responsibility for the security of our beloved Motherland.

Our system is strong precisely with such courageous persons, strong in spirit and true to the heroic traditions of the army and the missile forces. They are very young, the Strategic Missile Forces, but in the Colors under which the soldiers perform their service radiate Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, and Suvorov. We were formed on the basis of units which distinguished themselves in the Great Patriotic War. And the present generation holds sacred in its memory the exploits of brother soldiers and enhance it with military activities.

Missilemen understand well that glorious combat traditions are not only the heroic past, not only the memory of exploits. The traditions are today's valor in service, high combat readiness, unremitting revolutionary vigilance against the schemes of the enemies of peace and progress. And when the situation requires, our troops, as well as the troops of all the Armed Forces, go without hesitation, boldly and selflessly, to carry out any mission, with the strength of their morale affirming the wonderful truth: "There is always a place in life for an exploit."

Warrant Officer L. Filippov has performed a feat in peacetime. In a raging blizzard which toppled telegraph poles, tore off roofs and broke trees, Leonid Filippov entered into an engagement with the elements, saving military property. He was seriously wounded. The skill of physicians and the soldier's courage and self-control, multiplied by the strength of will and love for army service, helped him to return to duty. Today young soldiers are "making a life," as a poet said once, from Warrant Officer Filippov. They are learning valor and military skill from him.

Jr Sgt S. Yanyuk also demonstrated bravery and valor. While on a detail he noticed that flames had enveloped a neighboring building. Without hesitating, the soldier entered into single combat with the fire: he climbed up the outside of the building to the third floor and put out the flames soon after. He was awarded the Komsomol Central Committee decoration "For military valor."

Warrant Officer A. Shelyakin, crew chief and son of the bearer of three Orders of Glory, carefully guards and augments the combat traditions of frontline soldiers by his deeds. His father, a former frontline scout, time and again came to the unit where his son was in first-term service, and addressed the soldiers on the day they took their oath and at ceremonial evenings. It is his merit that Aleksandr chose an important and correct path in life.

Today Warrant Officer A. Shelyakin is the secretary of the party organization of a subunit, member of the party bureau of a unit, and commander of an excellent battle station.

It is about such military men as Warrant Officers A. Shelyakin and L. Filippov and Jr Sgt S. Yanyuk that Comrade L. I. Brezhnev spoke at the 26th CPSU Congress: "The sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War now stand in the ranks of the defenders of the Motherland. They have not endured the severe trials of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are true to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And each time the interests of the country's security and the defense of peace require it, when the victims of aggression must be helped, the Soviet soldier appears before the world as an unselfish and courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome any difficulties."

...I experienced a wonderful feeling on that memorable day in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Grippled by universal pride in the Soviet Armed Forces and unshakable confidence in their might and nobility, I greeted our army and navy warmly, together with other delegates, and felt that I was an inseparable part of them.

Let our enemies know that the formidable weapons which the Motherland has entrusted to us are in reliable and capable hands. Our combat potential is inexhaustible. All Soviet military men, from the soldier to the marshal, inspired by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, will always be on the alert and prepared to give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor in the most difficult situation.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1981

8936

CSO: 1801/034

LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

SIGNAL TROOPS: TELEGRAPHER TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 10, Oct 81 (signed to press 23 Sep 81) pp 21-23

[Article by Col V. Golyshev, director of a department of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School for Communications imeni Mar SU M. V. Zakharov: "A New Procedure in the Practice of Training"]

[Excerpt] It is well known that much training time is spent in preparing telegraphers and radiotelegraphers, which make up two large groups of specialists in the signal troops. At the same time, a significant part of it is devoted to mastering the keyboard of telegraph apparatus and the R-010 transmitter. For this reason, ways are constantly being sought to accelerate the specialists' training. At the editorial staff's request, Col V. Golyshev, director of a department of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School for Communications imeni Mar SU M. V. Zakharov, tells about one of these.

Lately the preparation of telegraphers in training subunits has been carried out by two procedures: the traditional one and the new one. What does the new procedure consist of? How does it differ from the old one?

The new procedure has a number of peculiar features. Thus, transmission is made by the "blind" method, that is, the keyboard is concealed from the student's eyes, and the texts of exercises are made up at once on all characters. Each specialist has a training chart on which drills are performed, and an additional device is installed on the keyboard—a guiding grid for the fingers. But this concerns not only the features mentioned.

In the book "Osnovy metodiki raboty na radiostantsiyakh i telegrafnykh apparatakh" [Fundamentals of Operating Procedure for Radio Stations and Telegraph Apparatus] (I. P. Belyayev and others, Voenizdat, 1973), a model lesson plan is given on the topic "Mastery of the telegraph apparatus keyboard" calculated at 60 hours. In the process, attainment of a speed of 400-600 words (groups) per hour is envisaged in the 30th 2-hour lesson in transmitting standard texts "to one's self." And the students arrive at these results in the process of practical drills.

Obviously there are always those soldiers who could attain a higher speed, although the training method itself (mastery of the keyboards by parts) does not provide them with the opportunity to move ahead.

If the errors committed by beginning telegraphers training under the traditional procedure, where the principle of "practice, practice and practice" is basic, are analyzed, conformance with a principle is revealed: it is quite difficult for students to orient their fingers on the keys. This is especially noticeable in the stage of mastering the keyboard. The fingers fall not on that key, but in another area, and sometimes the characters are transmitted with the other hand. So-called symmetrical errors appear, and only many exercises make it possible to eliminate them.

The new procedure makes it possible to increase the capacity of the training process not by increasing exercises and training, but just by changing the approach to the specialists' preparation itself. Its effectiveness leaves no doubts. Experience shows that complete mastery of the keyboard and the transmission of different texts at a speed of 400-600 words (groups) per hour is attained in eight to ten 2-hour lessons planned in a day, and not in 30, as traditionally envisaged.

I will give examples of training under the new procedure. In the Ryazan communications school all students attain a speed of 400-600 words (groups) per hour in 16-20 hours. Thus, in one of the subunits after 10 planned 2-hour lessons, 92.5 percent of the students have been transmitting a text at a speed of 400-1,300 words (groups) per hour and only 7.5 percent of them have been transmitting at a speed of 300-500 words (groups) per hour, although they also have completely mastered the keyboard. Under the traditional procedure, in the time indicated, the program makes it possible to master only 20 letters. Another 11 letters, 10 figures and 12 punctuation marks—that is, nearly two-thirds of the keyboard—remain unmastered. At present, students in the second course under the guidance of department instructor Lt Col I. Sigov, using the new procedure, already are studying under the program for the third course.

The training of young telegraphers brought to a demonstration exercise in the Red Banner Kiev Military District in November 1980 was effective. In 4 days (3 hours of classes per day), the soldiers mastered the keyboard and attained speeds of 350 to 500 words (groups) per hour, committing not more than three or four errors in the telegrams. At the same time, only 3 to 4 hours were required to memorize the keyboard. This fact is interesting, in my view. A warrant officer was senior in the team of young military men. In the same time he independently familiarized himself with the new procedure, made the grid and prepared the entire crew (including the vehicle driver) for work on the telegraph apparatus.

The basis of the new procedure is the theory of stage-by-stage formation of mental concepts and actions developed by Professor P. Gal'perin, doctor of psychological sciences. Among military specialists it has been called the "Theory of Training According to Plan." This theory makes it possible for a supervisor of lessons to conduct training in a properly controlled process.

The process of mastering the new procedure is as if it were stepped—at first the organs of thought direct the person himself how to carry out one action or another, then they ensure complete implementation. That is, two steps are separated here—the orientation and the execution.

Correct execution of an operation can be expected only from a well-trained specialist when his orientation in the action itself is perfectly complete. And if it is not, it is necessary to establish it. This also is achieved by the use of training charts or, as they are sometimes called, the flow sheets of the orientation bases of actions (OOD). The training chart consists of detailed instructions with a complete series of reference points printed on a paper. By this means, detailed instructions on how to correctly and completely carry out all operations are immediately put "into the hands" of the future specialist. At the same time, the instruction must be such that the student can perform an operation, slowly at first but from the start, without error, and then all actions.

Most important in mastery of the keyboard probably is to observe the sequence: the student at first speaks aloud (reads according to the training chart), thinks it over, and then performs without error. For example, it is necessary to transmit the letter "K." The telegrapher finds it on the training chart and reads aloud: "K--with the left first above," then strikes the corresponding key with the index (first) finger of his left hand.

Preliminary pronunciation is a mandatory condition for elementary mastery of the keyboard. This is explained psychologically by the fact that a person who says an action to himself aloud, with its consequent correct execution, rapidly and involuntarily remembers it. [Portion not translated describes the new training method in greater detail.]

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1981

8936

CSO: 1801/034

CIVIL DEFENSE

COMBATTING PEAT FIRES DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 8 Oct 81) pp 22-23

[Article by P. Gorbunov: "Fighters on the Fire Front"]

[Text] Forest and peat fires broke out during this year's hot summer in a number of localities around Moscow. There was an especially great danger of fire in Shaturskiy Rayon, where the peat enterprises of the "Shaturtorf" production association are located. A state of emergency was declared there by decisions of the Moscow Oblispolkom and the Shatura Gorispolkom.

In this article we shall describe how civil defense formations, blue- and white-collar workers from the peat enterprises and forces which came to help, waged a selfless struggle against the fires.

Before acquainting the reader with the details of this unusual fire-fighting operation on the Shatura peat fields, let us discuss why the fires broke out there.

"The hot summer," A. Seleznev, general director of the "Shaturtorf" association, said, "was not the main cause of the widespread fires. The summer of 1972 was just as hot, but what happened this year did not occur that summer. The fire started on fields which had been worked and were overgrown with a dense stand of raspberry bushes. A lot of people came here to gather the berries. Careless handling of fire or a burning cigarette butt dropped by some careless individual was enough to ignite the dry grass and the remains of the dried-out peat. And then there were the fishermen who worked the local lakes. They would build campfires and would not always extinguish them before leaving."

Then there were people such as V. Semin, a driver for the "Mosenergo" electric power system. He violated the ban on campfires and built one right in the woods. This is why the fires ordinarily broke out suddenly in the most unexpected places, threatening to leap over to those fields in which the peat is now being gathered.

The first rigorous test fell to the lot of the "Tugoleskiy bor" peat enterprise. It should be noted that the labor team at that facility and its non-military formations demonstrated good organization and great stamina. The rampaging elements did not find them unprepared. In practical and special tactical classes back in the winter they

had carefully studied fire-fighting techniques and the procedure for using equipment specially adapted for this purpose. A drill in the use of the fire-fighting equipment was conducted in the spring to test their readiness and that of the equipment.

"All of this came in handy during those hot July days," says M. Zolin, the enterprise director and civil defense chief at the facility. "We were essentially attempting to envision, as it were, alternate plans of action not in a training situation but an actual fire-fighting situation."

The actual situation was the following in the first production section, especially around Lake Voymeznoye. The fire threatened the main GSM [fuel and lubricants] depot, the dacha community and the rail lines for the electric trains. Personnel and equipment had to be transferred there immediately from other production sections, along with forces which arrived to help fight the fires and a fire-fighting train.

The fires which broke out were fanned by winds of hurricane force. The fuel and lubricants depot, toward which the wall of fire was advancing, was in an especially dangerous location. The people did not flinch, however, but opposed the elements with know-how and courage. The fuel was rapidly pumped out of the storage facilities, and the equipment was removed to a safe place. The fire was prevented from breaking through. A broad firebreak was created as reliable protection around the fuel and lubricants depot and was wetted down.

What occurred there during that time in some ways reminded one of a frontline situation. Vehicles with pumps stood near the firebreaks like guns at a position. Long branching delivery hoses protruded from them, through which powerful streams of water were aimed wherever needed to block the path of the fire.

One of those positions was manned by tractor drivers V. Shabanova and K. Shashkina. Their vehicles were equipped with pumps and fire hoses. The two women delivered water continuously, and fighters of the civil defense subunit worked the branch hoses, preventing the fire from reaching the community. A new fire suddenly broke out in the vicinity, however, threatening to surround the people there in a ring of fire. Shashkina noticed an officer running toward them. He was signalling frantically to her and to the soldiers working the branch hoses.

"Get out!" Klavdiya Vasil'yevna understood him to be telling them.

Shutting off the pump, she immediately began to remove the tractor from the area of the fire to a safe place. Dense smoke enveloped the area, however, and made it difficult to see. Making out familiar landmarks with difficulty, she stopped the vehicle at the next firebreak. Valentina Ivanovna Shabanova did the same. After shifting positions the two friends continued to provide water for the fighters on the fire front.

Machine operators at the peat enterprise Hero of Socialist Labor Nikolay Grigor'yevich Gryaznov, the Krylov brothers Mikhail and Anatoliy, Anatoliy Ksenofontov and many others fought the fire courageously. Ksenofontov had operated a tractor for 2 years before entering the army. His unit command had therefore entrusted him with an artillery prime mover. After his discharge into the reserve he returned to his old peat enterprise, but with army conditioning behind him and wiser from experience. During those days of fighting fires he interacted constantly with fighters of the civil defense subunit and established a good friendship with them.

The fires were being fought in the Tugoles'ye, when new ones broke out at other peat enterprises--Ryazanovskiy, Petrovskiy, Radovitskiy Mokh and Baksheyevo. This time they had to regroup the forces and maneuver them over the entire "Shaturtorf" association.

At the Ryazanovskiy Peat Enterprise the field bases of the 3rd, 5th and 6th production sections were encircled by the fire. People were hauled from the base of the 6th section on a fire train. They were strangling in the smoke at the bases of the 3rd and 5th sections, however. The fire was approaching nearer and nearer. Steam locomotive mechanic Viktor Yegorovich Milerchnikov came to the rescue. With his assistant Viktor Kopytin, he managed to break through the curtain of fire and smoke to both field bases and hauled out 70 people. Later, when the two brave transport workers were asked what had made them do this--after all they had risked their own lives--they answered:

"There were only two of us, and 70 of them.... We could not do otherwise."

During those days of alarm the fire approached the village of Radovitsy. The transport service civil defense formations created at the Radovitsy Transport Administration rapidly evacuated all of the residents from the village. The village managed to hold back the fire, and the residents returned to their homes.

The field base of the 2nd production section of the "Radovitskiy Mokh" peat enterprise found themselves in the same situation. A wall of fire was advancing on it from the direction of Lake Shchuch'ye. N. Tarasov, chief of the section and commander of the civil defense formation, immediately organized the fire-fighting operation. Tractors with fire-fighting pumps and branching hoses took up their positions along a fire-break. Peat-cutting machine operators from the 1st section and led by its chief A. Novikov came to help. The fire was halted. Fighters A. Moiseyev, P. Dikarev and A. Struyev and senior master S. Kuz'min especially distinguished themselves in that battle.

This readiness to come to the aid of comrades was observed wherever a difficult fire situation developed. Following are two more examples of this, which occurred during the fire-fighting operations at the Petrovskiy Peat Enterprise.

A water-filled quarry with a tiny island in the middle, where a stump heated up by the sun was ignited.... The flame, fanned by the wind, was growing stronger, devouring the dry grass and brush. A sort of whirlwind developed, which could leap across to the stacks of peat in the fields. It had to be extinguished before it could spread.

Civil defense formation fighter Anatoliy Khamidulin began swimming across to the island, drawing a fire hose behind. He was unable to drag the heavy water-soaked hose up to the fire alone, however. Valeriy Gavrikov, a graduate of the GPTU [State Fire-Fighting Technical School?], swam the 100 meters to the island and helped Khamidulin drag the hose out of the water.

"Turn it on!" the brave men yelled to Ivan Gromov, whose tractor stood on the edge of the quarry.

The pump was turned on, and water was forced through the hoses to the burning island. From the other side one could see Khamidulin and Gavrikov rush to the attack against the fire with hoses in hand. Reinforcements soon went across on boats, and the dangerous fire was rapidly extinguished.

That tense day, it should be mentioned, was Valeriy Gavrikov's first day on the job as an excavator operator. A good beginning!

In another incident a lookout in a tower in the 3rd section noticed a stump pile begin to burn. When the peat-fields are worked the stumps are ordinarily piled up at certain spots. And one of these had become a dangerous source of fire. Winds of hurricane force spread the fire over a 30X100 meter area.

The section command and specialists with the rayon civil defense fire-fighting service decided to position tractors outfitted with pumps and branching hoses on the windward side of the fire, in order to lessen the disastrous effect of the hurricane-strength winds. After that they would be using untested techniques. The upper, burning, layer of the peat bed was scraped off with bulldozers into a readymade pit. In this case there was a quarry nearby. And bulldozer operator Aleksandr Zhukov, a fighter with the civil defense formation, undertook this dangerous work in the area of the fire. He first moved damp peat up to the burning stumps and then shoved the entire burning mass to the quarry. Others were spraying the bulldozer operator and his vehicle with water as he worked.

All of this valuable experience acquired in the fire-fighting operation needs to be thoroughly studied and summarized. It should be extensively used in the practical and special tactical exercises in the new training year which will soon begin for the civil defense system. More effective methods of extinguishing peat fires should be developed in the process. In addition to the techniques mentioned above, the use of mineralized strips 5-6 meters wide proved to be highly effective for localizing fires breaking out on worked-out peat fields. With this system the bulldozer removes the peat down to the mineral soil. The strips are then soaked with water, which provides a reliable fire barrier. They can then be used as passageways for the equipment.

When a deep layer of peat is on fire, the excavators dig deep ditches (three rows in the direction in which the fire may spread), and the ditches are filled with water.

Water and wetting solutions are used for extinguishing fires in the piles. First, the surface of the pile is soaked. A bulldozer and a screw-type cutter are used to create an embankment of damp peat around the burning pile, which is then piled onto the surface by means of a ricking machine. Small areas of burning peat are then watered down a second time and covered with a solid layer of damp peat.

These and other methods of localizing and extinguishing fires should be thoroughly learned in the practical and special tactical exercises conducted for all the non-military formations of peat enterprises.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1981.

11499

CSO: 1801/031

CIVIL DEFENSE

CD COURSE OUTLINED

Moscow VOYENNIYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 8 Oct 81) p 24

[Article: "The Program Has Been Changed"]

[Text] Beginning with the current training year the program has been altered for teaching civil defense in the upper grades of general education schools, vocational and technical schools. Although the changes are not extensive, they affect all the subjects, and the stress is on the practical mastery of means and methods of protection against weapons of mass destruction.

The entire program, which consists of 11 subjects, is designed for a 2-year period. The first six subjects--"Civil Defense at a National Economic Facility (or Educational Institution)," "The Characteristics of Weapons of Mass Destruction Possessed by Foreign Armies," "Individual Protective Equipment," "Collective Protective Equipment," "Rescue Work in Areas of Nuclear Destruction" and "Civil Defense Warning Signals, Rules of Conduct and What People Must Do in Areas of Radioactive or Chemical Contamination and Areas of Bacteriological Damage"--are taught in the 9th grade. The other five--"Evacuation and Dispersal of the Urban Population," "The Personal Cleansing of People and the Radioactive and CW Decontamination and Fumigation of Clothing, Footwear, Protective Equipment, Weapons and Equipment," "Radiation and Chemical Reconnaissance and Radiac Monitoring Devices," "The Radiac and CW Monitoring Station" and "What the Population Must Do in Areas of Natural Disasters"--are taught in the 10th grade.

The total amount of time allocated for the study of civil defense has been increased to 32 hours: 1 hour each has been added to the 6th and 9th subjects, and "What the Population Must Do in Areas of Natural Disasters" has been made into a separate subject, for the study of which 1 hour has also been designated. The new program defines more precisely the material to be covered and the extent of its coverage during each lesson. All of the subjects have been broken down into classes, and the program specifies the number of hours to be included in the general school schedule. The classes are closely linked with the other divisions of initial military training and are conducted in a sequence indicated in the program.

All of the changes and additions take into account the modern civil defense requirements, both theoretical and practical, and accumulated experience in the teaching of civil defense at schools, vocational and technical schools, as well as suggestions submitted by public, vocational and technical education agencies and civil defense staffs.

The program is accompanied by an explanatory note, which describes the basic tasks of the training and the requirements set for the planning and the organization of the civil defense training process and work outside the classroom.

The new program orients military instructors (teachers) toward the creative mastery and the active employment of all of the best expertise accumulated in recent years with respect to methods for teaching civil defense at schools, vocational and technical schools and toward the achievement of more effective utilization of the training materials base. It stresses the need to devote special attention to developing in the students good moral-political and psychological qualities and a readiness to fulfill their civil defense duties in any kind of difficult situation.

The civil defense staffs and courses have been assigned the task of making changes in the regular training of military instructors in accordance with the new program and continuing to provide them with all-round effective assistance.

Beginning with this issue of the magazine we will be publishing articles on the new program to assist the military instructors. They will also be useful for civil defense instructors at national economic facilities.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1981.

11499

CSO: 1801/031

CIVIL DEFENSE

CIVIL DEFENSE LOCAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNIYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 8 Oct 81) pp 24-25

[Article: "Explain and Convince"]

[Text] The first subject is described as civil defense at a national economic facility (or educational institution). Since this is the introductory class on civil defense, the military instructor has not only a training task but an important indoctrinational one as well--that of convincing the students of the need to study this subject seriously. His success in accomplishing the latter and immediately establishing the proper attitude will greatly determine the working atmosphere for all subsequent lessons and ultimately, how useful and effective they are.

When the military instructor begins his presentation of the material, he always touches upon the contemporary international situation, its difficulties and problems. Despite the peace-loving initiatives put forth by the Soviet Union and other socialist commonwealth nations the aggressive imperialist circles have not abandoned their monstrous plans, which threaten mankind with a new world war. The danger has increased particularly with the establishment of the new administration in the USA, the actions of which have all indicated that it does not wish to pursue a course of peace and cooperation.

In this situation the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have been forced to concern themselves especially with strengthening our state's defense capability, while firmly defending their policy of peaceful coexistence.

As he explains the first topic in this subject (civil defense--a component of the system of general state defense measures and of its task) he stresses the fact that the Soviet State has the Armed Forces, which are outfitted with first-class combat equipment and are capable of providing a devastating rebuff to any aggressor. "...To offset the power of the aggressive circles," Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, has said, "to defend peace, to protect the peaceful labor of peoples creating socialism and communism and to preserve the revolutionary gains, we need strength, considerable strength. This is the kind of strength which the Soviet Army and Navy represent."

It is enormously important to prepare the entire population and the national economy to protect themselves against weapons of mass destruction. It should be explained to

the students why, with the development of nuclear weapons, the local air defense system was converted into the USSR Civil Defense system, which is an integral part of the system of general state defense measures.

Civil defense is charged with three basic tasks. The main task is that of protecting the population against weapons of mass destruction. How effectively the other defense measures are carried out depends upon how successfully this task is accomplished. It is for this purpose that we are building shelters, stockpiling individual protective equipment and have made provisions for dispersing and evacuating the population from the cities to the country, should the need arise. The instructor should remind the students and give examples of how, during the Great Patriotic War, shelters served as reliable protection for the populations of cities subjected to air raids by the Hitlerites. The extraordinary step of evacuating to the east also had an important role in maintaining a good defense capability for the nation. It made it possible to save the lives of many Soviet people and to preserve a great deal of our material wealth.

The second civil defense task lies in ensuring the stable functioning of national economic facilities and branches in wartime. Its third important task is that of conducting rescue and emergency repair work in centers of destruction. Without this it would be impossible to restore production operations in the damaged cities and rayons or to create essential living conditions for the population.

As a component of the system of general state defense measures civil defense is a matter for all the people. Each citizen of our nation is expected to contribute to the strengthening and the continued improvement of civil defense. Students also have certain obligations. They have to learn means and methods of protecting themselves against weapons of mass destruction and be able to employ them, take an active part in civil defense activities conducted at the school or the vocational and technical school, and develop the necessary moral qualities and willpower. They have an example in the courage and steadfastness demonstrated by Soviet school children during the Great Patriotic War, particularly during the fascist air raids on our cities.

The military instructor moves on to the second topic--the organizational structure of civil defense at a national economic facility (or educational institution). He explains that civil defense is organized on a territorial-production basis. Civil defense measures are carried out both through the soviets of people's deputies and through the ministries, departments and institutions which direct the administrative and economic operations.

The republic, kray, oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies themselves oversee civil defense in Union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, cities and rayons. As civil defense chiefs the chairmen of the soviet executive committees bear responsibility for measures to protect the population and national economic facilities against weapons of mass destruction.

The civil defense chief at a national economic facility is the director of the industrial enterprise, institution, sovkhoz, kolkhoz or educational institution. The director is naturally in charge of civil defense at a school, tekhnikum or vocational and technical school.

A civil defense staff is formed under the civil defense chief for a facility, which is the directing agency and the actual organizer of all the practical civil defense

work. The chief of staff is the deputy civil defense chief (first deputy at large facilities). A poster can be used or a diagram can be drawn on a classroom blackboard to provide the students with a more graphic concept of the civil defense structure at the facility.

Such a diagram is also extremely useful for explaining the third topic of this subject--the non-military civil defense formations, their purpose and their equipment. Before starting on the new material, however, the military instructor calls on two or three of the students and questions them to make certain that they have mastered the second topic.

The non-military formations are civil defense forces. Rescue detachments, teams or groups are created at most facilities, which may be reinforced with other formations and equipment, when necessary. These formations are charged with such tasks as searching for victims, removing them from beneath rubble and demolished buildings, and providing them with first-aid. Composite detachments (teams or groups) and composite detachments (teams) for mechanizing the work may also be formed at large enterprises. In addition to rescuing people they may also perform emergency repair work, extinguish fires, decontaminate areas and so forth.

Reconnaissance groups (sections), radiac and CW observation posts, communications groups (sections), medical detachments and medical-aid posts, fire-fighting and emergency equipment teams, shelter servicing detachments and a number of other elements are created at a facility in addition to the rescue and composite formations.

In accordance with the civil defense plan for an educational institution the military instructor familiarizes the students with the organizational make-up of the formations at their school or vocational and technical school. A rescue group, a radiac and CW monitoring station, a group for the preservation of public order and a shelter servicing team are formed at a school, for example. These are made up of permanent staff members and upper-grade students at the school.

The military instructor completes his presentation of the material by stressing once again the fact that it is the students' duty to take an active part in civil defense measures. He then informs them as to what civil defense subjects they will be covering during the current academic year and what standards they will have to meet.

The following literature can be recommended for preparing for the classes: "Grazhdanskaya oborona. Posobiye dlya podgotovki naseleniya" [Civil Defense: An Aid for Preparing the Population], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980; "Uchebno-methodicheskoye posobiye po nachal'noy voyennoy podgotovke" [A Training Methods Aid for Initial Military Training], Moscow, "Prosveshcheniye" publishing house, 1981.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1981.

11499
CSO: 1801/031

CIVIL DEFENSE

TRAINING OF COMMANDERS OF NON-MILITARY FORMATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNIYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 8 Oct 81) p 25

[Article by Col V. Shustikov: "Taking the Field of Specialization Into Account"]

[Text] Special field-oriented training, which is differentiated according to the specialization of the tekhnikum, school, etcetera, occupies an important place in the civil defense training program for secondary specialized educational institutions. This division of the training, which is covered in a special brochure attached to the new initial training program for the youth, has been expanded somewhat.

The content of each subject has been more specifically defined to make it possible for the future commanders of non-military formations to better prepare themselves for the performance of civil defense measures at the facilities where they will be working. This pertains not only to the special training, but to the general preparation as well. It is recommended that even such subjects as the description of weapons of mass destruction possessed by the imperialist states and methods of protection against them, reconnaissance of centers of destruction, rescue and emergency repair work be oriented toward the specialization of that branch of the national economy in which the graduates of the tekhnikum or school will be working.

Both theoretical and practical classes are provided for the special field-oriented training subjects. Practical classes constitute the main type of training, since they provide greater possibilities for drills, for practicing the techniques, making extensive use of TO equipment, instruments and various visual training aids. In the practical classes the students are also familiarized with modern protective installations.

The latter training topic is especially thoroughly covered at construction tekhnikums. The students there study the basic designs of various kinds of shelters and the materials used in their construction. They make the required calculations and determine the protection coefficient of radiation shelters.

Students at teachers schools are given an assignment, in accordance with their future field of work, of compiling a civil defense class plan for the lower grades or for the 20-hour program. After discussing the plans in a class the military instructor grades them and points out the best methodological procedures contained therein. This thorough creative work helps the students not only to master civil defense information, but also to test themselves in the new role of teacher.

The special field-oriented training of students at medical schools also has its own specific features, which cover individual training topics in special tactical exercises conducted by the city or rayon medical service. In these exercises they perform the duties of medical detachments and nurses within medical reconnaissance groups, of functional OPM[first aid detachment] subsections and at hospitals in the countryside.

Some of the classes at agricultural tekhnikums are also conducted outside the classroom. Methods of preparing premises for livestock in situations of radioactive, chemical and bacteriological contamination are learned in the field, at livestock farms. The students learn methods of decontaminating areas, feed and water and of veterinary cleansing of the animals affected in the same manner, in practical exercises.

The program thus focuses precisely on effective training which produces results. The totally concrete knowledge and skills acquired in the classes must give the students a foundation for performing successfully as formation commanders.

Base (sponsoring) industrial enterprises are assigned an important role in the special field-oriented training at the educational institution. They have training centers or well-equipped training stations, which make it possible to conduct classes effectively and at a good methodological level. In addition, the military instructor can always obtain competent advice from an experienced worker with the civil defense staff or service.

Closer contacts with the national economic facilities are also beneficial to the military instructors in another way. They help the instructors to gain a better understanding of the specific nature of production and the specific features of civil defense for the given branch.

Experience has shown us that military instructors are incapable of orienting themselves with adequate ease in matters of special field-oriented training precisely because of their lack of understanding of the specific nature of the branch. For this reason they sometimes approach the presentation of this important division of the civil defense program in an overly simplified manner and base it on the general technical field, ignoring the peculiarities of "their own" branch. The poor training materials base also hinders the process markedly.

Inspections have shown that the training materials base at a number of secondary specialized educational institutions does not measure up to the requirements for special field-oriented training. Some of the military instructors did not have lesson plans for the special field-oriented subjects. Deficiencies of this kind were found at the Serdobsk Livestock Management Tekhnikum, the Tula Mechanics Tekhnikum, the Voroshilovgrad Construction Tekhnikum and the Lytkarino Experimental Machinery Tekhnikum. It is not surprising that those schools had a poor overall success rate in civil defense training. One could say that the way in which the special field-oriented training is handled is to some degree a yardstick of the overall level of civil defense instruction at a tekhnikum or school.

I shall describe one example as proof of this. The Penza Railroad School (K. Koronotov--director, and A. Afanas'yev--military instructor) was awarded the Certificate of Honor of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and the USSR Ministry of Railways for its well-organized civil defense training process

and for the extensive military-patriotic work performed there. When the military instructor conducts classes there, especially on the special field-oriented training subjects, he always keeps in mind the fact that his students are future railroad workers. The goal-orientation and concreteness which are sometimes lacking in other military instructors' classes make each of Comrade Afanas'yev's lessons truly interesting and instructive. This tekhnikum's training materials base could also be used as a model. Mock-ups, stands, posters, photographic displays and other visual training aids provide an adequately thorough picture of the specific nature of civil defense in rail transport.

The outstanding tekhnikums and schools use not only classes, but also various kinds of extracurricular activities--competitions, military sports games, quizzes and so forth--for perfecting the special field-oriented training of the students. Special tactical and comprehensive exercises conducted at national facilities contribute to this work. Various forms of propaganda--civil defense days, as an example--serve as an important means of training and indoctrination at a number of secondary specialized educational institutions.

Special or special field-oriented civil defense training for the students makes special demands of the military instructors. In connection with this we must not fail to mention the assemblies which are conducted in civil defense courses. They are held for purposes of providing answers to those very questions on the specific aspects of the branch, which come up for the military instructors in the process of teaching the special field-oriented subjects in the program. The specifics of organizing and conducting civil defense in various national economic branches and the most effective methodological procedures (especially for teaching ways of increasing functional stability, performing SNAVR[*rescue and emergency reconstruction work*] and conducting reconnaissance in areas of destruction)--these are the subjects which are of constant interest to this category of students in the courses. It is useful to call upon leading specialists of ministries and departments and of enterprises with related fields of specialization to serve as lecturers

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1981

11499
CSO: 1801/031

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

JAN. 12, 1982